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Abstract  
Instrumental Enrichment, an Intervention Program for Cognitive 
Modifiability, is a curricular package of methodology and materials 
designed to help teachers mediate in the learning experiences of pupils 
whose performance at school has been retarded by cultural deprivation. 
The originator of Instrumental Enrichment, Reuven Feuerstein, and the 
bulk of empirical research into his work, concentrates on the "thinking 
skills" aspect of how children process their perceptions of reality and 
takes little account of how they feel about those perceptions. 
Nonetheless, Feuerstein's theory seems to me to contain a blueprint for 
a more balanced approach to the curriculum, and in this thesis I seek 
to evaluate its potential for promoting affective and conative aspects 
of children's development as well as the cognitive aspect. 
My evaluation is limited to a study of the effects of Instrumental 
Enrichment on children's adjustment to school; although increased 
psychological integration, which I find in many cases where pupils rate 
their adjustment as having improved, is hopefully manifest both inside 
and outside the classroom. Indeed, I go so far as to say that 
implementation of Feuerstein's methodology constitutes a political 
force in favour of the sovereignty of the individual learner and 
democratic procedures in education. 
My first chapter is an attempt to furnish the reader with the 
theoretical background and terminology associated with Instrumental 
Enrichment. It is followed by a chapter which describes from a 
practitioner's perspective how Feuerstein's theory, especially his 
concept of the teacher as a mediator between children and their 
culture, translates into classroom tasks. The third chapter provides 
operational definitions of how the effects of Instrumental Enrichment 
were measured in the course of a two-year experiment on primary and 
secondary pupils in Buckinghamshire; it defines my use of the Child at 
School - a new behaviour schedule, the Repertory Grid Technique, and 
ability and attainment tests. 	 In the fourth chapter, I record and 
comment on the mean ratings and scores obtained by Buckinghamshire 
pupils; results are subjected to analysis of covariance. Finally, I 
infer some support for the hypothesis that Instrumental Enrichment can 
improve children's adjustment to school, and note the implications of 
this finding for policies on curriculum planning and teacher training. 
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THEORY AND TERMINOLOGY  
The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Education of 
Handicapped Children and Young People (Warnock, 1978), the 
subsequent White Paper (Secretary of State for Education and 
Science, 1980) and the Education Act 1981, have repudiated the 
assumption, implicit in previous legislation, that making 
appropriate provision for children with special educational needs 
entails placing them in a modified environment; instead, whenever 
practicable, ordinary schools are now the focus of provision and 
the emphasis is on modifying individuals rather than falling back 
on what has been called the passive acceptant approach: 
The passive acceptant approach, which  can be 
fundamentally humane, shapes such policies as placement 
in special homogeneously formed environments oriented 
toward the current level of functioning of the 
individual, reducing the nature and intensity of stimuli 
to conform to the apparent low capacity of the 
individual to respond to them, and structuring the 
environment in terms of types and levels of pressure in 
order to match the individual's limited adaptive 
response (Feuerstein and Jensen, 1980). 
Such an approach is no longer acceptable in a society which is 
committed, "not merely to tending and caring for its handicapped 
members, as a matter of charity, but to educating them, as a 
matter of right and to developing their potential to the full" 
(Warnock, 1978, p.7). Indeed, a sharp distinction between 
"handicapped" and "normal" children is hardly acceptable either, 
because for educational purposes children with special needs are 
located on a continuum of ability and categorising them should not 
be allowed to circumscribe their progress along that continuum. 
In practice, special educational provision entails giving some 
form of additional support, thereby affecting what is taught or 
how teaching is conducted, to help children overcome educational 
difficulties; 	 but the aim of special education is no different 
from the aim of education generally. The aim is twofold: 
first, to enlarge a child's knowledge, experience and 
imaginative understanding, and thus his awareness of 
moral values and capacity for enjoyment; and secondly, 
to enable him to enter the world after formal education 
is over as an active participant in society and a 
responsible contributor to it, capable of achieving as 
much independence as possible (Warnock, 1978, p.5). 
There is no question, in the light of the Warnock Report, of 
making provision that has been designed to do no more than match 
children's limited adaptive responses; 	 each child's range of 
responses must be enlarged, no matter how small the steps in this 
process are. Moreover, it is important for children to discern 
how much progress they have made, and it is in this connection 
that Her Majesty's Inspectorate have criticised many special 
educational units for their "excessive concentration on routine 
remedial reading and basic arithmetical work" and their excessive 
adherence to individual programmes which curtail children's 
opportunities for learning to cooperate and work with peers 
(Bolton, 1981). 
When children do not feel enhanced by the educational provision 
that has been made for them, they are at risk of becoming 
disaffected; 	 if they have been separated from their peers into 
the bargain, then the "adverse effects of isolation and 
segregation" 	 referred to in Educational Opportunites For All? 
(Fish, 1985, p.5) are likely to exacerbate their predicament to 
such an extent that it is tempting for all concerned to become 
preoccupied with manifestations of difficulty rather than dealing 
with needs and preparing for fulfilment. Circular 1/83, issued a 
little over a year after the Education Act 1981, cautioned against 
preoccupation with difficulties; it said, 
The main focus should be on the child himself rather 
than on his disability. The extent to which a learning 
difficulty hinders a child's development depends not 
only on the nature and severity of that difficulty, but 
also on the personal resources and attributes of the 
child, and on the help and support he receives at home 
and at school. 	 A child's special educational needs are 
thus related to his abilities as well as his 
disabilities, and to the nature of his interaction with 
his environment (Dept. of Education and Science, 31st 
January 1983, p.1). 
Spoon-feeding children with a "narrow curricular diet" (Bolton, 
1981) must give way, then, to an educative process which promotes 
interaction with the environment. This educative process must 
produce adaptability in children, because the environment is not 
static. 	 An active modificational approach is required in 
education to enable children to adjust to the everchanging 
conditions of life. It is not an approach that has to be invented 
from scratch, but it must be developed and more widely discovered; 
there are only a few teachers I cherish from my own childhood who 
in retrospect seemed to be "living fearlessly out of the heart of 
themselves, their feeling and striving fully integrated with their 
thinking and willing" (Dunlop, 1984, p. 110) and who prepared me 
for life in ways I can still appreciate. 
	 I suspect from my adult 
experience as an educator that many of the present generation of 
children would tell a similar story of precious few teachers 
putting pressure on them to enlarge their experience and 
imaginative understanding and all too many teachers being 
preoccupied with product oriented approaches concerned with 
notions of deficiency, competency, information acquisition and 
socialisation (Further Education Curriculum Review and Development 
Unit, 1980). 
So, what I want here is not so much an introduction to 
something new but more a theoretical point of entry to an active 
modificational approach. 	 If I tentatively accept Feuerstein's 
proposition that promoting a child's intellectual growth will 
increase her potential for successful adaptation, then 
Instrumental Enrichment, an Intervention Program for Cognitive 
Modifiability, along with Feuerstein's other works, might afford 
just such a point of entry. 
Cognitive modifiability is Feuerstein's label for a state of 
susceptibility to intellectual growth. 	 He holds that this state 
obtains when children have access to a rich array of stimuli 
together with the creative intervention of more experienced human 
beings (Weller and Craft, 1983, p.11). 	 I shall return later to 
Feuerstein's concept of creative intervention, which he calls 
"mediation," and explore how he aims to render children with 
learning difficulties, "retarded performers," more modifiable. I 
shall pay particular attention to how teacher-mediated learning 
experiences are meant to equip children with the tools for 
intellectual autonomy and self-esteem, and also to how learning 
experiences are bound up with the cultural contexts in which they 
take place. But first, let us take a closer look at the concept 
of cognitive modifiability and the perspective it offers on why 
children with learning difficulties are limited in their ability 
to adapt. 
Cognitive Modifiability  
To arrive at the concept of cognitive modifiability, Feuerstein 
had to discredit a tenet that was once a corner-stone of the 
empirical tradition; he had to demonstrate that perception could 
not be adequately explained in terms of passive reception, and 
that the mind was "furnished with active powers of creative 
conjecture without which the information provided by the senses 
would remain disorganised and chaotic" (J. Miller, 1983, p.10). 
Feuerstein's demonstrations emerge from his clinical work: I have 
attached the case history of "C" to the end of my thesis 
(Appendix 1). 	 "C" provides an elegant example of a profoundly 
handicapped young person with a glimmering of "intrinsic 
curiosity," in whom Feuerstein kindled powers of creative 
conjecture. 
"C," according to Feuerstein's analysis, was such a retarded 
performer in respect of his cognitve functioning that he did not 
have the prerequisites for adaptation; he seemed destined for a 
protected life in an environment where demands would be kept at a 
minimum. But what are the prerequisites for adaptation and why 
are they dependent on cognition? 	 Furthermore, how might 
experience of adaptation in its turn enrich an individual's 
cognitive development, so that the individual becomes more 
modifiable than he ever was? 
According to Vurpillot, an adapted human being must interpret all 
the information which is available before predicting what the 
outcome of the current situation would be if he did not intervene, 
in order to anticipate how it would change if he undertook one or 
another course of action, and to evaluate what consequences such 
outcomes would have for him. Adaptation implies, therefore, the 
conjoint involvement of multiple processes (trans. Gilham, 1976, 
p. 21). Vurpillot puts evaluation of the current situation under 
the heading of "perception," whereas the process of referring to 
previous situations and making conjectural models to display 
possible changes is assigned to internal "representation." She 
treats "memory" as an adaptive process too, because it allows 
observed relationships between sequences of events to be stored 
and thereby makes it possible for learning to be transferred as 
well as simply cumulated. 	 Finally, she says, "intelligence" is 
involved at the level of strategies and decisions when it is 
necessary to choose from amongst all the information available 
that which is relevant, and from amongst all the possible courses 
of action that course which it is preferable to adopt. What is 
interesting, as regards the first of the two questions I posed 
above, is that Vurpillot concludes from her deliberations that all 
of the processes which are prerequisites for adaptation are also 
components of cognition and none of them is completely independent 
of the others. 
Now that internal representation has been mentioned, this is a 
convenient juncture to note Feuerstein's recommendation that 
children should at least have reached the representational level 
of thinking and should preferably be towards the end of what 
Piaget called the period of concrete operations (Beard, 1969, 
Ch.3-Ch.6), which usually prevails until children are about eleven 
years old, before they are expected to use the instruments in his 
programme. It is a recommendation which raises a perennial 
question pertaining to the concept of cognitive modifiability: is 
there a ceiling, determined by some inherent immutableness, on how 
far certain children can go up the continuum of ability; 	 or is 
there no fixed limit to the extent to which cognitive structures 
built at a younger age can go on evolving into integral parts of 
more advanced structures? Rephrasing the question in 
Feuerstein's terminology, I should ask: is the human individual a 
closed system or an open system? 
Some educational writers are inclined to portray the child with 
learning difficulties as one who reaches a ceiling during the 
period of concrete operations: 
The final stage of "formal" operations, when his 
thinking can extend beyond the here and now to the 
possible and the hypothetical, to the potential rather 
than the real, will almost certainly never be reached by 
the slow learner. 	 If such children are given a 
curricular diet of formal, verbal, non-practical 
lessons, then, motivational factors apart, neither 
effective learning nor transfer is likely (Williams, 
1970, p.22). 
Not many of the teachers with whom I am acquainted would go along 
with Williams' closed system diagnosis and prescription without 
wanting to add qualifying remarks about the ubiquitous experience 
of occasionally observing children who make exceptional progress 
despite earlier indications to the contrary. Nevertheless, most 
of them seem to be fairly comfortable with the deficit model of 
remedial education, wherein their chief task is "plugging gaps." 
Only a few look deeper than the ordinary diagnostic level, where 
they are concerned with the absence of particular skills or gaps 
in knowledge, and search for more radical means of promoting the 
process of learning in their pupils. 	 It is not that the majority 
never bemoan the passive, dependent cogntive style of their slower 
learning pupils, but that they do not expect children with 
learning difficulties to become autonomous thinkers and therefore 
do not expect to find any means of diverting them from their 
current patterns of development. 
Feuerstein's expectations are far more ambitious. 	 He expects the 
child with learning difficulties to be vulnerable to all kinds of 
influences, because he regards human individuals as open systems. 
In particular, he expects the teaching of his intervention 
programme to make enduring changes in the child's cognitive 
structure which are not simply accelerated maturational 
transitions, nor specific to a given set of circumstances, but 
alterations to her manner of interacting with sources of 
information. Such changes will rarely come about by chance, since 
exposure to stimuli alone tends to produce islands of learning 
rather than a coherent set of alterations to the overall capacity 
to learn. 
So experience must be set in a meaningful context for a child to 
reach a state of cognitive modifiability; 	 it is mediation that 
facilitates "the generation of continuous growth by rendering the 
organism receptive and sensitive to internal and external sources 
of stimulation" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.9). 	 There is more to this 
than an axiom to the effect that well thought out teaching 
constructs a framework for learning. Feuerstein is arguing that 
once cognitive development has been sufficiently charged by 
enriching experiences of mediated learning, it has its own impetus 
and it pervades individuals, thereby preparing them for future 
encounters with their environment at the same time as adaptation 
to their current situation is under way. He explains his argument 
by analogy to a river, "whose stream not only determines the 
movement of its waters (content) but also carves the bed 
(structure) along which the waters flow" (1980 p. xvii). 	 But in 
what sense are the changes which mark a child's cognitive 
development structural changes? By attempting to answer this 
question, we may get the measure of just how ambitious 
Feuerstein's expectations are. 
I shall begin the attempt by quoting from an article which 
presents a definition of structure that is peculiar in its detail 
to Feuerstein and Jensen; they claim that rendering a person more 
modifiable entails making a change in that person's cognitive 
structure, 
inasmuch as it corresponds to the three characteristics 
of a structure, namely: (1) A strong relationship 
between the part and the whole. 	 That is, each 
experienced event will not have a restricted effect on 
the organism in the direction of a task-bound change, 
but will affect the totality of the organism and thereby 
better prepare him to adapt to new situations. 	 (2) A 
propensity to become involved in processes of change. 
Each newly acquired experience may undergo processes of 
transformation, thereby enlarging the existing schemata 
of the organism, making them ready for new experiences 
as they become constantly transformed through the double 
process of assimilation and accommodation. (3) Finally, 
a self-perpetuating, autoregulative quality of the 
process is made possible. Once the process is set into 
place by some external intervention or internally 
determined change, it is perpetuated and continues 
according to specific needs and the interaction of the 
organism with them. 
(Feuerstein and Jensen, 1980, p.407) 
Feuerstein uses the words "assimilation" and "accommodation" in 
the same way that Piaget does, which is what we should expect once 
we know that his early work of thirty years ago was inspired by 
"two great masters of the Genevan school, Professor Jean Piaget 
and Professor Andre Rey" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.xx). Hence, 
assimilation denotes the incorporation of new objects and 
experiences into existing schemata; whereas accommodation denotes 
the modification of schemata, as a result of new experiences 
having precipitated new cognitive structures. But Feuerstein 
imputes structural attributes to schemata in a way that goes 
beyond Piaget's conception of them as sequences of physical or 
mental acts (Beard, 1969, p.ix). For Feuerstein, it is not just 
schemata that are altered as assimilation and accommodation 
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combine to produce adaptation, it is the schematist himself who is 
modified. 	 Cognitive modifiability, then, is a state of 
susceptibility to intellectual growth wherein particular instances 
of adaptation have been transformed beyond inclusion in or 
extension of existing schemata to produce a mental infrastructure 
with its own dynamic and capable of sustaining the transfer of 
learning to new experiences. 
Let us return to the question about the sense in which cognitive 
changes are of a structural nature. We have now examined 
Feuerstein's definition of structure and how it contributes to his 
concept of cognitive modifiability. What we have not yet done is 
identify the parameters of cognition which are supposedly subject 
to structural change. This is such a formidable task that I have 
only tackled it on a highly selective basis in the experiment 
described later, concentrating on "level of efficiency" in so far 
as it is revealed by children's adjustment to school rather than 
on more specific parameters. However, it would be putting the 
cart before the horse to discuss the tenability of the 
theoretical position the task leads to before the task itself has 
been performed, so I shall turn directly to Feuerstein's model of 
how cognition may be analysed according to seven parameters. 
The Cognitive Map  
Feuerstein calls his model for analysing mental acts "the 
cognitive map" (1979, p.122; 	 1980, ch.5). 	 The cognitive map 
comprises the following parameters of analysis: 	 content, 
operations, modality, phase, level of complexity, level of 
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abstraction, and level of efficiency. 
	 I shall give a brief 
description of each of them. 
1. Content. Assessment of a child's cognitive functioning is 
often coloured by whether the child is familiar with the "universe 
of content" on which she is required to operate. Familiarity will 
depend largely on the priorities set by her culture, and the 
extent to which those priorities have fashioned her experiential 
background and her educational history. Failure to solve a 
problem may thus be due to lack of familiarity with the subject 
matter in hand rather than any underlying cognitive deficieny. 
2. Operations. 	 Operations are strategies for organising, 
transforming, manoeuvring and acting upon information. They seem 
to me to have a reciprocal relationship with schemata, serving as 
matrices and expressions of cognitve structure in turn, although 
traditionally, as Weller and Craft point out, "this area is deemed 
rather impervious to interpretation" (1983, p.15). 	 It is 
certainly difficult to get to grips with the operations parameter 
as a whole, but it is relatively easy to identify individual 
operations. 
Feuerstein took a piecemeal approach when selecting the materials 
he intended to infiltrate into children's cognitive operations, 
and several of the instruments in his Instrumental Enrichment 
programme are named after specific operations. This said, it 
should also be acknowledged that Feuerstein did not pretend 
that this piecemeal approach amounted to teasing out individual 
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operations in such a way that they could be dealt with in 
isolation. 	 Even in the first instrument, Organisation of Dots, 
the list of operations shows how much Feuerstein was aware of the 
intricate relationships between operations; it reads, 
"Organisation of the field with articulation and segregation; 
differentiation and segregation; 	 categorization; anticipation 
and representation; 	 inference; 	 induction and generalization" 
(1980, p.138). 
3. Modality. Modality refers to the language or medium of 
communication which is prominent in a learning transaction. In 
our repertoire we have verbal, numerical, symbolic, pictorial, 
diagrammatic and gestural modalities amongst others. If we can 
identify which of these had been adopted when a learning 
transaction aborts, we can experiment with an alternative 
modality. 	 Individuals may not be able to perform or learn with 
equal facility in different modalities (Weller and Craft, 1983, 
p.15). 	 In order to find the appropriate locus for intervention, 
educators must know whether a child's learning difficulties can be 
traced to weaknesses in certain modalities or whether there is a 
more fundamental cognitve deficiency affecting operations. 
4. Phase. Kendler asserts that all theories of thinking, "motor 
or central, behaviourist or phenomenological, dealing in the 
second-signal system or using computer models, postulate internal 
processes that intervene between the presentation of the problem 
and its solution, between the input and output, or between the 
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parameter which Feuerstein uses to reduce the web of internal 
processes to a few accessible routes. 
	 In problem solving, the 
route from input of data to output of a solution passes through a 
stage where data are elaborated by cognitive operations. 
Affective and motivational factors add another dimension to the 
route from input to output and preclude its being represented as a 
straightforward linear one. Elaboration is therefore a sort of 
cross—roads and it appears at the centre of the figure Feuerstein 
draws to represent its relationship to the input and output 
phases. 
Figure 1. Relationships among the three phases of the mental act 
(1980, p.75). 
Furthermore, elaboration is the crucial phase for educational 
intervention since, if a child is able to elaborate, she can 
"bypass the barriers obstructing the regular channels of input or 
output" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.75). The example of Helen Keller, 
who bypassed blindness, deafness and muteness to function 
cognitively at a level which allowed her to graduate cum laude from 
Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is the most famous in 
educational history (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1978, Micropaedia 
5). However, the barriers are not often as obvious as those which 
handicapped Helen Keller. 	 They can be insidious; 	 for instance, 
difficulties arising from a child's having selected information 
impulsively during the input phase can easily be mistaken for 
elaborational difficulties if testing is not diagnostic. 
Feuerstein finds that, 
The nature of the elaborational process in 
disadvantaged, low functioning adolescents is very often 
obscured by the presence of behavioral deficiences at 
the input and output levels. Failure to take into 
account these peripheral deficiencies contaminates our 
assessment processes and results in our frequent 
inability to realize that elaborational capacities are 
intact and appropriate and that failing responses are, 
in many instances, caused by the use of incorrect data 
or the incorrect expression of adequate elaborational 
functions. (1980, p.76) 
5. Level of Complexity. The complexity of a mental act depends 
on "the quantity and quality of units of information it contains" 
(1979, p.124). Weller and Craft substitute "the nature and amount 
of the information involved" for Feuerstein's wording, but I doubt 
the accuracy of their translation because in this context quality 
has a more precise meaning for Feuerstein: "The quality of the 
information is a function of its degree of novelty" (1979, p.124). 
6. Level of Abstraction. Feuerstein claims that a hierarchy of 
levels of abstraction can be established, using as a criterion 
the distance between each mental act and the objectives or events 
on which it operates. Direct operations on objects, such as in 
sorting activities, demand a low level of abstraction; whereas 
discerning relationships "between purely hypothetical 
propositions without reference to real or imagined objects or 
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events" demands a high level of abstraction (1979, p.124). 
7. 	 Level of Efficiency. A child's level of efficiency might not 
correspond to the capacity he has, according to the other six 
parameters, for grasping and elaborating problems. This is 
because, while efficiency is a function of the other parameters, 
it can be reduced by extraneous factors of a task-intrinsic or a 
task-extrinsic nature. 
I suggested, in my description of phase, that lack of motivation 
or disproportionate anxiety may disrupt a child's efficiency in 
performing a task. The child may have acquired the knowledge and 
skills necessary for the task, and yet he is distracted from 
making use of his preparation or too debilitated to do so. 
Here I should also like to suggest that while conative and 
affective factors can be defined as extraneous to cognitive 
factors, the nature of the interaction among factors is not 
restricted to one or two disrupting a third. 	 Interaction can be 
productive, resulting in compound factors such as the blend of 
intent and willpower Phillips calls "purposive striving" (in 
Dunlop 1984, p.107). 	 Indeed, it can be argued that interaction 
among conative, affective and cognitive factors produces the 
dynamics of development, or what Dunlop calls the "thrust out" 




and affective factors for promoting efficient 
functioning and concentrates instead on their 
Feuerstein has reservations about this argument, because he does 
not believe that all cognitive processes necessarily depend on a 
"purposeful and intentional orientation of the organism." He 
hesitatingly concedes that conative and affective factors are 
important in so far as "the organisational activity of the 
organism is, at least in its early stages, a product of a 
volitional, intentional and purposeful effort on the part of the 
individual" (1980, p.102). 
	 But he tends to neglect the potential 
deleterious properties. 	 It is a bias I regret, albeit that it 
facilitates his single—minded exposition of "the role of emotional 
factors in producing cultural deprivation and its detrimental 
effects on cognitive development" (1980, p.45). 
Perhaps Feuerstein would seem less ambiguous in his treatment of 
conative and affective factors if I were to detach emotion from 
them, in the way that Strasser does: 
emotion represents a sinking back, in the face of a good 
or evil presented as absolute, to the level of primary 
mechanisms indicated by the strong physiological 
disturbance expressive of the emotional state. 
Behaviour in the strict sense of the term disappears and 
elementary movement takes its place. 	 (trans. Wood, 
1977, p.31) 
Emotion, in the sense made technical by Strasser, "involves an 
abdication of the sovereignty of the human spirit and often leads 
to movements ill—adapted to the situation." Emotional action is 
therefore not intentional; it is an impulse "without a conscious 
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goal but with an awareness of the general possibility of being 
fulfilled" (Strasser, trans. Wood, 1977, p.28). The affective 
factors which Feuerstein credits with organisational activity, on 
the other hand, are characterised by their intentionality. 
Since "emotion" would usually be subsumed by "affective factors," 
it may be more convenient to adopt Strasser's stratification of 
feelings into pre-intentional, intentional and meta-intentional 
levels, when distinctions are required. These three levels of 
feeling relate to one another in the way that stages on a 
continuum do, as I have tried to indicate by the following 
examples: 	 at the pre-intentional level, the individual is 
disturbed by an emotion or feels unease; at the intentional 
level, she feels attracted to a source of gratification for 
herself; at the meta-intentional level, she experiences a "drive 
toward that which is beyond self," a passion charged with the 
power of conation and ready for creative expression (Lersch, in 
Strasser, trans. Wood, 1977, p.281). Progress from one stage to 
the next is not automatic; 	 it may be blocked. Feuerstein points 
out that while he can shift his focus from "cognitive dissonance" 
to "a feeling of compatibility" by inverting the concept, the 
practical transition from the pre-intentional to the intentional 
level is not always so simple: 
The definition of problems and the search for their 
solutions is strongly contingent upon the presence of a 
feeling of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and 
disequilibrium (Dewey, 1933; 	 Piaget, 1952), generated 
by the incompatibility or incompleteness of data in a 
given situation. A feeling of compatibility is derived 
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through the grasp of the relationships either between 
objects present, or between a given object or event and 
previously stored information. However, even if the 
problem is experienced and incompatibilities are felt 
and registered, a search for solution may still be 
lacking if no need to change the situation in order to 
restore the disrupted equilibrium is felt. (1980, 
p.95). 
What Feuerstein calls the "automatization" of behaviours, a 
process of familiarisation with universal components of tasks 
which leaves individuals free to concentrate on components 
requiring "vigilance," is the antidote for such blocking of the 
need to restore disrupted equilibrium. Because it encourages 
concentration on relevant details, it also helps develop efficient 
cognitive functioning. Before I discuss antidotes any further, 
though, I must describe a number of deficient cognitive functions 
besides blocking. 
The Inventory of Deficient Cognitive Functions  
I shall not describe all of the deficient cognitve functions 
Feuerstein describes; 	 his list, by his own admission, (1980, 
p.72), is neither definitive nor exhaustive, anyway. Instead, I 
shall pick out the details of a few key deficiencies which have a 
direct bearing on children's adjustment to school. For the 
remainder of Feuerstein's list of deficiencies, please refer to 
the separately published inventory attached to the end of my 
thesis (Appendix 2). 
While the cognitive map afforded us a means of analysing thinking, 
the inventory of deficient cognitive functions relates to and 
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helps us identify "the prerequisites of thinking" (Feuerstein, 
1980, p.72). 	 In so far as a checklist of the prerequisites of 
thinking can be said to anticipate a model of thinking, we can say 
that the inventory anticipates the map; 
	 but the inventory is not 
a model in its own right. At first appraisal, it is only an 
incomplete checklist to aid educators in their attempts to 
diagnose the reasons behind children's manifest levels of 
performance. Ultimately, however, the inventory is inextricably 
linked to the inception of the entire Instrumental Enrichment 
programme. Feuerstein developed the programme with the intention 
of fostering and correcting those cognitive functions that neglect 
had rendered deficient; 
	 moreover, he was determined that 
children's retarded performances should be attributed wherever 
possible to unmodified cognitive functions rather than petrified 
low intelligence: 
All too often, a child's failure to perform a given 
operation, whether in the classroom or test situation, 
is attributed either to a lack of knowledge of the 
principles involved in the operation or, even worse, to 
a low intelligence that precludes his understanding of 
the principles. What is over looked is that the 
deficiency may reside not in the operational level or 
inthe specific content of the child's thought processes 
but in the underlying functions upon which successful 
performance of cognitive operations depends. For 
example, underlying the operation of classification are 
a number of functions such as systematic and precise 
data gathering, the ability to deal with two or more 
sources of information simultaneously, and the necessity 
to compare the objects or events to be classified. 
Failure to correctly classify objects or events may 
either be caused by an inability to apply the logical 
operations governing classification or may result from 
deficiencies in the underlying functions that are 
presupposed in the operation. (1980, p.71). 
Let us now look beyond Feuerstein's example concerning the 
operation of classification, at key deficiencies which impede 
cognitive operations generally. 
"Narrowness of the mental field" is a deficiency which is 
characteristic of culturally deprived children. It is an 
impediment to conceptualised operational thinking because it 
drastically limits a child's capacity for assimilating and 
accommodating information. Memory is thus constricted; where 
there is a narrowness of the mental field, "there is a loss of 
fragments of previously acquired information once the individual 
changes the focus of his attention to other information derived 
from the same source" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.93). Feuerstein 
illustrates this aspect of the culturally deprived child's 
predicament by describing the "short blanket" phenomenon, wherein 
the child repeatedly uncovers her legs in order to cover her head 
and vice versa. 
Not surprisingly, children with a narrow mental field tend not to 
have faith in their memories. They feel more secure if there is an 
extrinsic locus of control which allows them to adopt a passive 
role in processing information, "which makes them dependent on 
what will happen to them rather than on what they can make happen 
to themselves and to others" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.94). In other 
words, these children consider themselves to be recipients rather 
than generators of information, and this in turn may act as a 
depressant on their self—esteem. Consequently, they fight shy of 
responsibility for their own learning and experience 
difficulties in adjusting to school. 
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Faced with children experiencing difficulties in adjusting to 
school, many teachers will exercise greater control than they 
would normally so as to pre-empt behaviour that is potentially 
distressing for the children or disruptive in terms of classroom 
management. Excessive control by teachers may in the long run 
remove the need from children to pause and consider what their 
priorities are. 
	
In recognition of this danger, each of 
Feuerstein's instruments has what is supposed to be a habit-
forming slogan on its cover: "Just a minute, let me think." 
By exhorting children to think, Feuerstein hoped to shift the 
emphasis in schools away from manipulating children and towards 
instilling in them a sensitivity to the sort of discipline which 
arises not from external forces but from the values intrinsic to 
an activity. Nash sought a similar shift in 1966, saying that 
schools must educate children to appraise social rules rationally 
and to submit themselves to the discipline inherent in valued 
activities because of their interest in those activities and not 
just because a teacher had succeeded in arousing them from "a 
pervading lethargy only by dramatic tricks or colourful gimmicks" 
(In Docking, 1980, p. 36). Feuerstein would agree with Nash that 
the disciplined child is one who has attained "an autonomous power 
of attention and interest," and he would further argue that the 
route to attaining such power is through mediated learning 
experience. 	 For him, 	 valued activities must not only be 
interesting, they must derive from a child's cultural heritage 
and broaden her mental field. As I assume Margaret Thatcher 
realised when she complained that schools were, "not teaching 
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children their heritage, not teaching them right from wrong," 
(Panorama, 17th February 1986) the disciplined child is a child 
who can tap her cultural heritage. For a child to be consistent 
in her judgements of what is right and what is wrong, she must 
transcend the narrowness of her mental field and actively engage 
with her culture: 
What is required is a change from a passive episodic 
grasp of reality to an active mode of interacting with 
the environment by operating on and transforming 
experiences and, thereby, detaching oneself from the 
constraints and limits imposed by the sheer sensorial 
perception of the world. (Feuerstein, 1980, p.103). 
"Episodic grasp of reality" is a key deficient cognitive function 
in its own right, although most of the deficiencies Feuerstein 
describes could be subsumed under its heading. 
	 It is epitomised 
by a lack of comparative behaviour in children, which confines 
their experience of events to seemingly unique and unconnected 
fragments set in the concrete here and now. Since the generation 
of information is contingent on individuals needing to evoke, 
compare, order and re—order objects and events that are remote in 
space and time, children with an episodic grasp of reality will 
feel perplexed if they are asked to identify relationships in 
their environment for themselves; a teacher's insistence on such 
children's becoming active generators of information, rather than 
passive recipients, is liable to cause distress or to provoke 
resistance at first. 
Few children have an entirely episodic grasp of reality, and even 
the most retarded performers exhibit a limited readiness to 
respond to incompatibilities and pick up hints that problems exist 
from time to time. The trouble is, they are often thwarted by 
another key deficient cognitive function, "impulsivity." The 
impulsive and unsystematic nature of their exploratory behaviour 
confounds their incipient problem solving: 
When presented with a number of cues that must be 
scanned, the individual's approach is so disorganised 
that he is unable to select those cues whose specific 
attributes make them relevant for a proper solution. 
(Feuerstein, 1980, p.77). 
Conceptual impulsivity during the input phase, then, is 
characterised by what Feuerstein calls a "probabalistic—
accidentalist" approach to whatever cue is offered (1980, p.79). 
It indicates that a child is unaware of her need for data in 
addition to the information she already has in hand, and it 
presages the use .of blurred, fragmentary and incomplete data. 
During the elaboration phase, impulsivity results in excessive use 
of trial and error where, instead of "internalized processes 
marked by a high degree of flexibility" being developed, an 
"unplanned externalized motor approach" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.105) 
or what a drama therapist might call "acting out" behaviour 
(Moreno, 1974) is adopted. Output will inevitably be distorted by 
impulsivity during the earlier phases of mental activity. 
Even if a child inhibits her impulsivity during the input and 
elaboration phases, impulsive output may yet displace her logical 
conclusions and prevent her from giving them immediate expression. 
In these circumstances, a "secondary impulse" (Strasser, 
trans. Wood, 1977, p.29) usurps the child's intentions and might 
produce bizarre results comparable with those produced by 
emotional disturbance at the pre-intentional level of feeling. 
This happens most often when output is expected in an immediate 
modality, such as speech, without sufficient rehearsal. 
	
If the 
child subsequently realises that her output was far from what she 
intended, her self-confidence will suffer. 	 After repeated 
failures, she is likely to feel reluctant about voicing solutions 
to problems and will not always reveal that she has answers on the 
tip of her tongue. 
Inconsistencies in a child's problem solving performance may 
provide an examiner with a wealth of differential knowledge about 
the child's cognitive functioning. Peak performances may indicate 
strengths, such as preferred modalities of output, whereas troughs 
in performance may indicate either weaknesses or interference from 
secondary impulses. Obversely, if a child's performance is 
consistently poor, she may be deficient in one or more of the 
fundamental cognitive functions. For example, "lack of, or 
impaired, interiorization" means that she will hardly be able to 
represent a future to herself and therefore she will seldom raise 
her performance to reach remote goals. 
Conventional psychometric test procedures obscure the 
inconsistencies in a child's problem solving performance by 
summarising scored responses in the form of a quotient, an index, 
a percentile, or an average. Indeed, it is often implied in test 
rubric that, 
failure on easier tasks makes success at more advanced 
levels not just improbable but also meaningless as a 
random aberration from the established level of 
performance. 
	
Viewed in this way, the episodic 
appearances of correct responses to more difficult 
questions (the "peaks of performance") are seen to be 
nonrepresentative of the individual's capacity. 
(Feuerstein, 1979, p.33) 
Feuerstein challenged this view, because it confuses a child's 
manifest level of functioning with her capacity for modifiability 
(1979, p.32; 	 1980, p.61). His challenge led to the development 
of the Learning Potential Assessment Device (LPAD), which is used 
in clinical settings to compare children's cognitive functioning 
after they have been taught how to perform on test materials with 
their cognitive functioning prior to intervention. 
The LPAD is not widely used outside clinical settings, because it 
has not emerged as a scaled battery of tests and it is unwieldy. 
Nonetheless, in so far as it facilitates a dynamic form of 
assessment that takes account of children's most modifiable and 
least predictable behaviours, it has an advantage over 
psychometric tests which only yield static measurements. Like the 
cognitive map and the inventory of deficient cognitive functions, 
the LPAD focuses on "the process of learning rather than its 
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product and, accordingly, on the qualitative rather than the 
quantitative dimensions of the individual's thought" (Feuerstein, 
1980, p.61). 	 In other words, the LPAD tests the extent to which 
children are instructible rather than how much they have been 
instructed in the past (Vygotsky, 1962). 
By testing, teaching and testing again, educators and 
psychologists can learn about the conditions which render a child 
more instructible; they can observe how she adapts to new 
situations more and more efficiently and they can infer from this 
that she has attained a state of cognitive modifiability. Knowing 
which conditions are likely to promote cognitive change does not 
amount to knowing how a child will change under certain 
conditions, however. This may not matter, so long as intervention 
helps the child who has hitherto been passive and listless to 
discover the energy she needs to play an active part in forming 
what Feuerstein and Jensen call the "trajectory" of her life 
course (May 1980, p.402). 	 Fletcher found a metaphor for this 
argument; he asked, "what if we tap a layer of gas instead of the 
oil we were drilling for? We can continue our exploration at 
deeper levels but, meanwhile, we will surely make use of the 
alternative source of energy we came upon first." 	 (In 
conversation, 17th March 1986). What does matter, though, is that 
we do not mistake Instrumental Enrichment for a "prescription for 
intervention" (Hobbs in Feuerstein, 1980, p.ix) which has a 
precise effect of a "cold, considered, cerebral" nature on 
children's adjustment to school (Griffiths, 1985, p.291). 
Feuerstein himself sometimes writes as if he has been misled by 
his own devices into believing that creative intervention in a 
child's learning experience can be reduced to what Griffiths calls 
a "means-end calculation" (1985, p.290). For instance, he states 
that the joint purpose of the cognitive map and the inventory of 
deficient cognitive functions is to explain cognitive behaviour 
"by analysing its components, and locating and interpreting any 
weaknesses that may occur" (1980, p.113). 	 In doing so, he 
overplays the empirical evidence gathered from his work with the 
LPAD and isolates thinking from feeling. Consequently, he risks 
alienating British educationalists on two counts: 
	 for one thing, 
the view expressed in a Southern Examinations Group booklet on the 
new GCSE examination, "that we know little if anything about the 
way in which children think, " (Burke, December 1985) is widely 
held; and for another, Griffiths' assertion that "human 
intelligence is not divided into the hard, calculating scientific 
part and the soft, expressive artistic part," (1985, p.291) has 
become an 	 influential tenet in many secondary schools' 
reappraisals of divisions in the curriculum. Primary schools 
already have a long history of recognising that thinking and 
feeling are interrelated and of reflecting this recognition in the 
way they organise their pupils' learning experiences. 
An effective intervention programme for cognitive modifiability 
must harness the goal-oriented and organising properties of 
feelings. 	 If Instrumental Enrichment modifies children's 
cognitive make-up, it does so in the presence of feelings that 
only individual children can know and experience directly. We can 
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guess at children's probable intentions, and the rational 
viewpoints they hold, from the feelings they express. But we must 
remember that what children say may only be the tip of the iceberg 
in respect of their cognitive functioning, and we can expect 
Feuerstein's quest to locate and interpret cognitive deficiencies 
to founder on hidden obstacles occasionally. 
Recent hypotheses about the human brain's functioning have not 
produced an alternative framework for intervention against which 
we might judge Feuerstein's programme for promoting cognitive 
development. The commonest hypothesis of the early nineteen—
eighties posits a loose federation of modules concerned with 
perception and behavioural concert, yielding information to a more 
central system responsible for collation and integration. Of the 
more central system Jerome Fodor, Professor of Pyscholinguistics 
and Philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says, 
I suppose that that's the kind of system that mediates 
problem solving and higher cognitive processing at 
large. I have no idea how that works, nor am I 
convinced that the currently available theoretical and 
experimental techniques are very likely to throw much 
light on that question. (ed. J. Miller, 1983, p.98). 
So, is Instrumental Enrichment wildly beyond the state of the 
science as far as cognitive development psychology is concerned? 
And even if it is not, can retarded children's learning about 
their own thought processes help them to think? Fodor is of the 
opinion that most thought processes are inaccessible, in which 
case any programme addressed to them is likely to be a shot in the 
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dark; there is no biological need for massive introspectability, 
convenient as it might have been for educationalists and 
psychologists. Nevertheless, there are a few things about thought 
which do seem to have been reported with some accuracy and Fodor 
concedes, 
It may be that what you get out of introspectability is 
the possibility of conscious correction. Insofar as one 
can look at one's thought processes, they're sensitive 
to instruction and re-examination and self-criticism. 
(ed. J. Miller, 1983, p.94). 
This concession falls short of Feuerstein's aim toward a 
cultivated sort of self-correction faculty which would ultimately 
be exercised spontaneously, without its having to enter a child's 
consciousness. However it corresponds to my own observations of 
how children's spontaineity initially appears to be impeded by 
Instrumental Enrichment, because the programme heightens 
individuals' levels of self-directed attention or "objective self-
awareness" (Eiser, 1980, p.9). 
Too little is known about the languages of thought, or the 
mechanics involved in the human brain's functioning, for anyone to 
say whether Feuerstein's instruments are intrinsically valuable 
for helping a retarded child to correct herself unconsciously. 
With regard to teaching conscious self-correction, though, 
Feuerstein gives a plausible account of how the Instrumental 
Enrichment programme counteracts impulsivity by introducing 
planning behaviour to children, step by step. He says that while 
the steps are being learnt, there is a concomitant change in 
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"conceptual tempo" which results in children's adopting a more 
ponderous "cognitive style" (1980, p.265). 
	 But it does not 
necessarily follow that, once planning and synthesizing behaviours 
have been instilled or cultivated, they will be available to 
children for spontaneous recall when fresh encounters with the 
environment demand them. As Brennan reminds us in Curricular 
Needs of Slow Learners (1980, p. 155), children who find learning 
a frustrating and difficult process "do not easily acquire 
insight, relate different aspects of learning or generalise 
established learning in new situations." 
Perhaps feelings make a considerable difference to the 
transferability of learning. When a teacher uses Feuerstein's 
instruments in a direct attempt, of the means-end calculation 
sort, to change a child's cognitive structure, I should expect any 
increase in the child's modifiability to be allied to a side-
effect whereby the child has come to feel more positively about 
herself as somebody who can make use of what she has learnt. By 
dint of placing materials designated as "tools for thinking" at a 
child's disposal, the teacher imparts confidence in the child's 
potential and esteem for her as an active learner. It is an 
approach which contrasts with the behaviour modification 
techniques derived from learning theory psychologists. While the 
latter seek to manipulate children into making pre-determined 
changes in their behaviour, the Instumental Enrichment route to 
cognitive modifiability entails a relationship between teacher and 
pupils which is analogous to the relationship between a master- 
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craftsman and his apprentices: the tools of the craft are not 
withheld for the use of the initiated alone, but are shared 
components in a collaborative learning exercise which may result 
in developments that surpass those anticipated. 
However, children do not have the wealth of experience and 
knowledge a master-craftsman can bring to bear on his problem-
solving. Feelings might enhance the transferability of learning 
by serving as synergists to thinking, and introspection might 
foster self-correction, but children also need a reservoir of 
information to draw from. Even the most willing and insightful 
nine-year-old child will barely have begun to tap her cultural 
inheritance and learn from others' experience as well as her own, 
which is probably another reason for Feuerstein's lower age limit 
as regards when the Instrumental Enrichment programme should be 
started: 
One may use Henri Bergson's illustration (1919) 
describing the relationship between past and future as 
similar to the relationship betwen the taut bowstring 
and the distance of the arrow's trajectory. The more 
taut the string, the further the arrow is projected; the 
more remote the past to which an individual can refer, 
the further he can project himself into the future, 
planning and working constructively toward it. 
(Feuerstein, 1980, p.30) 
But some children arrive at school with only the most tenuous of 
references to the past and correspondingly little aptitude for 
planning and working toward their futures. Hence, they are ill-
prepared "to relate specific events to a broader system of meaning 
and purpose" (Feuertein, 1980, p.44) and they must struggle from 
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one episode in their lives to the next, unable to make sense of 
the rules others expect them to follow. Feuerstein calls the 
symptomatology of these children "cultural deprivation." He uses 
this label ambiguously, as Wolfe Mays has pointed out (1985, 
p.155), sometimes treating the notion of cultural or intellectual 
deprivation synonymously with mental handicap without commiting 
himself to a position on the inevitable question of how much 
nature sets the scene for nurture. I shall therefore look more 
closely at what cultural deprivation might mean. 
Cultural Deprivation  
Cultural deprivation not only stunts the acquistion of information 
and skills but also "the development of the prerequisite cognitive 
schemata to enable an individual to derive maximum benefit from 
direct exposure to sources of stimulation" (Feuerstein, 1980, 
p.19). Geertz goes so far as to say that the human brain is 
"dependent upon culture; that it probably could not exist and that 
we could not function outside of culture" (in J. Miller, 1983, 
p.208). 
	
The most plausible explanation I know for these 
assertions runs as follows: 
practical and social knowledge, the rules of proper 
action, the actual processes of thought, might not be in 
an individual's possession at all. All these things 
might be properties of the social—collective of the 
human group. 	 In so far as the group has a social 
structure, so does the system of rules, so does the body 
of knowledge. (Harre in J. Miller, 1983, p.165). 
The rules of cognitive development, according to Harre, are 
"cultural artefacts" (in J. Miller, 1983, p.163). While the 
33 
fundamental cognitive processes of man, "the kinds of thinking 
your brain makes possible, both peripherally and centrally, are 
essentially the same the world over" (Geertz in J. Miller, 1983, 
p.201; Cf Gardner, 1983, p.319, on universal "raw intellectual 
competences"), different cultures mobilise them in different ways 
to produce reasoning and sensitivity to information in individuals 
as befits their location in the social structure and their alloted 
"right to display certain pieces of knowledge" (Harre in J. 
Miller, 1983, p.165). 
Although Feuerstein is at pains to distinguish cultural difference 
from cultural deprivation, he identifies children who have been 
transplanted into cultures radically different from their own as 
being particuarly at risk of sustaining cognitive deficiencies on 
account of their not knowing the rules necessary for becoming 
"modified by direct encounters with the new culture" (1980, p.41). 
He sees culturally different children as needing compensation for 
the loss of continuity or constancy they have experienced, lest 
they degenerate into "social pathological" modes of behaviour or 
otherwise become victims of cultural deprivation. For him, 
compensation should take the form of "cultural transmission both 
in the home and at school" (Feuerstein and Hoffman, 1982, p.61). 
The Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from 
Ethnic Minority Groups, under the chairmanship of Lord Swann, saw 
the practice of teaching children their culture in a different 
light: 
The role of education cannot be and cannot be expected 
to be to reinforce the values, beliefs and cultural 
identity which each child brings to school - indeed such 
an education would surely be as rooted in one culture as 
much of the traditional Anglo-centric curriculum is at 
present. (Swann, 1985, 2.5). 
The Committee spurned the idea of cultural preservation in favour 
of recognising that "all cultures are dynamic," but it did go on 
to suggest a policy to counter cultural deprivation: 
We would instead wish to see schools encouraging the 
cultural development of all their pupils, both in terms 
of helping them to gain confidence in their own 
cultural identities while learning to respect 	 the 
identities of other groups as equally valid in their own 
right. (Swann, 1985, 2.5). 
It is a commonsensical policy, but children who have already 
become disaffected would most likely remain hesitant about 
trusting their schools' encouragement (Evans, 
	 1981), 	 perhaps 
suspecting that they were being offered "another brick in the 
wall" (Pink Floyd song, 1982) which protects the status quo and 
restricts their scope for self-determination. 
	 Feuerstein's 
message for these children is that rejecting cultural imposition 
from your teachers is like cutting off your nose to spite your 
face; you can use the "bricks" of culture to build a foundation 
for self-determination rather than a containing wall. 
	 His 
argument is that, in order "to modify oneself, to free oneself by 
one's own autonomous decision and volitional act - one must have 
previously had the benefit of cultural transmission." Conversely, 
one's capacity to choose is reduced by cultural deprivation 
(Feuerstein and Hoffman, 1982, p.61). Teachers need have no 
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qualms about contributing judiciously to their pupils' cultural 
make—up, then; even if Godber's comments, on the price many 
pupils currently pay for accepting the curriculum, give them pause 
for thought: 
The street level culture is held back, in order for you 
to aspire 	  
As soon as you start doing an "0" level, you are 
filtered through somebody else's culture. 
	 (South Bank 
Show, 20.4.86) 
Perhaps the price of an advantageous location in the social 
structure, and the number of disaffected pupils, will go down if 
there comes a time when the vision the Schools Council submitted 
to Lord Swann becomes a reality: 
Whatever the make—up of the locality, the pupils or the 
staff, however homogeneous or heterogeneous, the 
interplay of cultures and the world form the backdrop 
against which we act out our lives, and must be 
represented fully and compulsively in every facet of the 
curriculum. A curriculum that is not multicultural 
would prepare pupils for an unreal society and world; 
and involve them in a relearning process outside school:. 
it would be an anachronism and an irrelevance since it 
would fail to prepare pupils for the real world. (Swann, 
1985, 6.2.1.). 
Meanwhile, how can children be helped to overcome cultural 
deprivation and to become more modifiable? For Feuerstein, the 
difference between a child who is readily modifiable and a child 
who has the "inadequate cognitive development syndrome of cultural 
deprivation" (1980, p.18) is chiefly determined by the amount and 
quality of mediated learning experience each child has had. 
	
In 
Feuerstein's scheme of things, genetic endowment and organic 
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malfunction, together with cultural difference and several other 
"distal etiological factors," are no more than remote background 
influences on whether a child will be culturally deprived in 
comparison with the ascendancy of mediated learning experience 
(see "Distal and proximal etiologies of differential cognitive 
development," Appendix 3.). 
Feuerstein does of course recognise that neurophysiological and 
neurochemical factors produce different thresholds to stimulation 
in children, but he sees these constitutional factors as barriers 
to mediated learning experience rather than as inherent limits to 
intellectual growth. 	 This is why he says the significance of 
mental handicap is best understood in terms of how much it 
deprives a child of cultural input and the opportunity to 
elaborate on data. For example, he has the following to say about 
children with Down's syndrome: 
Certainly, the hypotonicity of the children produces a 
considerable delay in their ability to seek out 
stimulation, which, together with their general slowness 
in behaviour and development, produces a restricted 
environmental input. Even the available stimulation may 
be only partially registered if it does not reach the 
amplitude, intensity, and frequency necessary to 
penetrate the barriers present in these children. Thus, 
it is reasonable to assume that much of the extero- and 
proprioceptive stimulation that is actually absorbed by 
the system is of a diluted quality and is insufficient 
to produce modification. Unless otherwise instructed, 
parents of Down's syndrome children tend to provide 
these children with less stimulation than that which 
their normal children receive, and, in so doing, they 
inadvertantly produce even greater deprivation. 	 (1980, 
p.54). 
The presence of a mediator, somebody who intentionally frames 
filters and schedules stimuli, is the critical factor in a child's 
learning to transcend her immediate concerns and reach out for her 
cultural heritage. 	 It is not necessary for either of the parties 
participating in the mediating process to "formulate the rationale 
or specific intention" underlying their interaction (Feuerstein, 
1980, p.22); so, neither of them is tied to any preconceived 
commitment, except that the mediator will lead the child to 
venture beyond the here and now, in space and time. 
	 Such an 
open-ended model of educational exchange will not allow us to pre-
judge the learning potential of children according to expectations 
associated with certain types of handicap or the aetiology of 
their difficulties. This is the reason for Feuerstein's broad use 
of "cultural deprivation," and it is also my own reason for using 
labels loosely and interchangeably where retarded performers are 
concerned. 
What matters in practice is that the amount of time a child must 
spend with professional mediators should be judged, "by relating 
specific aspects of a pupil's learning difficulties to the 
teaching of an appropriate curriculum" (Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate, 1985 draft copy of an extract of some of the advice 
concerning the revision of government Circular 4/73 relating to 
staffing for pupils with special educational needs on statements). 
This concept of a child's entitlement to teacher time is not meant 
to translate directly into the amount of time a pupil has in a 
one-to-one situation with a specialist teacher, but it represents 
a step forward from simply specifying teacher-pupil ratios. If it 
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is to be included in guidelines or regulations for local education 
authorities, as advice at the time of writing suggests, then some 
of the credit is surely attributable to Feuerstein's presentation 
of teachers as mediators and the criticality of mediated learning 
experience. My next chapter will deal more with how the concept 
of teachers as mediators translates into classroom practice. 
A PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE  
I have taken my pursuit of Feuerstein's theory almost as far as I 
intend to for the time being. 
	 Now I want to explore the 
Instrumental Enrichment programme from a practitioner's 
perspective. 	 My first step in this direction might have been to 
analyse and describe Feurerstein's classroom materials, but he 
himself anatomises all fifteen instruments in a lengthy 
descriptive chapter (1980, Ch.7) and in the Teacher's Guides which 
complement the five hundred pages of paper and pencil exercises 
for distribution to pupils (sample pages attached as Appendix 4). 
So, rather than superfluously stripping the programme down to its 
bare bones, my purpose here is to concentrate on how the 
articulation of its bones affects flesh and blood; I want to deal 
with the experiential significance of what is meant to happen as a 
result of intervention for cognitive modifiability. 
Let me begin by extending the anatomical metaphor a little, to say 
that although the bones of Instrumental Enrichment constitute a 
framework for mediated learning experience, they can become sites 
of stiffness and inflammation, just as in real joints seized by 
arthritis, if they are not adequately lubricated by the synovia of 
human exchange. 	 The extent to which artificial lubrication, in 
the form of classroom techniques, can be substituted for heartfelt 
human exchange, is logically the extent to which Feuerstein's 
programme of intervention is teacherproof. But this equation 
misses an important point: 	 Instrumental Enrichment was designed 
to stimulate teachers' need for involvement in children's 
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cognitive development (Feuerstein, 18th July 1985, lecture at 
Nottingham University), and treating Feuerstein's instruments as 
if they were a set of teacherproof intellectual levers would not 
reveal their intended potential. 
Intervention to modify children's cognitive make—up demands both 
painstaking organisation and boundless spontaneity from the 
teacher. 	 Organisation, because the teacher's most obvious 
contribution toward inducing structural change is the order he 
brings to children's perceptions of their experiences. 
Spontaneity, because, even if each child's profile could be known 
fully in respect of the seven parameters of the cognitive map, in 
practice it is mercurial persons and not profiles who present 
challenges in the classroom. 
Intervention to promote cognitive modifiability and intellectual 
growth not only demands a daunting level of personal involvement 
and professional preparation from teachers but also takes them 
beyond the limits of what they know how to teach. 	 In these 
circumstances, when it is no longer possible to talk confidently 
about teaching cognitive skills, it may be helpful for us to focus 
instead on trying to create optimum conditions for children to 
learn by a process Polanyi has called "tacit knowing." Tacit 
knowing is, 
an act of indwelling by which we gain access to new 
meaning. When exercising a skill, we literally dwell in 
the innumerable muscular acts which contribute to its 
purpose, a purpose which constitutes their joint 
meaning. (Polanyi, 1971, p.160) 
Hansen posits that abilities as diverse as reading and swimming 
are acquired "tacitly" (1985, p.2). Could it be that the 
rudiments of cognitive modifiability are acquired by the same 
process? It is an attractive explanation since, as Polanyi claims 
for the theory of tacit knowing, 
It bridges the gap between the ."I — It" and the "I —
Thou" by rooting them both in the subject's "I — Me" 
awareness of his own body, which represents the highest 
degree of indwelling. (1971, p.160) 
If I accept tacit knowing as an appropriate way of conceiving of 
learning that is beyond the limits of what I can teach explicitly, 
this confers a responsibility on me as a teacher for what I convey 
implicitly to children. 	 My attitude, for example, is liable to 
up—stage a feebly delivered message. Faced with ambiguity of this 
sort, children might well respond as Buber did when he asked, 
How can I hear what you are saying, when what you are is 
drumming in my ears? (In Gibson, 1983, p.58) 
Without integrity, the teacher becomes a mere transmitter rather 
than a mediator between his pupils and their culture. 	 Reason 
becomes dissociated from feeling and there is a danger that, 
Means take precedence over ends, indeed, become ends as 
details of skills; 	 methods, techniques and measurement 
replace concern for meaning, interpretation and purpose. 
(Gibson, 1983, p.54) 
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Gibson attributes this bleak scenario to what he calls 
"instrumental rationality," a philosophy which ignores the part 
feelings play in choosing ends whilst it emphasises the dominance 
of reason in selecting means to achieve those ends (Gibson, 
1983,p.55). Were it not for Feuerstein's concepts of the teacher 
as mediator and the pupil as active participant in learning 
experiences, Instrumental Enrichment might at first glance be 
mistaken for a product of instrumental rationality designed to do 
little more than help teachers isolate cognitive operations as 
"entities that can be taught" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.122). 
Feuerstein's instruments were in fact produced to succeed "a set 
of paradigms for teaching cognitive processes by means of a 
language-based program," a scheme which had proved disappointing 
because "teachers' capability of turning the paradigms into a 
systematic and sustained sequence of exercises was limited, and 
therefore the exercises were of no real meaning for the masses of 
children in need of a steady and continuous systematic 
intervention program" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.122). Feuerstein 
blames his own naivety for not having anticipated earlier that 
teachers who displayed a talent for enshrining their thinking in a 
curriculum would not necessarily be orientated to fostering 
operational thinking in children. Trials lasting more than two 
decades, with Instrumental Enrichment gradually approaching its 
present form, have subsequently led him to conclude that, 
Achieving the proper orientation requires special 
training and constant use and application. (1980, 
p.122) 
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My own formal training was spread over two years and amounted to 
three weeks of intensive instruction, including a few days from 
Feuerstein himself. 	 It changed my orientation in two respects. 
First, it made me more aware of how particular cognitive 
operations contribute to the heuristics in children's lives and 
how interference from deficient cognitive functions can easily be 
mistaken for an immutable lack of operational capacity. Secondly, 
it helped me phenomenise that "quality of interaction between 
mediator and child" (Feuerstein, 19th July 1985, lecture at 
Nottingham University) which effective educational intervention so 
often seems to hinge upon. The first change inevitably informs my 
diagnostic and prescriptive practices, but it is the second change 
which resolves my conduct in the classroom into specific tasks. 
Feuerstein's tasks for the teacher who wants to mediate in 
children's learning experience are as follows: 
	 communicating 
intentionality, negotiating meanings, fostering transcendence, 
instilling a feeling of competence, interpreting achievements, 
establishing psychological differentiation, encouraging sharing 
behaviour and reciprocity, issuing challenges and setting goals. 
I shall adopt them as headings, under which I shall attempt to 
further my exploration of what teaching Instrumental Enrichment 
entails. 
Communicating Intentionality  
Intentionality is a state of purposefulness which affects both 
teacher and pupils, and binds them in a reciprocal relationship. 
Feuerstein's interest in this state stems from his belief that 
children respond best to a teacher who clearly feels something is 
worth saying or demonstrating and who harbours confidence in their 
fitness to learn about it (18th July 1985, lecture at Nottingham 
University). Moreover, it is not just that children should see 
themselves as fitting targets for what their teacher intends; 
intentionality offers insight into why he intends it. 
	 Before 
children can gain such insight, however, their teacher must 
communicate intentionality. 
	 He can either communicate it subtly, 
by hints and gestures, or openly, by giving an exposition of a 
lesson's rationale. 
Communicating intentionality is always an intricate task for the 
teacher, whether it is done subtly or overtly, because its thrust 
is like that of a double—edged sword: 	 one edge impinges upon 
pupils, by making them aware of their teacher's view of their 
needs; 	 the other edge exposes what the teacher intends to do 
about meeting pupils' needs, thereby yielding an opportunity for 
negotiation and alterations to the programme of work ahead. 	 This 
opportunity is missing when a teacher unilaterally derives 
objectives from undisclosed aims and then attempts to make pupils 
submit to the discipline required for executing those objectives. 
Nonetheless, Feuerstein does not advocate that the teacher ought 
to totally eschew making children execute his objectives if they 
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are children who have failed to realise the virtue of his 
objectives for themselves. 	 Perhaps the dual effect attributed to 
intentionality could also be seen as a reflection of ambivalence 
on Feuerstein's part toward controlling children's learning. 
Instrumental Enrichment was designed as an intervention programme 
and not as a vehicle for the more radical forms of collaborative 
learning (described in Docking, 1980), but it was also designed to 
take account of Feuerstein's respect for children's feedback in 
the classroom. Hence, Feuerstein wanted intentionality to satisfy 
two apparently conflicting conditions: the teacher must convince 
his pupils of the importance he attaches to whatever it is that he 
wants them to learn (1980, p.27), yet he must not let his 
intentness overwhelm them and forestall their putting forward 
priorities of their own (1980, p.3). These conditions are not 
juxtaposed by Feuerstein himself; he treats them as steps in a 
sequence, wherein teaching from conviction precedes encouraging 
pupils to take learning initiatives (Feuerstein and Hoffman, 1982, 
p.61). 	 The sequence starts with the teacher's eliciting 
particular behaviours by means of precise forms of intervention, 
and ends with children's feeling supported enough to burgeon 
intellectually in directions of their own choosing. 
In reality, the Instrumental Enrichment teacher begins to nurture 
an autonomous state of susceptibility to intellectual growth in 
his pupils as soon as he takes control of their thinking skills 
curriculum. 	 Cognitive modifiability is contingent on children's 
having both the scope and the ability to initiate changes 
(Feuerstein, 1980, p.3). The teacher's intentionality lends 
direction to children's learning; 	 communicating intentionality 
not only reveals a commitment to certain fixed objectives, but 
also transfers something of the volitive force which bears those 
objectives. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon might be 
that, by giving children insight into the purpose underlying a 
lesson, the teacher bestows some of his status on them. 	 In so 
doing, the teacher gives his pupils a sign that it is legitimate 
for them to become active participants in the lesson rather than 
passive recipients. 	 As Wall said in 1965 (see Hunter—Grundin, 
1985, p.86), education should be marked by the attainment of such 
signs of "increasingly complex intellectual independences." 
Negotiating Meaning  
Intellectual independences reside in language, "experience 
expressed being experience possessed" (Creber, 1972, p.31). I use 
the term "language" to denote "a purely human and non—instinctive 
method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires, by means of a 
system of voluntarily produced symbols" (Sapir, 1921, in 
Wilkinson, 1971, p.I4). If children frequently find it difficult 
to discern the message encoded in the language their teacher 
produces, they are likely to retreat from active participation in 
lessons. The teacher's intentionality is threatening unless 
children can trust that they have understood its meaning for 
them. Moreover, 
the damage caused by a teacher's incomprehensibility is 
to be measured not in terms of particular meaning lost, 
but of the cumulative effect of such experiences on the 
child's attitude to learning. 	 The real danger is that 
we may so condition him that he learns to accept 
his incomprehension. (Creber, 1972, p.30) 
Feuerstein's solution for ensuring that the language of 
intentionality is comprehensible is to instruct the teacher to 
make his pupils party to negotiating meanings (19th July 1985, 
lecture Nottingham University). 	 The teacher's task, then, is 
to help pupils create a mediating system wherein meanings are 
mutual and trust is inherent; they do not have to start from 
scratch, yet their situation still bears some resemblance to that 
of fellow workers who had to create language in the ancient times 
referred to by Vygotsky: 
Rational, intentional conveying of experience and 
thought to others requires a mediating system, the 
prototype of which is human speech born of the need of 
intercourse during work. 	 (1962, reprinted in De Cecco, 
1969, p.59) 
Feuerstein does not assume that negotiating meanings and creating 
a system of mediation are innate behaviours in children, but that 
they are natural social developments. The need for communication 
is cultivated by, 
the verbal community that says, "Why did you do that?" 
"What are you going to do next?" Consciousness is 
imposed on the unconscious, rather than the unconscious 
being produced by driving conscious material to the 
repressed depths. (Skinner, in Cohen, 1977, p.281) 
Educationalists may worry "that not all pupils in schools would 
want or indeed be mature enough, to negotiate sensibly; that 
extensive negotiations and discussions could be time—consuming; 
that committee decisions were not always the best ones and that 
there was a distinction to be made between the knowledge and 
responsiblilities of the adult and those of the child or young 
person" (Schools Council seminar on Disruptive Pupils, September 
1980, ed. Evans, 1981, p.24). 	 Yet, in respect of classroom 
language development, the teacher may face a choice between 
negotiating meanings with pupils and reducing them "to silence or 
to a subversive retreat into their own language" (Creber, 1972, 
p.22). 
The negotiation of meaning makes an obvious contribution to what 
Rosenshine called "a climate of involvement" in the classroom. 
Given such a climate, Rosenshine predicted that pupils would feel 
better adjusted and that their attitudes toward one another, 
toward the teacher and toward learning would be more conducive to 
the realisation of educational aims and objectives than would 
otherwise have been the case (1971, in Kellmer Pringle, 1975, 
p.39). I shall be describing how my evaluation of Instrumental 
Enrichment was based on a somewhat similar hypothesis in my next 
of my inference 
be at least as 
respect of their 
chapter; so I shall only make a brief note here 
from Rosenshine that pre—existent attitudes can 
powerful as the intentionality of the moment, in 
influence upon pupils' willingness to try and 
meanings with their teacher. 
arrive at consensual 
Unlike emotions, which have an evanescent quality, attitudes can 
be formulated and stored. Socially or culturally acquired 
attitudes are generally formulated according to identifiable sets 
of values, whereas inborn attitudes are attributable to 
psychophysical constancies known collectively as "temperament." 
Acquired attitudes can persist indefinitely, just like inborn 
attitudes, once they have been stored in an individual's 
"affective memory" (Yarlott, 1972, p.59ff). Whenever the 
individual makes an intuitive appraisal of her circumstances, her 
view is coloured by a combination of acquired and inborn attitudes 
unknowingly brought forward from her affective memory. 
If we conceive of pupils' disaffection in terms of the 
embitterment of their affective memories, then we will not want a 
teacher's attempts to dismantle mistrustful attitudes curtailed on 
the grounds that they are time-consuming. Time must be found 
because, so long as barriers to cognitive modifiability are left 
in place, we have stalemate in the classroom. By negotiating 
meanings, the teacher can at least minimise the risk of stirring 
his pupils' affective memories and reviving unpleasant feelings 
associated with experiences of incomprehension. Shared language 
is the social means of thought (Luria and Yudovich, 1959); 	 and, 
unless the teacher ensures that pupils are provided with a clean 
set of verbal tools, the transfer of thinking skills will be in 
jeopardy. 
Whilst Feuerstein's original paradigms for teaching concentrated 
on verbal tools for thinking, as was consistent with Vygotsky's 
assertion that "human mental development has its source in the 
verbal communication between child and adult" (1962, in Creber, 
1972, p.36), the pre-eminence of verbal components in mediated 
learning experience is less pronounced in the later theory of 
Instrumental Enrichment: 
Whenever such verbal tools are missing, they may be 
substituted for by intonation, mimicry, gestures, and 
metalinguistic types of communication. (1980, p.82) 
Feuerstein even describes the first of his instruments, 
Organisation of Dots, as If nonverbal" (1980, p.126). 	 This is 
virtually correct, insofar as only the most rudimentary level of 
literacy is required of pupils attempting the worksheets. But the 
most important phase of any Instrumental Enrichment lesson is the 
"discussion for insight," when pupils endeavour to recognise the 
strategies they employed during the paper and pencil phase, to 
name the cognitive operations involved, and to speculate about 
other possible applications of their strategies. Feuerstein does 
concede that when pupils are confronted with abstract and formal 
logical operations, "the lack of verbal tools makes the mastery of 
such tasks very difficult, and, in many cases, uneconomical to the 
point of being prohibitive" (1980, p.83). Indeed, the length and 
sophistication of his vocabulary list in the Teacher's Guide 
which accompanies Organisation of Dots is a concession to the need 
for verbal communication in itself. Feuerstein's list includes 
the following words for teachers to impart to their pupils: 
systematic hypothetical projection relevance 
impulsivity differentiate discriminate strategy 
cognitive priorities elaboration precision 
principle constancy flexibility evaluate 
inference implicit internalize explicit 
ambiguous scientific particular universal 
Because some of these words are labels for cognitive operations 
and were singled out to lead pupils into thinking about their own 
thought processes," Instrumental Enrichment teachers are sometimes 
tempted to spend a lot of time explaining their meanings and to 
skimp on negotiations in which pupils play an active part. A 
substantial minority of pupils complained of teachers talking too 
much when asked by Schools Council evaluators to say what they did 
not like about Instrumental Enrichment lessons (Weller and Craft, 
1983, p.50). Feuerstein's instruments elicit problem-solving 
behaviours from pupils, and his Teacher's Guides suggest to 
teachers how they might present sophisiticated language to focus 
pupils' attention on the strategies they use to solve problems; 
but Feuerstein has not yet operationalised the task of negotiating 
meanings in sufficient detail. More remains to be done in the 
development of teachers' sensitivity to strengths as well as 
weaknesses in pupils' existing vocabulary, since pupils' strengths 
provide a platform for intervention whereas weaknesses are a 
bottomless pit into which no end of explanations can be 
fruitlessly poured. 
Meanwhile, let us return to Feuerstein's ideal classroom: 	 by 
exploring the meanings of existing vocabulary and negotiating the 
meanings of fresh vocabulary, the teacher helps pupils create a 
mediating system. Thus, mutual words are available for when the 
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teacher wants to assign meaning to experiences which hitherto 
would have seemed beyond the intellectual grasp of pupils. 
Language with agreed and personally felt denotations, a living 
language, can carry children who previously had only an episodic 
grasp of reality into the realm where knowledge is obtained a 
priori. 
	
Conversely, "words dry and riderless," like those 
described in Sylvia Plath's poem entitled Words, have no 




After whose stroke the wood rings, 
And the echoes! 
Echoes travelling 
Off from the centre like horses. 
The sap 
Wells like tears, like the 
Water striving 
To re-establish its mirror 
Over the rock 
That drops and turns, 
A white skull, 
Eaten by weedy greens. 
Years later I 
Encounter them on the road 
Words dry and riderless, 
The indefatigable hoof-taps. 
While 
From the bottom of the pool, fixed stars 
Govern a life. 
(Sylvia Plath, 1965, from the Ariel collection) 
Words may dislodge some of the "fixed stars" or the apparent 
immutableness in children's lives, and negotiating their meanings 
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is inextricably linked with fostering transcendence, another of 
the tasks Feuerstein sets for teachers. 
Fostering Transcendence  
Fostering transcendence involves extending pupils' need systems 
beyond what is here and now. It would be futile for me to try and 
say what this might mean for Feuerstein in his Jewish context. 
Instead, I shall interpret the task as one of enrichment and 
extension in the areas of experience identified by Her Majesty's 
Inspectors; 	 those areas are, in alphabetical order: aesthetic 
and creative, ethical, linguistic, mathematical, physical, 
scientific, social and political, and spiritual (A View of the 
Curriculum, 1979). 
Many areas of experience, although logically distinct, can not be 
divided up exclusively for presentation under subject headings at 
school. Furthermore, some areas of experience are interrelated in 
such a way that they can arise from the study of a single subject. 
The relationships between areas of experience, school 
subjects, pupils' skills and attitudes have therefore been 
illustrated in a great variety of holistic formulations. Wilson's 








Figure from "The Curriculum in Special Schools," 1981, p.17. 
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Wilson also provides us with an example of how subject boundaries 
are crossed by areas of experience and how one subject can unfold 
into successive areas of experience; its span from the mundane to 
the spiritual is apt, since our present concern is with pupils' 
transcendence, albeit that Feuerstein sometimes debases the 
meaning of transcendence by using the word as a synonym for 
progression: 
Exploration of the social/political areas of experience 
can be seen as a developmental process, beginning with 
interpersonal relationships before proceeding to study 
the organisation of larger groups. Discussion of 
social and political issues raises questions of 
morality, and eventually the issue of absolute ethical 
standards, and the meaning and purpose of life. So 
awareness that there is a spiritual side to experience 
is not confined to religious education or morning 
assembly. As with aesthetic experiences this experience 
cannot be predicted. 	 All that can be done is to devise 
situations in which their occurence is likely for some 
pupils. (Wilson, 1981, p.15) 
At this point I shall rejoin Feuerstein in order to take issue 
with Wilson's conclusion that all that can be done, in view of the 
unpredictability of transcendent learning experiences, is to 
devise situations in which their occurrence is likely for some 
pupils. For pupils with learning difficulties, mere exposure to 
situations is not enough; before they can use direct experience as 
a springboard for taking imaginative leaps into a priori 
cognition, they must learn to identify the strategies gained from 
direct experience and thereby to hold them in readiness for future 
applications. Feuerstein argues that the teacher can intervene to 
support pupils in this process of generalising from what they 
know, by focusing attention on relevant aspects of their cognitive 
behaviour: 
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Insight can be achieved by analyzing experiences and 
showing the child which functions play a role. Not only 
successes, but failures, too, should be analyzed in 
terms of their components. Each activity should be 
evaluated according to its relevance in achieving 
certain goals. The child's own experience should be 
utilized to generate his understanding of his past 
performance for its contribution to his future 
accomplishments. (1980, pp.300-301) 
The teacher fosters transcendence by giving pupils practice at 
recognising their own cognitive operations, identifying their 
problem-solving strategies, and extracting general rules from 
numerous specific contexts; so that pupils become aware of having 
gained insight that is not task-bound but generalisable, and so 
that they feel confident about attempting to apply their skills in 
ways that are different from their previous experience. Grant 
sets out pupils' ascent through "the learning hierarchy" as a 
table (1986, in an unpublished paper, based on Haring et al, 
1978), with each level of skill transfer characterised by a 









no delay in response 
Continued fluency 
without reward and 
after a period of time 
Performance in 
different situations, 
selection of skill  
Demonstration, 
clues/prompts 
Drill and practice, 
rewards, feedback 








Adaptation Changing the skill or 
combining skills in 
new, creative way  
Problem-solving 
simulations 
Without a teacher to expand pupils' experience in the areas 
described by Her Majesty's Inspectorate and to prompt 
introspective thinking, 	 Feuerstein's instruments would just be a 
brain-teasing collection of mainly diagramatic puzzles. 	 It is 
the mediating teacher who helps culturally deprived pupils inhibit 
impulsive behaviour and make "more organised, articulated and 
differentiated" responses when they encounter challenging 
situations (Feuerstein, 1980, p.117). As Feuerstein points out, 
because the culturally deprived child lacks mediated learning 
experience she constantly searches for extenal stimuli with very 
little investment in relating them to the conditions they produce 
in herself; she has learning difficulties because she is "addicted 
to acting-out behaviour" and she is a virtual stranger to 
introspection (1980, pp.116-117). The Instrumental Enrichment 
teacher's method for helping such pupils transcend their limited 
ambit is know as "bridging" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.295). 
The teacher uses bridging to pave a way to transcendence for 
pupils; he selects 	 "concepts, vocabulary and operations" 
(Feuerstein, 1980, p.295) to make key elements of pupils' past 
experience more accessible in classroom discussion and to initiate 
a new synthesis of those elements. For example, the teacher may 
point out to pupils working on the Organisation of Dots 
instrument that they have been looking for universal shapes in 
clouds of dots, that they have communicated concepts of shapes to 
one another by using an agreed vocabulary to define shapes 
according to their attributes, that they have been engaged in 
operations such as comparison and differentiation, and that they 
have employed strategies such as systematically searching for 
relationships between the dots; he may then open up the far end of 
this bridging activity with a question about where else people 
search for patterns in a mass of information. 	 If responding to 
such a question causes pupils to experience a sense of things 
falling into place, the teacher's bridging has been successful. 
Successful bridging produces a chain of intellectual events which 
culminates in a newly synthesised experience being accommodated 
or, in other words, in a new mental schema being precipitated, and 
it is thereafter likely to be evidenced in pupils as a bent for 
assimilating further experiences comparable to the synthetic one 
which accrued from the teacher's intervention. I expect this bent 
for assimilating further experiences to be the outcome of 
successful bridging because to extend pupils' cognitive structures 
is surely to forecast an extension of their need systems? 
Feuerstein presumably had a similar argument in mind when he said 
that children's transcendence to a state of greater cognitive 
modifiability was characterised by a widening of their need 
systems (18th July 1985, lecture at Nottingham University). 
Unfortunately, Feuerstein has not provided much guidance for the 
practice of bridging. The teacher is left to string together all 
the components of the curriculum pupils will need in order to 
realise the experience intended, rather like a lone sapper with 
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the task of building a pontoon-bridge from boats in turbulent 
water. 	 Moreover, an Instrumental Enrichment bridge can never be 
secured at its far end, since there is no fixed point in the 
domain of generalisation; so, the teacher also has the task of 
instilling a feeling of competence in his pupils before he can 
expect them to break ground with a confident leap, to transcend of 
their own volition, and to venture forth from the bridge into the 
unknown. It is this latter task that I shall turn to next. 
Instilling a Feeling of Competence.  
The task of instilling a feeling of competence in children is 
about engendering self-confidence and self-respect in them. 
Parents begin the task by being deferential and attentive toward 
their helpless babies, so that they produce infants who, by about 
six months of age, appear to develop a sense of omnipotence. 
Ansubel and Sullivan infer this phenomenon from the imperious and 
possessive expressions which commonly feature on the faces of 
infants of six months and over. They suggest that the infant's 
self-respect hinges upon his misinterpretation of his parents' 
obedience to his will and needs, "as a result of which he 
exaggerates his volitional power and autonomy" (in Herbert, 1974, 
p.88). 
The infant's exaggeration of his power is tolerated for a while 
and then gently eroded by parents who want to see their child 
learn to give as well as take. Being thus weaned has its 
compensations, because from about eighteen months to three years 
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old, the infant can normally enjoy the increased autonomy that 
comes with learning the skills of toddlerhood. If there are 
prolonged difficulties in mastering socially significant skills 
such as locomotion, enunciation, and bowel and bladder control, 
however, the infant may come to fear that he is inadequate. 
Parental support is crucial in these circumstances, although 
excessive attempts to motivate the infant can stifle his 
determination to deal with difficulties rather than restore his 
feeling of competence. 
According to Erikson, children of three to five years old become 
increasingly vulnerable to both inadvertant and deliberate 
attacks on their initiative; for him, initiative is the 
manifestation of a child's feeling of competence. 	 Erikson 
counsels parents to avoid undue restraint on their child's 
behaviour as well as avoiding intrusive attempts to motivate him, 
lest they jeopardise the child's prospects for active 
participation in educational or interpersonal exchanges by 
conditioning him to accept a passive role. Erikson suggests that 
the major hazard to the achievement of initiative is, 
overly strict discipline and the concomitant 
internalisation of rigid ethical attitudes which 
interfere with the child's spontaneity and reality 
testing, and lead to excessive guilt. 
(1965, in Herbert, 1974, p.189) 
Unlike teachers, parents are in a position to mediate for the 
young persons in their charge with what Newson calls "unreasonable 
care" (1978, p.12). Instead of having to demand conformity to the 
rules of a social institution at the same time as pursuing 
educational interests, parents can give their undivided attention 
to bolstering their child's self-esteem. They have the luxury of 
deciding for themselves alone what lattitude of acceptance they 
will afford to their child's eccentric behaviours; 
	 so, whilst 
teachers threaten to change the child, parents may wish to 
preserve the idiosyncrasies which contribute to the uniqueness of 
their offspring. As Newson reports: 
In many different ways, parents accept as valid, and 
worthy of their attention and respect, demands from the 
child which they might reasonably judge as irrational 
whims. (1978, p.12) 
It would not be feasible for a teacher to cherish every child, 
warts and all, to an extent where he was pandering to their whims; 
indeed, many parents would insist on a more cautious approach from 
somebody who is not part of their family circle, quite apart from 
the obstacles presented by conflicting demands and interests in 
the classroom. 	 Some children, who present as having been 
deprived of effective parental support, can be singled out for 
compensatory treatment; 	 but the way for a teacher to instil 
feelings of worth and competence in all pupils is through 
rendering the curriculum accessible to them and, specifically, by 
setting them appropriate programmes of work. 
When setting programmes of work, the teacher should take account 
of how much correspondence there is between each programme and 
each pupil's cognitive map. On some but not all of the seven 
parameters I defined in my chapter on Theory and Terminology, the 
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demands made by a programme should slightly exceed the recipient's 
current attainments; in other words, a programme should extend or 
enrich the pupil in some respects only, so that he is stretched 
but not defeated. Buckinghamshire County Council's Education 
Committee endorse the latter point in a policy document on 
Extension of the Technical and Vocational Education Initiative; 
the Committee states that all pupils "need to find themselves 
systematically challenged but not to find that the tasks set are 
beyond them" (16th October 1986). 
Evans observes that it is particularly important to ensure that 
work is "programmed for success" when pupils are known to be 
intolerant of criticism or hypersensitive about the adequacy of 
their performance (1981, p.22). Nevertheless, in order to 
implement Buckinghamshire's policy of setting programmes at the 
right pitch for individual pupils, it is not just teachers of 
exceptionally vulnerable children but all teachers who will 
require a means of both analysing the curriculum and profiling 
their pupils on the same parameters. I have already suggested 
that Feuerstein's cognitive map might provide teachers with such a 
means, whereby they can check what they intend to teach against 
their pupils' strengths and weaknesses. But I have also noted 
earlier in this chapter that Feuerstein was soon disabused of the 
idea that teachers could spend their time and energy analysing the 
curriculum into programmes of work, then find more time and energy 
to systematically adapt those programmes into individualised 
responses to various profiles of pupils' needs, all without highly 
structured and constant support. 
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The Instrumental Enrichment programme is highly structured and 
constant; so much so that it would be in danger of becoming 
fossilised, were it not for offshoots such as the Somerset 
Thinking Skills Curriculum and the Oxfordshire Skills Programme 
(both published by their respective Local Education Authorities in 
1986; although the Somerset materials are not available to any 
schools, except those participating in pilot studies, at the time 
of writing). It provides teachers and pupils with a steady 
nucleus in the ceaseless tide of curricular innovation. This 
might appear to be a dubious virtue if curricular innovations were 
better orchestrated, but it contrasts favourably with the School 
Curriculum Development Committee "evidence that much unsystematic 
planning, repetition and unplanned discontinuity exists in 
schools" (1986, Curriculum Issues No. 2, a leaflet prepared in 
collaboration with Derricott and Dunne). In the following extract 
from a seminar report, Evans describes what happens to secondary 
school pupils whose working conditions have been thrown into 
disarray by bungled re—structuring of the curriculum: 
It is also necessary not to overlook how difficult it is 
for pupils to make sense of what one contributor called 
"the shifting kaleidoscope of the curriculum". The 
totality of the provision is not readily grasped and it 
is only too easy, where routine and patterns of work 
tend to be fragmented, for pupils to lose their way and 
become detached from the school's main purpose. This 
situation needs to be forestalled and one of the ways of 
doing this is to ensure success early, certainly in the 
first two years. (1981, p.22) 
Progress is far from a kaleidoscopic experience for pupils working 
on the Instrumental Enrichment programme. Indeed, colleagues 
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engaged in the development of the Oxfordshire Skills Programme 
have sought to present a greater variety of stimuli and to induce 
less "over-learning" through their instruments, as compared with 
Feuerstein, despite their desire to emulate his systematic 
approach. 	 The tasks in Feuerstein's instruments have been 
meticulously sequenced to increase the complexity of pupils' 
mental activties gradually and, "in the best traditions of the 
spiral curriculum, learning is reinforced and concepts and skills 
are re-encountered in successively more demanding situations" 
(Weller and Craft, 1983; p. 18). 	 "Mastery" pages, on which 
pupils can confirm their growing competence, have been interleaved 
at intervals in most of Feuerstein's instruments. 
There are, of course, alternative methods of organising the 
mainstream curriculum to reduce pupils' confusion and alienation; 
for instance, modules or units provide an opportunity to re-
structure two-year public examination courses into smaller 
learning packages. The modular approach offers pupils shorter-
term goals and is flexible enough to make it possible for learning 
programmes and the needs of individual pupils to be closely 
matched (Schools Curriculum Development Committee, 1986, in 
Curriculum Issues No.1). But I have chosen to study Instrumental 
Enrichment because it purports to offer something which supervenes 
its structural merits and which no subject-based mainstream 
curriculum in my experience has offered to the same extent: 
That is to say, this type of training is concerned with 
enhancing conscious awareness of the general 
strategies which come under the executive control of the 
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individual. It teaches "thinking about thinking" and 
"learning about learning" rather than specific subject 
matter. 
A knowledge of one's own cognition (metacognition) is a 
developmental ability but it can be trained in 
individuals who have not acquired it spontaneously 
(Flavell, 1976; Brown, 1978). According to Wiens 
(1983) developing control over one's own thought 
processes, and the pleasure derived from that control, 
creates the motivation to learn. Metacognitive training 
may therefore suit the needs of the passive learning 
disabled adolescent. (Shayer and Beasley, April 1986) 
In the experiment I am about to describe in my next chapter, I 
shall be particularly interested in looking for evidence of pupils 
rating themselves higher in respect of their learning ability. 
If, after 	 intervention 	 using 	 Feuerstein's 	 instruments 
and methodology, pupils gain more than their peers as regards 
feeling competent as learners, irrespective of their gains on 
tests of academic ability and attainment, it might be reasonable 
to infer that Instrumental Enrichment has furnished the means for 
them to acquire a more powerful sense of executive control over 
their learning and thinking. I shall pursue this hypothesis 
later; there are still five more tasks for the teacher before 
this chapter is complete, albeit that they require a good deal 
less explanation than the previous four because they either 
amplify certain aspects of those four corner-stones to the 
practice of Instrumental Enrichment or they cover ground that has 
been well-trodden by educationalists with other concerns. 
Interpreting Achievements  
By interpreting a pupil's achievements, the teacher makes that 
pupil aware of how she measures up against whatever situation is 
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confronting her (Feuerstein, 19th July 1985, lecture at 
Nottingham University). The aim of this task is to help the pupil 
grasp the scale of the problem she has to solve in order to close 
the gap between her previously accumulated experience and her 
goal, and to give the teacher an inkling of the pupil's strengths 
and weaknesses "for the purpose of diagnosis, formative assessment 
and sensitive guidance" (Oxfordshire Skills Programme, Teacher's 
Notes, 1986). Execution of the task falls into two stages within 
a lesson, both of which are described succinctly in the following 
paragraphs from Oxfordshire's booklet outling the argument for a 
cognitive skills learning programme and suggesting classroom 
techniques: 
DEBRIEFING provides an opportunity to review the work 
done and consider the reason for any unexpected ease or 
difficulties experienced. It is important that students 
should often be asked to justify their judgements and 
solutions and indeed to modify them in the light of new 
evidence introduced within or after the task in 
question. "Arguing the point" is to be encouraged if it 
leads to consideration of what is a "reasonable" answer. 
Students should learn to recognise when an alternative 
solution is feasible. 
A valuable part of many lessons will be FEEDBACK, 
inviting, indeed expecting, individuals to comment on 
their own experience of the lesson. In a small group 
this may be done "round the circle" with everyone, 
including the teacher and any visitor, contributing. In 
large groups it may be feasible to involve only some of 
the number. 	 Students may talk about "what I learned 
today", "what I enjoyed most and what I liked least in 
today's lesson" or "high and low points". This may in 
turn generate discussion and disagreement between 
students, but this phase should allow a negotiation 
between students and teacher on the conduct and 
direction of work. 
Establishing Psychological Differentiation and Encouraging
. 
 Sharing  
Behaviour and Reciprocity  
These two tasks are obversely related; establishing psychological 
differentiation is about urging each pupil to re-constitute the 
culture he or she is exposed to, so that they develop a cultural 
identity of their own; 	 whereas encouraging sharing and 
reciprocity is about engaging with pupils in what Feuerstein calls 
"a joint search for novelty" (19th July 1985, lecture at 
Nottingham University). A joint search suggests that interaction 
between the teacher and his pupils should be typified as "support 
between independents," and not merely as a one-sided attempt by 
the teacher to elicit novel outcomes from his pupils (Fletcher, 
in a letter dated 25th June 1986). 
	 Fletcher defines support 
between independents as a relationship wherein, 
the persons involved are both recognized to be capable 
of some things and complementary in others. Their ideas 
can be in partial or extensive conflict but there is not 
a power struggle because all of the task is not taken 
over and there is discussion of every stage. Both 
parties can expect to moderate their views and 
approaches. (25th June 1986) 
This relationship has three inherent characteristics: "a concern 
for the quality of relationships (TRUST)"; 	 "a recognition that 
support is a mutual expression and need (RESPECT AND 
REASSURANCE)"; 	 and "a concern to monitor progress from 
everybody's point of view (EVALUATION)" (see Appendix 5 for 
Fletcher's table showing Stages of Support Between Independents). 
Before they can enter such a relationship, children have a hard 
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road to travel. 	 According to Erikson, the development of 
reciprocative behaviour patterns involves a series of crises in 
roughly the same three areas of concern as those identified 
by Fletcher; Erikson names these crises as follows: "trust 
mistrust", "confidence - doubt" and "initiative - guilt" 
(1965, in Herbert, 1974, p.4ff). When children resolve the bi-
polar conflicts which cause the crises, their personal integrity 
increases and so does their inclination toward sharing and 
reciprocation. 
Paradoxically, while psychological differentiation is allied to 
personal integrity, in that both are aspects of a child's 
individuation, the teacher's task of establishing differentiation 
is prone to interference from his task of encouraging sharing and 
vice versa. By the same token, it may be difficult for pupils to 
realise that responsibility for themselves implies responsibility 
towards others (Kierkegaard, 1843). 
The two tasks revolve around the teacher and his pupils striving 
for a balance of interests; a balance subject to tensions between 
feelings and to tensions which stem from cognitive disequilibrium: 
"Play" and "imitation" are examples of cognitive 
behaviour marked by a lack of balance, in one direction 
or the other, between assimilatory and accommodatory 
processes. 
	
Danziger states that it is possible to 
understand Erikson's bi-poplar pairs as involving a 
similar lack of balance or conflict in the development 
of social reciprocity. (Herbert, 1974, p.5). 
Extrapolating from Danziger's curious link between Piaget's 
concepts and Erikson's, I wonder if the dynamic of mediated 
learning experience derives from a perpetual struggle between the 
teacher and his pupils to rectify the imbalances between them. 
Perhaps such a struggle is an inevitable consequence of 
interdependence. 
Issuing Challenges and Setting Goals  
Feuerstein instructs Instrumental Enrichment teachers to issue 
challenges in order to create cognitive disequilibrium in their 
pupils. Cognitive disequilibrium is a feeling of unease which 
obtains when an individual does not have the knowledge she needs 
to meet a challenge. 	 If we accept that "thinkkng is what we do 
when we don't know" (Hansen, 1985, p.2), then cognitive 
disequilibrium is liable to provoke thinking. However, our 
reaction to not knowing what to do may be to panic rather than to 
engage in problem-solving thought processes, even though it may be 
more comfortable to calmly try and "restore the equilibrium 
between the perceived facts and those anticipated on the basis of 
previous experience" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.90). 
Pupils baulk at problems when they do not feel competent to tackle 
them; as one can infer from combining Festinger's first and second 
findings in the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, people tend to 
actively avoid situations which give rise to cognitive 
disequilibrium or "dissonance" unless they believe there is some 
prospect of their achieving equilibrium or "consonance" (1957, 
p.2). 
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Setting goals makes the prospect of achieving equilibrium more 
tangible. The teacher's task is not only to set goals but also to 
demonstrate to pupils how he uses his interpretation of their past 
achievements, in conjunction with his assessment of their present 
needs, to inform his selection of goals. Hence, the teacher 
provides a model for how pupils might choose their own future 
priorities. Once again, as with the other eight tasks, the nature 
of the mediation is an integral part of its message. 
Diagram to summarise ways in which the Teacher's Tasks contribute  
to Pupils' Mediated Learning Experience  
Several of the nine tasks may be performed simultaneously by the 
teacher, rather than as a sequence in the order given by 
Feuerstein. It is therefore tempting to represent mediation as 
intervention which encapsulates pupils' learning experience in a 
permeable bubble, with the tasks comprising the interface of the 
bubble between teacher and pupils. Such an illustration of all 
conceivable permutations of task interaction serves no practical 
purpose, however. 
I shall instead restrict myself to drawing just those lines of 
development from task to task for which I have provided an 
explanation in the course of this chapter. My diagram is more 
complicated than I should have wished but, if we start at the 
corner dedicated to "Communicating Intentionality" and work round 
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in both directions to "Fostering Transcendence" at the same time 
as working inwards, it might at least remind us of how the tasks 
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The arrow-heads in the diagram indicate that some tasks tend to be 
precursors of others; but we should not presume from this that 
simple cause and effect relationships exist, either as chain 
reactions within the teacher's performance of tasks or as 
predictable stimulus-response patterns from pupils in receipt of 
mediated learning experience. 	 Predictions from particular tasks 
would overlap so much as to prove futile, in my case. 
	 For 
example, pupils' higher ratings of themselves as learners may 
result from their teacher's instilling a feeling of competence in 
them or, equally, higher ratings may occur in the light of the 
teacher giving a new interpretation of pupils' achievments. None 
of the tasks is entirely discrete in theory and, having teased out 
the classroom practice of Instrumental Enrichment to a certain 
extent, we are not left with nine mutually exclusive variables to 
manipulate. 
In my next chapter, I shall treat all nine tasks as combined 
elements of mediated learning experience; indeed, I shall treat 
the whole of Instrumental Enrichment, an intervention programme 
for cognitive modifiability, as a single independent variable in 
an experiment designed to yield insight into how much certain 
factors in pupils' adjustment to school might be influenced by one 
of their teachers using Feuerstein's methodology and materials. 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS  
We know that the aim of Instrumental Enrichment is to produce in 
pupils a state of mind that Feuerstein calls cognitive 
modifiability. 	 A state of mind is of course unobservable, an 
intervening variable that can not be measured directly because the 
rules for assigning numerals to it can not be ascertained by 
empirical tests. 	 So, how can I find out about the efficacy of 
Instrumental Enrichment in respect of its potential for enhancing 
pupils' cognitive modifiability, given this stumbling—block in the 
way of an appeal to experiment? 
	
I shall have to infer variations 
in cognitive modifiability from relevant data on those constructs 
which I believe, in the light of the two chapters preceding this 
one, account for the qualities of cognitive modifiability that I 
am interested in. 	 In order to be able to do so, I must first 
identify my criteria for determining the relevance of data or, 
more precisely, I must establish operational definitions of the 
constructs by specifying which activities or operations are 
appropriate for measuring them. 
Adjustment To School  
The construct "adjustment to school" is a useful means of focusing 
on behaviours which presumably relate to the attitudinal 
components of pupils' cognitive modifiability. "Adjustment," more 
so than "adaptability," has connotations which emphasise the 
affective and conative aspects of pupils' cognitive 
modifiability, as well as the purely cognitive aspect; and 
"school" has the virtue of limiting my study of pupils' behaviour 
to a single microcosmic context and, moreover, to a type of 
context where I have vested interests. 
"Adjustment to school" is open-ended conceptually in that it 
refers to the extent to which a pupil's behaviour conforms to the 
expectations of her school, without suggesting that the roots of 
such behaviour lie either with the pupil or with the school 
(Varlaam et al, October 1983, p.1). To be consistent with 
Feurstein's view of cultural deprivation, I should treat the roots 
of pupils' behaviour as properties of the pupils themselves. 
However, the extent to which pupils have sovereignty over their 
behaviour or, obversely, the extent to which pupils' behaviour is 
impulsive, is not solely attributable to how much they have 
learned from their cultural heritage or whether they suffer from 
the "inadequate cognitive development syndrome of cultural 
deprivation" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.18). Lawrence, Steed and Young 
(1984) argue that a lot of the responsibility for defining
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adjustment and maladjustment, and for precipitating disruptive 
behaviour, is attributable to teachers. I can not afford to enter 
into Lawerence, Steed and Young's "Disruptive Children 
Disruptive Schools?" arguments here, but in preparing for my 
experiment I shall have to allow for the possibility that teachers 
sometimes violate pupils' sovereignty and prevent them from 
behaving as responsibly as they would wish to behave. 
Measuring pupils' adjustment to school is full of snags, even if 
it is possible in theory for teachers or outside observers to 
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find objective means of recording the frequency and intensity of 
certain behaviours. 
	 There is the snag I have already mentioned: 
teachers sometimes thwart pupils' attempts to control their own 
behaviour and hence obscure pupils' readiness for change. 
	 This 
can happen if teachers forget that changes in their perceptions 
lag behind changes in pupils' attitudes; teachers may allow their 
old expectations to impinge on pupils and thus discourage new 
initiatives. There is also the snag that teachers' perceptions of 
pupils' adjustment to school may be distorted by a tendency to 
construe behaviours as if they reflected children's strengths and 
weaknesses more than adults' successes and failures as mediators. 
It is tempting to treat a pupil's weaknesses as developmental 
faults rather than acknowledge the constraints she is currently 
under, particularly when one is party to having fashioned those 
constraints. 	 Snags, then, often arise from ignoring the context 
in which behaviours occur; yet allowing for different contexts 
would be so complicated and time-consuming as to be impracticable. 
Varlaam, Stoll, Sammons and Kysel describe how this deadlock can 
be broken: 
In practice, pupil behaviour is usually assessed by 
means of rating scales completed by teachers. The 
Bristol Social Adjustment Guides and the Rutter B(2) 
scale are perhaps two of the best known and most widely 
used in educational research. 	 Ratings on such scales 
are, of course, essentially subjective but in one sense 
this subjectivity is an asset. 	 Teachers tend to rate a 
pupil's behaviour in relation to the behaviour they 
expect of the class. In other words, they make an 
assessment of the pupil's adjustment to those norms of 
behaviour. (October, 1983, p.'). 
The Child at School - a new behaviour schedule 
I shall use the new rating scale devised by Varlaam and his 
colleagues (see Appendix 6 for Inner London Education Authority's 
Report on The Child at School - a new behaviour schedule) to 
generate data on teachers' perceptions of pupils' adjustment to 
school. It is more succinct than those in most observation 
schedules, yet it does not mutilate the concept of adjustment to 
school beyond recognition. 	 Its short length, just nine pairs of 
statements with five scoring positions between each, means that 
class teachers can complete ratings of all their pupils at one 
sitting. The task is not too much to ask of colleagues who are 
otherwise uninvolved in my experiment and they should not become 
so tired that accuracy suffers. 
Because "The Child at School - a new behaviour schedule," 
henceforward abbreviated to "the CAS schedule," is based on 
teachers' judgements about pupils' behaviour rather than direct 
measurement of pupils' behaviour, it is applicable to a wide age 
range. This means that I can use it with both of the age groups 
in my experiment: ten to twelve years old primary school pupils 
and twelve to fourteen years old secondary school pupils. The 
judgements required by the CAS schedule focus on aspects of 
pupils' behaviour with which teachers are likely to be familiar; 
teachers are asked to rely on their own knowledge of pupils in the 
school context, and they do not need to offer exceptionally deep 
pyschological insights or to make global interpretations. 
Furthermore, since I am seeking improvements in pupils' adjustment 
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to school as a result of experimental intervention, it is 
important that judgements about the nine CAS schedule items can 
yield positive as well as negative assessments of behaviour. The 
structure of the CAS schedule affords teachers the opportunity of 
recording high levels of adjustment in pupils, instead of 
restricting them to a scale whereon adjustment has a neutral 
rating and all gradations are dedicated to levels of 
maladjustment. 
Notwithstanding all the advantages of the CAS schedule over other 
means of generating data on teachers' perceptions of pupils' 
behaviour in school, I have already argued that any measuring 
operation which only gathers teachers' perceptions ought to be 
complemented by another operation which generates data on the 
feelings or beliefs underlying pupils' behaviour. Why not ask 
pupils to complete CAS schedules on themsevles, instead of using a 
different measuring operation to go over the same ground? There 
are at least four reasons for rejecting this proposition. First, 
pupils would not necessarily take the whole of their class into 
consideration when rating themselves in relation to others; they 
would certainly not have anything like their teacher's experience 
of other classes of the same age. Secondly, modesty might forbid 
highly positive self—ratings, and T.S. Eliot's observation that 
"human kind cannot bear very much reality" (Four Quartets, Burnt 
Norton 1) is a warning which precludes our expecting children to 
rate themselves very negatively in response to bald statements. 
Thirdly, the CAS schedule is couched in teacher—oriented language 
and is liable to induce a "social desirability response set" (as 
defined by Burroughs, 1971, p.80) in pupils, whereby they would 
tend to rate themselves either as they think their teacher would 
rate them or as they think their teacher would like to be able to 
rate them. Fourthly, not only the language but also the concepts 
which constitute the nine items on the CAS schedule are too 
teacher-oriented for some of the pupils involved in my experiment 
to grasp readily. 
So, what sort of measuring operation would enable me to present 
the construct, "adjustment to school," in a manageable framework 
that corresponds to the CAS schedule but does not transgress 
pupils' experience? How could I keep the construct distinct and 
yet not so bald as to drive pupils into making middle-of-the-road 
responses? How could I extract data that have been contaminated 
as little as possible by an implied response set, given a 
construct that is liable to evoke pupils' awareness of what their 
school regards as conventional behaviour? What sort of measuring 
operation might engage pupils in actively deciding where they 
stand in terms of the construct, rather than leaving them to 
dither between the level of adjustment they aspire to and a 
genuine self-appraisal? The Repertory Grid Technique provides a 
comprehensive answer to all of these questions. 
The Repertory Grid Technique is a measuring operation which is 
"nearer to conversation than it is to the standard psychological 
test" (Fransella and Bannister, 1977, p.112). 	 It is a means of 
exploring pupils' personal construct systems or, in other words, 
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of construing pupils' attitudes to form an insight into their 
experience. Pupils are not likely to hand over a record of their 
experience of adjustment to school "intact across the desk" 
(Kelly, 1955, p.200), but a grid will help them to inform us about 
how their construct systems are evolving. As Fransella and 
Bannister point out ( A Manual for Repertory Grid Technique, 1977, 
p.3), the results of the grid have often been looked on "as a map 
of the construct system of an individual, a sort of idiographic 
cartography as contrasted with, say, the nomothetic cartography of 
the semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957)". 
The Repertory Grid Technique  
To ensure that the grid I use with pupils covers the same ground 
as the CAS schedule I use with teachers, albeit from a different 
perspective, I shall have to depart from two of the principles 
established by Kelly, the originator of the Repertory Grid 
Technique: I shall not let pupils supply their own bipolar scales 
and I shall limit what Osgood, the originator of the Semantic 
Differential technique, calls the "semantic space" (see Burroughs, 
1971, p.138; Kerlinger, 1973, Ch.33). Rather than working within 
a semantic space defined by as many scales as pupils care to 
specify, I shall pre-determine just five scales. 
Three of the five scales will be dedicated to constructs that 
appear to be the key subordinate factors in pupils'adjustment to 
school. When Varlaam and his colleagues used the CAS schedule to 
assess nearly eighteen thousand primary school pupils and 
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subjected the results to principal components analysis, they found 
that three factors between them accounted for eighty percent of 
the variance in the data: 
What principal components analysis appeared to show was 
that although all items were positively correlated, both 
with each other and with total score on the CAS and 
there was a tendency for pupils to be seen as generally 
well or poorly adjusted, the items fell into three 
clusters or subscales. 	 Items 4, 5 and 6 formed one 
cluster or subscale, items 3, 7 and 9 another, and items 
1, 2 and 8 a third. 	 These subscales were taken to 
measure the dimensions of learning skills - learning 
problems, co-operative - aggressive behaviour, 
social/personal confidence - anxiety respectively. 
(October 1983, pp.7-8). 
It should not be difficult to select appropriate pairs of 
adjectives to help pupils describe the extremes of these 
subscales. 	 The bipolar pair, 	 "best - worst," 	 facilitates 
comparison when measuring achievements or performances on 
dimensions where competiton is involved: 	 the "learning skills - 
learning problems" dimension is an obvious example for 
Buckinghamshire pupils who have to compete for selective school 
places; and perhaps the "social/personal confidence - anxiety" 
dimension is an equally obvious example for pupils competing to 
move up the playground pecking order or conscious of fluctuations 
in their popularity. The same blatantly evaluative adjectives 
would arguably serve the remaining dimension, "co-operative - 
aggressive behaviour," since pupils may compete to please or annoy 
their teacher. However, as I pointed out when I cited the 
questions raised by Lawrence, Steed and Young (authors of 
Disruptive Children - Disruptive Schools?, 1984), it is not 
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necessarily under pupils' control whether they please or annoy 
their teacher. Even if two pupils ostensibly set out with the 
opposite intentions of pleasing and annoying their teacher, they 
may have attention-seeking as their common motive and both could 
find that they are perceived as nuisances. With the co-operative 
- disruptive dimension of adjustment to school in particular, 
then, it is important to concentrate on the potency of pupils' 
behaviour rather than judging it in terms of success or failure. 
Consequently, for this dimension, I shall substitute "most - 
least" for "best - worst." 
To avoid asking pupils directly to consider themselves in 
comparison with their classmates and to identify their positions 
on the subscales which measure the three dimensions of adjustment 
to school, I shall ask them to arrange just eight anonymous 
photographs, of boys or girls close to them in age, in rank order 
(The Salvation Army Public Relations Department has provided me 
with a collection of photographs, to which I have added a few, for 
this purpose). Pupils will be asked to put the photographs one-
by-one into two piles, starting with "the best at making friends 
at school" and "the worst at making friends, perhaps the one who 
has most difficulty making friends, at school." When pupils have 
ranked all eight photographs in response to this interpretation of 
the "social/personal confidence - anxiety" dimension, they will 
be asked to repeat the process in response to interpretations of 
the other two dimensions: "which one annoys teachers most?" as 
opposed to "which one annoys teachers least, perhaps gets on well 
with them?"; and, "which one is best at learning things at 
school?" as opposed to "which one is worst at learning things, 
perhaps has most difficulty learning things, at school?". 
Given a relaxed one-to-one interview situation, pupils will 
hopefully become sufficiently absorbed in ranking the photographs 
to project imagined characteristics onto them. I shall prompt 
pupils to wonder about the boys or girls in the photographs, by 
suggesting that they look carefully at expressions on the faces. 
When pupils have had time to invest whatever abstract qualities 
they might imagine in the eight photographs, they will be asked to 
rank the photographs for a fourth and fifth time. 
The fourth scale will range from "most like I should like to be," 
through six less and less preferable wishes to, "least like I 
should like to be." I shall introduce it by telling a joke 
version of a fairy story, at the end of which pupils will be 
invited to choose from among the photographs whose way of life 
they would swap for their own. The fairy story, which amounts to 
little more than the arrival of a fairy-godmother who regrets 
having missed her vocation as a witch and grants only a restricted 
wish, was originally developed as part of interview routine by a 
colleague (Mike Lake, an educational psycholgist working in 
Buckinghamshire) helping me to pilot Repertory Grid material; 
pupils of all ages recognised it as a signal that they had been 
given licence to vent their aspirations without fear of criticism. 
The fifth scale, "really most like me" through to "really least 
like me," will have a more sober introduction than the fourth; I 
shall ask pupils to leave aside any pretence inspired by the fairy 
story, and to rank the photographs according to how much each one 
reflects their situation in "real life". Such a straightforward 
probe into pupils' perceptions of themselves might have seemed an 
unacceptably startling approach, were it not for the fact that the 
Repertory Grid Technique allows respondents to encode sensitive 
information in comfortably oblique ranks of numbers. 
Once every pupil has ranked the eight photographs on all five 
scales, and I have recorded the order in which the photographs 
were ranked by entering ordinal numbers on a grid (see Appendix 7 
for copies of the photographs used and an empty grid), the search 
can begin for evidence of "affective - cognitive consistency" in 
pupils' responses (Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960, wrote about 
Affective - Cognitive Consistency Theory in "Attitude Organisation 
and Change: An Analysis of Consistency Among Attitude Components"; 
Eiser, 1980, p.36, has identified the central issue of the theory 
as, "the question of consistency between an individual's 
evaluations of attitude objects or "elements" and his beliefs 
concerning the relations between them"). 	 Such evidence, 	 if it 
exists, will come in the form of substantial correlations between 
the order in which pupils rank the photographs on the fourth scale 
and the order in which they ranked them on the previous three 
scales. 
Weak correlations, between the order in which pupils rank the 
photographs on the fourth scale and the order in which they ranked 
them on the previous three scales, will leave us uncertain about 
how much pupils have associated themselves with the photographic 
elements or the verbal descriptions of constructs. For example, 
in the case of a pupil who chooses both the photograph she 
identified as "best at learning" and the photograph she identified 
as "most annoying to teachersft to rank close together as first or 
second in the order of "most like I should like to be," it will be 
confusing if she has already indicated that being good at learning 
and annoying teachers are incompatible. The explanation might be 
that the pupil has interposed a construct of her own in selecting 
a photograph she wishes to be like. 	 Isolated contradictions are 
not important, since the order of the remaining seven photographs 
will usually outweigh a rogue ranking. 	 Lots of contradictions 
could indicate that a pupil has responded casually to my 
implementation of the Repertory Grid Technique. Alternatively, 
lots of contradictions could indicate that a pupil has conflicting 
aspirations. Hence, one experimental effect I shall look for is, 
whether intervention with Instrumental Enrichment has resulted in 
pupils becoming less equivocal about where they stand along the 
construct dimensions: are patterns of psychological integration 
emerging? 
If we can identify where pupils wish to stand in relation to the 
three adjustment to school factors, then the fourth scale will 
provide us with a set of bench—marks for measuring progress on the 
fifth scale. 	 Indeed, closing the gap between "like I should like 
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to be" and "really like me" is perhaps the most important 
experimental effect of all those I shall be looking for. Are 
pupils indicating that they feel their positions have improved on 
the personal construct dimensions for which I supplied labels? Our 
authority to make assertions about progress on the fifth scale 
would be questionable, without corroborative evidence from the 
fourth scale that pupils were adopting the labels for factors in 
adjustment to school as a basis for discriminating between the 
eight photographic elements presented to them. Kelly explains why 
it is important to measure change according to terms of reference 
that individuals have made their own: 
A psychology that participates in the human enterprise 
must perceive that the guidelines channelizing a 
person's processes are drawn by the person himself -
that they are therefore personal constructs, and may be 
redrawn and revalidated by the user to structure anew 
his thought and his behaviour. They are not the residue 
of biographical incidents, nor are they projected 
facsimilies of reality. They are, instead, the axes of 
reference man contrives to put his psychological space 
in order and to plot his varying courses of action. 
(1969, p.36) 
Now that scales, bench-marks, and the gap between pupils' self-
assessment and their aspirations have been mentioned, it is time 
to establish a system for measuring the strength of relationship 
between constructs. 	 For my next chapter, I shall convert inter- 
relationships between each pupil's rankings on the five scales 
into a correlation matrix; the resultant Spearman rank-order 
coefficients of correlation will then be extracted from the fourth 
and fifth rows of the matrix, in order for them to be tabulated as 
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"wished for" and "self-assessment" ratings of "personal/social 
confidence - anxiety," "co-operative - aggressive behaviour" and 
"learning skills - learning difficulties," alongside the CAS 
schedule ratings of the same factors (see tables of results in 
Appendix 8). There are many precedents for treating correlation 
coefficients as ratings or scores (for example, in Sawyer and 
Riding, 1979, pp. 151-156), so a measuring system which comprises 
Spearman rho ratings is not an innovation. 
Once I have obtained teachers' ratings and pupils' ratings of 
themselves, I shall be curious to know how those ratings compare 
and how far they are borne out by objective tests of intellectual 
ability and attainments. What are the conditions necessary for 
pupils to rate themselves favourably in respect of their ability 
to learn? Shayer and Beasley define the purpose of Instrumental 
Enrichment as, "to restore the ability to learn from fresh 
experience, and the individual's belief in that ability" (April 
1986, p.3). How interdependent are ability and belief? Do some 
pupils seem to achieve a feeling of executive control over their 
learning, the status of being sovereign over their thoughts and 
deeds, without manifesting a concomitant improvement in the 
reality-processing skills required for new learning? Is there a 
significant amount of covariance between pupils' self-assessment 
ratings and attainment scores or teachers' ratings, suggesting the 
influence of feedback from outside the Instrumental Enrichment 
classroom? 
I shall attempt to answer the above questions when I have recorded 
and analysed the results of my experiment. There are other 
questions that will remain unaddressed, even though they too might 
have thrown light on my thesis. If I had prepared sociometric 
tests (as pioneered by Moreno, 1937-38, in Sociometry, Vol.1), I 
could have explored how pupils rate in the eyes of their peers as 
well as in their teachers' eyes and their own eyes; a sociogram 
(of which there are examples in the Sociometry Reader, ed. Moreno, 
1960) would doubtless have been a particularly useful tool for 
setting ratings on the "personal/social confidence - anxiety" 
dimension into the context of group dynamics. Given that tests 
must not encroach too much on pupils' lesson time, however, I have 
had to make a choice between sociometric and psychometric tests: 
my reasons for choosing the latter will hopefully become clear in 
the course of the following brief discussion about two constructs 
I have mentioned and yet not defined operationally. 
Intellectual Ability and Attainments  
"Intellectual ability" is a highly complex construct which helps 
us account for the cognitive operations underlying pupils' 
intelligent behaviour. It is characterised by reality-processing 
skills rather than the "nonintellective factors of intelligence" 
(Wechsler, 1976, p.6), and IQ tests designed to assess those 
skills indicate that their presence in individuals remains at a 
relatively stable level. Feuerstein warns us against construing 
IQ scores as limits on intellectual growth, however, since IQ test 
designers make a deliberate effort to eliminate "those items that 
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address the characteristics of an individual's functioning that 
are subject to change and to retain only those questions directed 
toward characteristics that are most resistant to change" (1980, 
pp.6-7). Feuerstein does concede that "the IQ score reflects the 
product of a given quantum of ability," but he goes on to argue 
that placing too much emphasis on a product-oriented assessment of 
intellectual ability distorts our view of pupils' cognitive 
functioning and tells us nothing about "the processes responsible 
for an individual's performance or about the individual's capacity 
to improve it" (1980, p.7). Perhaps Feuerstein's main point about 
IQ is that while certain innate cognitive structures may be 
impervious to intervention for cognitive modifiability, they are 
fragments within a "composite or global" intelligence (Wechsler, 
1976, p.6) and not a governing entity which predetermines the 
scope of pupils' performances on all the parameters of the 
cognitive map. 
Having put IQ into perspective as regards intellectual ability, I 
shall nevertheless need to know whether it seems to be influenced 
by the independent variable, intervention with Instrumental 
Enrichment, in my experiment. If it is only an "attribute 
variable" which pupils bring to the experiment "ready-made" 
(Kerlinger, 1973, p.38), I shall need to know if it co-varies with 
the dependent variable, adjustment to school, and thus comes into 
the reckoning of presumed experimental effect. 
	 Two tests from 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised (WISC-R), 
"Similarities" and "Arithmetic," ought to generate sufficient 
data for me to find out what I need to know. 
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The "Similarities" and "Arithmetic" tests are both scored on 
Wechsler's Verbal Scale, although each relates to a different mode 
of communication and represents a different strand within the 
modality parameter of the cognitive map. Wechsler offers several 
other test modes so as to be "effective as well as 
fair, "acknowledging that pupils differ in which modes they find 
easy or hard (1976, p.5); but like the two tests I have selected, 
they are all typical modality-parameter tests concerned with the 
reception and production of modes of communication, and their 
relevance to the elaboration processes which operate between input 
and output on the phase parameter is a matter for conjecture. 
Shayer and Beasley tried to test children's intellectual ability 
in ways that kept measures on the operations and phase parameters 
of the cognitive map distinct from measures on the modality 
parameter (reported in Does Instrumental Enrichment Work?, April 
1986). 	 In order to obtain measures on the operations parameter, 
Shayer turned to an individual interview battery of twelve 
Piagetian tasks originally designed for recipients who might not 
be literate. This interview battery comprised the following 
elements: one-to-one Correspondence; Classification; Seriation; 
Conservation of Mass, Weight, Internal Volume, Displacement Volume 
and Length; and, the spatial tasks of Water-Level, Perspective, 
Mountain and House (details in Shayer, Demetriou and Pervez, 
1986). Beasley turned to a more interactive form of testing, 
based on part of Feuerstein's Learning Potential Assessment Device 
(LPAD), having been convinced by Feuerstein that "static forms of 
psychometric assessment lead to underestimation of the 
capabilities of the retarded" (Shaper and Beasley, April 1986, 
p.13). Beasley wanted to test children on both the operations 
parameter and the phase parameter; her method involved, 
an initial use of Raven's Matrices as a base—line 
measure, but taken only to the point where the subject 
starts to fail the items. Attention is then switched to 
LPAD Variations, a set of problems based on Raven's sets 
A to D. The administrator makes it clear from the 
outset that she is interested in the subject's success, 
and proceeds to supply an explicit teaching component. 
But she does not teach solution algorithms. 
The intervention proceeds using exactly the same model 
as underlies Instrumental Enrichment; observations are 
recorded of the subject's deficient cognitive 
functions and suggestions are then made to the subject 
for improving his information—gathering, elaboration and 
output strategies.... Finally the subject is taken back 
to the items in Raven's which he originally failed, to 
see how many more he can now solve. Again, a record is 
made in terms of the phase parameter of the 
subject's performance as well as of the extra items 
solved. The difference between the scores of the two 
administrations of Raven's represents a modifiability 
estimate: it indicates the extent to which the subject is 
able to transfer the recently acquired learning to new 
problems. (Shaper and Beasley, April 1986, pp.13-14) 
Shayer and Beasley found that six children who had followed an 
Instrumental Enrichment programme scored significantly higher than 
six comparable children who had not, on their Piagetian and LPAD 
tests; whereas the same experimental group of six pupils revealed 
no significant advantage on Thurstone's PMA, a static form of 
psychometric test which yields measures on the modality parameter 
(see Appendix 9 for table of Shaper and Beasley's results). The 
problem with such results is that their full meaning can only be 
understood by somebody engaged in forging a relationship between 
Instrumental Enrichment and the measures used to -study its 
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effects. 	 Despite this difficulty, it is still possible to accept 
that logically, Instrumental Enrichment, "with its emphasis on 
metacognitive training, should show its most immediate effects in 
changes on the phase parameter, on pupils' general problem- 
solving strategies. 
	 It should thus show as quickly on forms of 
psychological testing focussed on here-and-now reasoning and on 
general reality-processing such as studied by Piaget and co- 
workers" (Shayer and Beasley, April 1986, p.18). 
	 But do the 
immediate effects of Instrumental Enrichment, which register on 
Piagetian and LPAD tests, translate into durable skills that will 
enhance pupils' attainments in school? 
I shall ask the schools participating in my experiment to 
administer verbal, numerical and perceptual attainment tests (AH2 
and AH3 by Hein et al., 1975); and I shall also arrange for tests 
of reading accuracy and comprehension (Neale Analysis of Reading 
Ability, 1966). Although Instrumental Enrichment can not actually 
alter pupils' learning history retrospectively, it might teach 
pupils to process the contents of previous learning more 
productively. If I had more time to investigate, what would 
interest me further is whether pupils who have received 
Instrumental Enrichment show better adjustment to school, better 
problem-solving strategies and better reality-processing skills 
than others do, when tested by fresh learning situations a few 
years after experiencing Feuerstein's method of intervention. 
Regretably, my schedule of measuring operations will not run to a 
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second post-test; it is outlined below. 
Schedule of Measuring Operations  
NOVEMBER 1984: pre-tests in four schools, each with a teacher 
trained to teach the first four instruments of the Instrumental 
Enrichment programme. One hundred and twenty four pupils were 
selected on the basis of their ages; they were just entering their 
last two years of primary schooling or just commencing their first 
two years of secondary schooling. They had all been known to 
their form teachers, who would be completing the CAS schedule on 
them, for two months. In addition to the CAS schedule, teachers 
administered the AH tests of verbal, numerical and perceptual 
attainments as group tests. 	 An educational psychologist 
administered the WISC-R tests in one-to-one interviews. I used 
the Repertory Grid Technique and the Neale Analysis of Reading 
Ability in separate one-to-one interviews. 
DECEMBER 1984: I had planned to either split pupils randomly 
within each school to create experimental and control groups, or 
to use pre-test scores to create matched experimental and control 
groups. Both of these options assumed that organisation within 
the schools would prove more pliable than it actually was. The 
primary schools split classes in half, understandably making sure 
that experimental groups would have a preponderance of the pupils 
with learning difficulties, disruptive behaviour or symptoms of 
anxiety. They were quite open about having used criteria borrowed 
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from the CAS schedule "in certain cases," but stressed that the 
experimental and control groups would nonetheless both contain 
their "normal range of pupils." The secondary modern school and 
the special secondary school for pupils with moderate learning 
difficulties each split their pupils by using parallel classes as 
experimental and control groups. 
JANUARY 1985: Instrumental Enrichment teaching commenced, at a 
rate of two hours per week in each school. 
APRIL 1985: I began visiting the four schools to observe 
Instrumental Enrichment lessons. It worried me that I might 
increase the likelihood of a Hawthorne effect by concentrating on 
the experimental groups and seldom observing the control groups. 
I soon discovered, however, that form teachers were making a 
conscious effort with pupils from the control groups to rival the 
Instrumental Enrichment teachers' intervention in the experimental 
groups. Shipman describes what happened to one experiment where 
compensation in favour of control pupils went to an extreme: 
the effect of the programme could not be compared with 
the control schools because these had reacted to the 
tests by drawing upon new schemes of work, employing 
extra teachers and concentrating on improving the 
performance of the children on the tests. 	 This 
unintended consequence 	
 was named by the authors 
the Bethnal Green effect, after the Hawthorne effect 
that was the first indication of distortion caused by 
involvement in an experiment rather than by any impact 
of the selected variables. (1981, pp.110-111) 
It is hard to tell with any certainty, but Instrumental Enrichment 
seemed to be getting a fair trial in three out of the four schools 
I was visiting and neither the Hawthorne effect nor the Bethnal 
Green effect casts a noticeable shadow across my experiment. The 
fact that at least two of the Instrumental Enrichment 
teachers underwent profound changes in their professional practice 
as a result of adopting Feuerstein's methodology is not to be 
confused with unspecified or incidental effects. 
JULY 1985: the Instrumental Enrichment teachers received another 
week of training together. 	 The special school teacher reported 
that she could not maintain her commitment to teaching two hours 
of Instrumental Enrichment per week, and it was agreed that I 
should discount her pupils' results when post-testing was carried 
out. 	 The loss of the special school experimental and control 
classes reduced the total number of pupils to ninety six. 
SEPTEMBER 1985: 	 each class of pupils joined a different form 
teacher, at the start of the new academic year. The fact that it 
would not be the same teachers completing the CAS schedule during 
post-testing as completed them during pre-testing was not a 
problem, because the inter-rater reliability of the CAS schedule 
is satisfactory (see Varlaam et al., October 1983, p.11). 
JUNE 1986: 	 post-tests in three schools, with nominal testing in 
the fourth. Various changes in individual pupils' domestic 
situations had reduced the number who had attended lessons 
• 
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regularly and were available for 
evening up of experimental and 
numbers of primary and secondary 
and girls gave me a final total  
testing to eighty three. Random 
control groups to contain equal 
pupils and equal numbers of boys 
of seventy six pupils: nineteen 
control, 	 secondary 
The next chapter offers a 
each of primary experimental, primary 
experimental and secondary control. 
record and analysis of the test results from these four categories 
of pupils, although in reality pupils belonged to six physical 
groups in three schools. 
RECORD AND ANALYSIS OF TEST RESULTS  
This chapter offers a summary of the results from my experiment 
rather than a collection of all the data. A complete record of 
individual pupils' ratings and scores appears in Appendix 8. The 
summary deals with primary and secondary pupils separately, partly 
in anticipation of age-related differences, and partly in 
recognition of organisational differences. 
	 Primary experimental 
and control groups were formed by splitting classes, whereas 
secondary experimental and control groups were formed from 
parallel classes. Hence, poorly-adjusted primary pupils who 
benefitted from intervention were possibly better placed to 
experience an immediate sense of "catching up" with their peers 
than poorly-adjusted secondary pupils whose classmates kept up a 
similar rate of progress to their own. 
The primary pupils had a milieu of the whole gamut of progess 
among experimental and control group peers as a context for rating 
their adjustment to school, whilst neither half of the secondary 
pupils knew much about the progress of their counterparts. The 
situation could therefore have arisen, for instance, that one 
class of secondary pupils gained ground on the other in respect of 
learning skills, but remained unaware of any such reason for 
upgrading the range of their "self assessment" ratings. However, 
the effects of intervention should now be apparent whether or not 
this situation arose in the secondary school, given that one of 
the tasks of the Instrumental Enrichment teacher was to mediate on 
behalf of experimental pupils and interpret their achievements for 
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them (as explained in my chapter on A Practitioner's Perspective). 
In fact, the presumed effects of Instrumental Enrichment teaching 
on secondary pupils' ratings of their adjustment to school do 
appear to have a lot in common with the effects of similar 
intervention where primary pupils are concerned. As the tables on 
the following pages show, there is a pervasive tendency for both 
the primary and the secondary experimental groups to either 
improve more or worsen less than their controls in respect of how 
their adjustment changed between 1984 and 1986. This tendency is 
strong enough for us to reject the null hypothesis, since the 
probability of its being explained away as a series of 
coincidences is very low (see footnote F5.1); although analysis of 
isolated sub-tests rarely yields an F-ratio which is above the 




A two-tail sign test, of whether experimental or control 
groups' "self assessmentft ratings improve more or worsen less 
between 1984 and 1986, shows six positive differences out of the 
six possible (three adjustment to school factors, presented both 
to primary and to secondary pupils) in favour of the experimental 
groups. The probability of this being a fluke is one chance in 
sixty-four for a one-tail test, so for a two-tail test p = 0.032 
(still within the five percent level of significance, even when the 
probability has been doubled). 
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There was considerable within-groups error variance militating 
against sub-test results proving statistically significant, as the 
standard deviation figures which relate to the mean ratings from 
1984 indicate (see tables with a "Total Scores" heading). 
Nevertheless, an important set of results did prove significant at 
the five percent level: the intercorrelation between what primary 
experimental pupils "wished for" and their "self assessment" leaps 
from 0.41 before intervention to 0.74 after intervention, whereas 
the intercorrelation between what primary control pupils "wished 
for" and their "self assessment" drops slightly from 0.59 to 0.56 
during the same period. 
Such significant differences between intercorrelation means are 
missing from the equivalent set of secondary results. With the 
inter-correlation between "wished for" and "self assessment" 
ratings already amounting to a group mean of 0.65 when the 
secondary experimental pupils were pre-tested, they appear to have 
felt that their aspirations had been realised to a large extent 
even before intervention began. The primary experimental pupils 
appear to have felt comparatively dissatisfied in 1984. 
Perhaps longer experience of disappointments at school had taught 
the secondary pupils to set their sights lower than primary 
pupils' aspirations? Secondary experimental pupils' "wished for" 
identification with being good at learning was modestly rated at 
0.49 before intervention; whilst primary experimental pupils gave 
learning skills a higher priority, rating their "wished for" 
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identification at 0.61. The explanation remains a matter for 
conjecture. From my experience of administering the Repertory 
Grid Technique, I can report that secondary pupils presented 
themselves as diffident rather than complacent about what they 
wished for; but the data I gathered afford only scant support for 
the view that secondary pupils with learning difficulties are 
liable to be more resigned to low attainments than primary pupils 
with learning difficulties. My experiment was not designed to 
resolve such matters. 
Like all conventional experiments, mine was designed to control 
systematic extraneous variance as much as possible, so that 
unnecessary experimental error would not obscure any variance 
induced by intervention. 	 However, Local Education Authority 
colleagues in Buckinghamshire's Advisory Service had asked me to 
study the effects of Instrumental Enrichment in diverse schools, 
and I could not eliminate age—related and organisational sources 
of error entireley. The obvious alternative to elimination was 
incorporation: I had to deliberately distinguish primary school 
sources of variance from secondary school sources of variance, and 
to use these sources as mutual checks and balances within my 
experiment, thereby allowing for any systematic strengthening or 
weakening of the effects of intervention to be properly 
attributed. 
With results from the primary schools and the secondary school 
kept apart, the prospect of analysing them was not so daunting. I 
still needed to be vigilant, because the allocation of pupils to 
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experimental and control groups had not been done purely at 
random; this meant that the chances of unaccounted for variables 
cancelling one another out were reduced, and that the results were 
a little more vulnerable to contamination. Any contamination was 
likely to produce a bias against my hypothesis, since the 
exceptions to random allocation involved a few of the most 
intransigent pupils in my sample being selected for intervention. 
No amount of statistical manipultion will correct bias reliably if 
it remains unidentified, or course, but pre-testing had revealed 
the effects of schools' tinkering with the symmetry of my 
experimental design and Fisher's invention of the analysis of co-
variance would enable me to purge post-test results of the 
contamination associated with known differences in groups' initial 
status. Analysis of covariance is, 
a form of analysis of variance that tests the 
significance of the differences between means of final 
experimental data by taking into account the correlation 
between the dependent variable and one or more 
covariates, and by adjusting initial mean differences in 
the experimental groups. That is, the analysis of 
covariance analyzes the differences between experimental 
groups of Y after taking into account initial 
differences in the Y measures (i.e., pre-test measures) 
or differences in some pertinent independent variable. 
The measure used for the control (pre-test measures or 
measures on a pertinent variable) is called the 
covariate. (Kerlinger, 1973, p.370) 
Because the last column of figures in each of the following Tables 
of Means has been adjusted relative to the Instrumental Enrichment 
groups' and the control groups' initial status, in the way just 
mentioned, the difference between the figures in this column can 
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be said to represent and exptrapolation of experimental effect 
size. In other words, the "adjusted mean" figures provide a guide 
as to whether Instrumental Enrichment teaching changed pupils in 
operationally defined ways; although these figures must be read in 
conjunction with the F—ratios calculated to assess their 
statistical significance if they are to be cited piecemeal as 
evidence of specific changes. 
So far in this chapter, I have concentrated on pupils' ratings of 
their adjustment to school. 	 After the pages of tables, I shall 
highlight some of the ability and attainment scores as well. Once 
we have noted the direction and magnitude of changes in respect of 
every dependent variable, we shall be in a position to look for 
relationships between teachers' ratings, 	 pupils' ratings and 
objective test scores. All ratings and scores have been subjected 
to analysis of covariance in the same way. To help the reader 
sort through them, ratings or scores from each sub—test are 
recorded, analysed and remarked upon in the space of a page; these 
pages are coded and an index is provided to establish their order 
(see overleaf). 
5.0 INDEX OF RESULTS AND ANALYSES PAGES. 
PRIMARY SCHOOLS SECONDARY SCHOOL 
Code Code TESTS 
5.1 CAS schedule: 	 Personal/Social Confidence. 5.11 
5.2 CAS schedule: 	 Co-operative Behaviour. 5.12 
5.3 CAS schedule: 	 Learning Skills. 5.13 
5.4 Repertory Grid: 	 wished for Pers/Soc Confidence. 5.14 
5.5 Repertory Grid: 	 wished for Co-op Behaviour. 5.15 
5.6 Repertory Grid: 	 wished for Learning Skills. 5.16 
5.7 Repertory Grid: 	 self assess Pers/Soc Confidence. 5.17 
5.8 Repertory Grid: 	 self assess Co-op Behaviour. 5.18 
5.9 Repertory Grid: 	 self assess Learning Skills. 5.19 
5.10 Repertory Grid: 	 wish/self inter-correlation. 	 • 5.20 
5.21 WISC-R Similarities. 5.28 
5.22 WISC-R Arithmetic. 5.29 
5.23 Neale Analysis of Reading, Accuracy. 5.30 
5.24 Neale Analysis of Reading, Comprehension. 5.31 
5.25 AH 2/3, Verbal. 5.32 
5.26 AH 2/3, Numerical. 5.33 
5.27 AH 2/3, Perceptual. 5.34 
5.1 CAS schedule: summary of teachers' ratings of Primary School 
pupils' PERSONAL/SOCIAL CONFIDENCE. 
TOTAL SCORES 	 (lower ratings indicate fewer problems) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 169 8.89 3.78 
1986 171 9.0 2.61 
Control 1984 121 6.37 2.1 
1986 125 6.58 2.77 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 202.02 36 
Error 190.71 35 5.45 
Treat. 11.31 1 11.31 
F RATIO = 2.07 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 8.89 9.0 8.83 
Control 6.37 6.58 7.2 
REf•1ARKS 
The Instrumental Enrichment group contains pupils with more personal/ 
social anxiety problems than the control group, according to teachers. 
1984 ratings are wide-ranging within the I.E. group; the standard 
deviation is 3.78. Fewer experimental (I.E.) pupils stand out from 
the 1986 ratings as anxious members of their class. 
The Table of Means shows experimental pupils' confidence to be 
holding relatively steady in teachers' eyes, compared to control 
pupils' increasing anxiety; although the F-ratio is not high enough 
for the difference between means to be regarded as statistically 
significant. 
5.2 CAS schedule: summary of teachers' ratings of Primary School 
pupils' CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR. 
TOTAL SCORES 	 (lower ratings indicate fewer problems) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 123 6.47 2.43 
1986 144 7.58 2.58 
Control 1984 94 4.95 1.5 
1986 126 6.63 2.9 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 280.86 36 
Error 278.06 35 7.94 
Treat. 2.8 1 2.8 
F RATIO = 0.3528 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 6.47 7.58 7.39 
Control 4.95 6.63 6.81 
REMARKS 
Teachers find the Instrumental Enrichment pupils' behaviour to be 
more disturbing than that of the control pupils. 
The Instrumental Enrichment pupils' behaviour deteriorates less than 
the control pupils' behaviour between 1984 and 1986, but the 
difference between means is not statistically significant. 
5.3 CAS schedule: summary of teachers' ratings of Primary School 
pupils' LEARNING SKILLS. 
TOTAL SCORES 	 (lower ratings indicate fewer problems) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 175 9.21 3.33 
1986 172 9.05 2.52 
Control 1984 120 6.31 2.29 
1986 154 8.1 2.09 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 150.83 36 
Error 150.31 35 4.29 
Treat. 0.52 1 0.52 
F RATIO = 0.1219 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 9.21 9.05 8.45 
Control 6.31 8.1 8.71 
REMARKS 
Teachers rate some experimental pupils as having extreme learning 
difficulties. 1984 ratings are wide-ranging; the standard deviation 
in the Instrumental Enrichment group is 3.33. By 1986 the standard 
deviation is reduced, and the Table of Means shows experimental 
pupils' learning skill to be going up in teachers' estimation while 
estimations of control pupils' learning skill are going down. 
The difference between means is not statistically significant when 
variance within the whole primary sample is taken into account in the 
usual way. However, the difference between means in the larger of 
the primary classes alone is significant at the one percent level. 
5.4 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Primary School pupils' 
"wished for" identification with PERSONAL/SOCIAL CONFIDENCE. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 10.15 0.53 0.41 
1986 13.65 0.72 0.28 
Control 1984 13.77 0.72 0.21 
1986 13.14 0.69 0.3 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 2.83 36 
Error 2.75 35 7.85 
Treat. 8.46 1 8.46 
F RATIO = 1.078 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.53 0.72 0.75 
Control 0.72 0.69 0.65 
REMARKS 
Several primary experimental pupils could barely identify themselves 
with the "Personal/Social Confidence" construct in 1984; their wished 
for ratings are wide-ranging, with a. standard deviation of 0.41. 
By 1986 the experimental pupils have come together as a group, as the 
reduced standard deviation indicates, and their mean rating is higher. 
The difference between means is not statistically significant, but 
the trend toward greater adjustment to school is unmistakeable in the 
context of other results. 
5.5 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Primary School pupils' 
"wished for" identification with CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 9.89 0.52 0.38 
1986 9.91 0.52 0.3 
Control 1984 7.62 0.4 0.5 
1986 9.39 0.49 0.45 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 4.54 36 
Error 4.53 35 0.13 
Treat. 3.02 1 3.02 
F RATIO = 2.33 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.52 0.52 0.49 
Control 0.4 0.49 0.51 
REMARKS 
The whole primary sample, experimental pupils and control pupils, 
covers a wide range of wished for identification with "Co-operative 
Behaviour". 
Group means stay at modest levels throughout the period of interven-
tion, and the difference between means is not statistically signifi-
cant. 
Standard deviation from the means reduces in both groups. 
5.6 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Primary School pupils' 
"wished for" identification with LEARNING SKILLS. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 11.65 0.61 0.34 
1986 11.82 0.62 0.3 
Control 1984 9.5 0.5 0.44 
1986 10.4 0.55 0.39 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 3.99 36 
Error 3.97 35 0.11 
Treat. 1.21 1 1.21 
F RATIO = 0.1066 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.61 0.62 0.6 
Control 0.5 0.55 0.57 
REMARKS 
I.E. pupils wished for identification with the "Learning Skills" 
construct, more than the control pupils did, even before intervention 
began. Some of the pupils, whose self assessment indicates learning 
difficulties (see results in Appendix 8), are among those whose 
wished for ratings give learning a high priority. 
There is no evidence of any experimental effect on the mean rating of 
the I.E. group. The difference between means is not statistically 
significant. 
5.7 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Primary School pupils' 
"self assessment" in respect of PERSONAL/SOCIAL CONFIDENCE. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 5.46 0.29 0.47 
1986 9.88 0.52 0.38 
Control 1984 9.04 0.47 0.43 
1986 10.03 0.53 0.37 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 4.48 36 
Error 4.4 35 0.13 
Treat. 3.39 1 3.39 
F RATIO = 0.27 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.29 0.52 0.55 
Control 0.47 0.53 0.49 
REMARKS 
Pupils' self assessments in respect of "Personal/Social Confidence" 
are wide-ranging, as the high standard deviation figures show. 
In 1984, experimental pupils were more anxious than control pupils 
about their personal or social standing. By 1986, the two groups 
are virtually neck-and-neck; the adjusted means are open to the 
interpretation that there is more impetus behind the experimental 
group's build-up of confidence, but the difference between means is 
not statistically significant. 
5.8 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Primary School pupils' 
"self assessment" in respect of CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 2.8 0.15 0.44 
1986 6.96 0.37 0.33 
Control 1984 7.29 0.38 0.43 
1986 7.15 0.37 0.5 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 5.73 36 
Error 5.66 35 0.16 
Treat. 7.44 1 7.44 
F RATIO = 0.46 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.15 0.37 0.42 
Control 0.38 0.37 0.32 
REMARKS 
Pupils' self assessments are spread out along the "gets on well with 
teachers - annoys teachers" dimension. 
In 1984, experimental pupils were more depreciatory than control 
pupils about their record of co-operation with teachers. This is no 
longer the case in 1986. 
The adjusted means indicate how much the experimental pupils have 
distanced themselves from disturbing behaviour, compared to the 
control pupils' standstill. Neither group has many pupils who rate 
themselves as highly co-operative, though, notwithstanding the I.E. 
group's progress. The difference between mean ratings is not 
statistically significant. 
5.9 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Primary School pupils' 
"self assessment" in respect of LEARNING SKILLS. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 3.55 0.19 0.48 
1986 9.87 0.52 0.27 
Control 1984 5.88 0.31 0.49 
1986 7.2 0.38 0.52 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 5.6 36 
Error 5.27 35 0.15 
Treat. 0.34 1 0.34 
F RATIO = 2.23 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.19 0.52 0.54 
Control 0.31 0.38 0.35 
REMARKS 
In 1984, both groups' ratings were wide-ranging. The experimental 
group associated themselves with learning difficulties nearly as much 
as they associated themselves with learning skills. 
By 1986, the I.E. pupils have come together as a group, as the reduced 
standard deviation indicates, and their mean "Learning Skills" rating 
is much higher. 
The adjusted means invite speculation about a substantial experimental 
effect, although the difference between means is not statistically 
significant. 
5.10 Repertory Grid Technique: inter-correlation between what 
Primary pupils "wished for" and their "self assessments." 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 7.74 0.41 0.45 
1986 13.99 0.74 0.25 
Control 1984 11.21 0.59 0.35 
1986 10.64 0.56 0.38 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 4.03 36 
Error 3.55 35 0.1 
• Treat. 0.48 1 0.48 
F RATIO = 4.74 	 p < .05 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.41 0.74 0.76 
Control 0.59 0.56 0.53 
REMARKS 
By 1986, the experimental pupils have come together as a group, as 
the reduced standard deviation indicates, and they have come much 
closer than their control group peers to closing the gap between 
what they wish to be like and what they think they are really like. 
The control group figures remain virtually unaltered throughout the 
period of intervention, whilst the I.E. group figures provide a 
record of progress. The difference between mean inter-correlations 
is statistically significant at the five percent level. 
5.11 CAS schedule: summary of teachers' ratings of Secondary 
School pupils' PERSONAL/SOCIAL CONFIDENCE. 
TOTAL SCORES (lower ratings indicate fewer problems) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 147 7.74 3.22 
1986 144 7.58 3.04 
Control 1984 140 7.37 2.94 
1986 134 7.05 2.25 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 205.44 36 
Error 204.18 35 5.83 
Treat. 1.26 1 1.26 
F RATIO = 0.2162 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted M'ean 
I.E. 7.74 7.58 7.49 
Control 7.37 7.05 7.13 
REMARKS 
Teachers' mean ratings of the two secondary school groups start and 
finish very close together, where the "Personal/Social Confidence" 
factor in pupils' adjustment to school is concerned. The difference 
between means is not statistically significant. 
5.12 CAS schedule: summary of teachers' ratings of Secondary 
School pupils' CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR. 
TOTAL SCORES (lower ratings indicate fewer problems) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 106 5.58 2.97 
1986 129 6.79 3.38 
Control 1984 93 4.89 1.83 
1986 110 5.79 1.98 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 223.28 36 
Error 219.72 35 6.28 
Treat. 3.55 1 3.55 
F RATIO = 0.5664 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 5.58 6.79 6.59 
Control 4.89 5.79 5.98 
REMARKS 
In 1984, teachers perceived the experimental group as more diverse 
than the control group, as the standard deviation figures indicate. 
The behaviour of the experimental group was rated as more disturbing 
than that of the control group, due to there being a few more pupils 
in the experimental group who were regarded as troublesome (see 
individual results in Appendix 8). 
By 1986, little has changed overall, except that both groups' 
behaviour has deteriorated slightly in their teachers' eyes. The 
difference between mean ratings is not statistically significant. 
5.13 CAS schedule: summary of teachers' ratings of Secondary 
School pupils' LEARNING SKILLS. 
TOTAL SCORES (lower ratings indicate fewer problems) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 144 7.58 2.92 
1986 183 9.63 3.16 
Control 1984 137 7.21 2.3 
1986 177 9.31 2.29 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 246.74 36 
Error 246.48 35 7.04 
Treat. 0.26 1 0.26 
F RATIO = 3.6656 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 7.58 9.63 9.56 
Control 7.21 9.31 9.39 
REMARKS 
The I.E. group and the control group start and finish almost the same 
as one another. Both groups are perceived to be encountering more 
learning difficulties in 1986 than they were in 1984. The difference 
between mean ratings of the groups is not statistically significant. 
5.14 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Secondary School 
pupils' "wished for" identification with PERSONAL/SOCIAL 
CONFIDENCE. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 10.5 0.55 0.41 
1986 15.25 0.8 0.22 
Control 1984 13.3 0.7 0.27 
1986 13.95 0.73 0.13 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 1.2 36 
Error 1.12 35 3.21 
Treat. 8.1 1 8.1 
F RATIO = 2.5219 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.55 0.8 0.81 
Control 0.7 0.73 0.72 
REMARKS 
In 1984, the experimental pupils endorsed their teacher's view of 
them as a diverse group; the standard deviation from the group mean 
was 0.41. They did not wish to become more closely identified with 
the "Personal/Social Confidence" construct as much as the control 
pupils did. 
By 1986, the experimental pupils have come together as a group, as 
the reduced standard deviation indicates, and they have overtaken 
the control pupils in wishing for personal or social confidence. 
The adjusted means alert us to the possibility of an experimental 
effect on pupils' aspirations, but the difference between means is 
not statistically significant. 
5.15 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Secondary School 
pupils' "wished for" identification with CO-OPERATIVE 
BEHAVIOUR. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 8.57 0.45 0.46 
1986 7.48 0.39 0.65 
Control 1984 7.55 0.39 0.45 
1986 5.6 0.29 0.48 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 10.41 36 
Error 10.36 35 0.29 
Treat. 4.67 1 4.67 
F RATIO = 0.1579 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.45 0.39 0.38 
Control 0.39 0.29 0.31 
REMARKS 
In 1984, experimental pupils had a slightly more pronounced wish to 
co-operate with teachers than control pupils, despite the fact that 
their behaviour is rated as worse than that of their peers by teachers 
(see 5.12) and themselves (see 5.18). 
By 1986, both groups have lost some of their already modest enthusiasm 
for co-operating with teachers. Responses from I.E. pupils vary a 
great deal; the standard deviation from the group mean is 0.65, which 
indicates that many ratings are near the extremes of the -1 to +1 
range. The difference between mean ratings is not statistically 
significant. 
5.16 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Secondary School 
pupils' "wished for" identification with LEARNING SKILLS. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 9.49 0.49 0.46 
1986 12.34 0.65 0.42 
Control 1984 8.42 0.44 0.45 
1986 10.62 0.56 0.27 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 2.78 36 
Error 2.74 35 7.83 
Treat. 3,62 1 3.62 
F RATIO = 0.4628 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.49 0.65 0.63 
Control 0.44 0.56 0.57 
REMARKS 
By 1986, both groups wish for learning skills more emphatically than 
they did in 1984. The I.E. group maintains its lead over the control 
group, but the difference between mean ratings is not statistically 
significant. 
5.17 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Secondary School pupils' 
"self assessment" in respect of PERSONAL/SOCIAL CONFIDENCE. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 9.31 0.49 0.45 
1986 12.55 0.66 0.36 
Control 1984 12.17 0.64 0.25 
1986 13.73 0.72 0.19 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 3.09 36 
Error 3.08 35 8.79 
Treat. 1.23 1 1.23 
F RATIO = 0.14 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.49 0.66 0.67 
Control 0.64 0.72 0.71 
REMARKS 
Experimental pupils have become more confident during the course of 
intervention, but control pupils have also made a little progress in 
the same direction and the difference between mean ratings is not 
statistically significant. 
5.18 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Secondary School pupils' 
"self assessment" in respect of CO-OPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev, 
I.E. 	 1984 6.57 0.34 0.55 
1986 6.97 0.37 0.55 
Control 1984 8.48 0.45 0.39 
1986 6.27 0.33 0.42 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 6.26 36 
Error 6.18 35 0.17 
. 	 Treat. 8.67 1 8.67 
F RATIO = 0.4912 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.34 0.37 0.39 
Control 0.45 0.33 0.3 
REMARKS 
Both groups start and finish very close together, where self assess-
ments in respect of "Co-operative Behaviour" are concerned. The 
adjusted means make the trend, for I.E. pupils to make progress 
relative to control pupils, more noticeable; however, the difference 
between means is not statistically significant in itself. 
5.19 Repertory Grid Technique: summary of Secondary School 
pupils' "self assessment" in respect of LEARNING SKILLS. 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 7.96 0.42 0.47 
1986 10.05 0.53 0.44 
Control 1984 8.49 0.45 0.46 
1986 9 0.47 0.38 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 5.09 36 
Error 5.05 35 0.14 
. 	 Treat. 4.32 1 4.32 
F RATIO = 0.2994 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.42 0.53 0.53 
Control 0.45 0.47 0.47 
REMARKS 
Experimental pupils start marginally behind control pupils and 
finish marginally ahead of them in their collective self assessment 
of "Learning Skills". The difference between the mean ratings of 
the two groups is not statistically significant by itself, but the 
trend for experimental pupils to gain more or lose less than control 
pupils is reinforced. 
5.20 Repertory Grid Technique: inter-correlation between what 
Secondary pupils "wished for" and their "self assessments". 
TOTAL SCORES (based on correlation coefficients from grids) 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 12.28 0.65 0.39 
1986 13.69 0.72 0.34 
Control 1984 14.97 0.79 0.16 
1986 14.6 0.77 0.17 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 2.85 36 
Error 2.83 35 8.09 
Treat. 1.95 1 1.95 
F RATIO = 0.2407 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group  1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 0.65 0.72 0.72 
Control 0.79 0.77 0.77 
REMARKS 
By 1986, pupils in the I.E. group have closed the gap between their 
aspirations and their perceptions of personal reality a little 
further than in 1984. Control pupils virtually maintain their high 
level of self-satisfaction, however, and the difference between 
mean ratings is not statistically significant. 
5.21 WISC-R Similarities: summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 168 8.84 2.25 
1986 217 11.42 2.79 
Control 1984 189 9.95 2.18 
1986 234 12.31 2.65 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 141.78 36 
Error 141.75 35 4.05 
Treat. 3.64 1 3.64 
F RATIO = 8.9798 
	 p< .01 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 8.84 11.42 11.9 
Control 9.95 12.31 11.83 
REMARKS 
The adjusted means show the Instrumental Enrichment group having made 
greater progress than the control group. The difference between mean 
scores is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
5.22 WISC-R Arithmetic: summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 164 8.63 2.2 
1986 186 9.79 2.04 
Control 1984 192 10.1 2.89 
1986 217 11.42 3.37 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 248.7 36 
Error 240.88 35 6.88 
Treat. 7.82 1 7.82 
F RATIO = 1.1369 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 8.63 9.79 10.13 
Control 10.1 11.42 11.08 
RalARKS 
The control group maintain their superiority in arithmetic. 
5.23 Neale Analysis of Reading, Accuracy: 
summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 2166 114.0 17.43 
1986 2531 133.21 16.09 
Control 1984 2390 125.79 18.28 
1986 2675 140.79 15.26 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 2889.43 36 
Error 2880.35 35 82.29 
Treat. 9.08 1 9.08 
F RATIO = 0.1104 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 114.0 (9y6m) 133.21 	 (11y 1m) 137.51 
Control 125.79 (10y6m) 140.79 (11y 9m) 136.48 
REMARKS 
The I.E. group draw closer to the control group's level of accuracy; 
their greater progress is reflected by the adjusted means, but the 
difference between mean scores is not statistically significant. 
5.24 Neale Analysis of Reading, Comprehension: 
summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 2103 110.68 16.11 
1986 2540 133.68 15.31 
Control 1984 2396 126.1 17.81 
1986 2699 142.05 15.11 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 4783.46 36 
Error 4776.02 35 136.46 
Treat. 7.44 1 7.44 
F RATIO = 5.4543 	 p < .05 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 110.68 (9y3m) 133.68 	 (11y2m) 138.35 
Control 126.1 	 (10y6m) 142.05 
	 (11y10m) 137.38 
REMARKS 
The I.E. group draw closer to the control group's level of comprehen-
sion; their greater progress is reflected by the adjusted means, and 
the difference between means is statistically significant at the five 
percent level. 
5.25 AH 2/3, Verbal: summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 195 10.26 5.57 
1986 285 15.0 5.55 
Control 1984 239 12.58 5.21 
1986 368 19.37 6.2 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 1169.76 36 
Error 1072.05 35 30.63 
Treat. 97.71 1 97.71 
F RATIO = 3.1899 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 10.26 15.0 15.54 
Control 12.58 19.37 18.82 
REMARKS 
The control group maintain their written verbal superiority. 
5.26 AH 2/3, Numerical: summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 103 5.42 3.13 
1986 194 10.21 4.31 
Control 1984 136 7.16 3.36 
1986 236 12.42 5.1 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 605.07 36 
Error 598.79 35 17.11 
Treat. 6.29 1 6.29 
F RATIO = 0.3676 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 5.42 10.21 10.89 
Control 7.16 12.42 11.74 
RS1ARKS 
The control group maintain their superiority in written numerical 
work. 
5.27 AH 2/3, Perceptual: summary of Primary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 262 13.79 6.37 
1986 357 18.79 5.29 
Control 1984 289 15.21 5.21 
1986 426 22.42 4.68 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 778.71 36 
Error 694.52 35 19.84 
Treat. 84.19 1 84.19 
F RATIO = 4.2427 	 p < .05 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 13.79 18.79 19.1 
Control 15.21 22.42 22.1 
REMARKS 
The control group continues to do better than the experimental group 
on this written test of perceptual ability. The difference between 
mean scores for the two groups is statistically significant at the 
five percent level. 
5.28 WISC-R Similarities: summary of Secondary School pupils' 
results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 188 9.89 1.88 
1986 216 11.37 2.1 
Control 1984 176 9.26 1.71 
1986 210 11.05 2.35 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 121.81 36 
Error 121.6 35 3.47 
Treat. 0.21 1 0.21 
F RATIO = 6.1379 	 p < .05 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 9.89 11.37 11.13 
Control 9.26 11.05 11.29 
REMARKS 
The two groups start and finish at almost the same level as one 
another. However, owing to the small amount of within-groups 
variance, the difference between mean scores emerges as statistically 
significant at the five percent level and our attention is drawn to 
the control group's slightly greater progress. 
5.29 WISC-R Arithmetic: summary of Secondary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 176 9.26 2.35 
1986 216 11.37 3.18 
Control 1984 178 9.37 2.63 
1986 210 11.05 3.08 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 239.09 36 
Error 237.61 35 6.79 
Treat. 1.48 1 1.48 
F RATIO = 0.2185 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 9.26 11.37 11.41 
Control 9.37 11.05 11.01 
REMARKS 
The two groups start and finish at almost the same level as one 
another. The difference between mean scores is not statistically 
significant. 
5.30 Neale Analysis of Reading, Accuracy: 
summary of Secondary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 2493 131.21 15.05 
1986 2747 144.58 10.7 
Control 1984 2559 134.68 17.25 
1986 2742 144.31 10.6 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 1039.01 36 
Error 990.65 35 28.3 
Treat. 48.36 1 48.36 
F RATIO = 1.7086 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 131.21 	 (10y11m) 144.58 (12y1m) 145.58 
Control 134.68 	 (11y3m) 144.31 	 (12y0m) 143.31 
RET•1ARKS 
The Instrumental Enrichment group catch up with the control group in 
reading accuracy. The difference between mean scores is not statis-
tically significant. 
5.31 Neale Analysis of Reading, Comprehension: 
summary of Secondary School pupils° results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 2540 133.68 10.76 
1986 2782 146.42 5.16 
Control 1984 2538 133.58 15.93 
1986 2785 146.58 6.0 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 715.16 36 
Error 714.84 35 20.42 
Treat. 0.33 1 0.33 
F RATIO = 1.5973 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 133.68 	 (11y2m) 146.42 (12y 2m) 146.41 
Control 133.58 	 (11y2m) 146.58 (12y 3m) 146.59 
REMARKS 
The two groups start and finish at virtually the same level as one 
another. The difference between mean scores is not statistically 
significant. 
5.32 AH 2/3, Verbal: summary of Secondary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 267 14.05 5.36 
1986 362 19.05 3.36 
Control 1984 260 13.68 4.41 
1986 361 19.0 5.59 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 365.55 36 
Error 365.16 35 10.43 
Treat. 0.39 1 0.39 
F RATIO = 3.7714 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 14.05 19.05 18.92 
Control 13.68 19 19.12 
REMARKS 
The two groups start and finish at almost the same level of written 
verbal ability as one another. The difference between mean scores 
is not statistically significant. 
5.33 AH 2/3, Numerical: summary of Secondary School pupils' results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 213 11.21 4.49 
1986 307 16.16 6.69 
Control 1984 226 11.89 4.77 
1986 239 12.58 6.41 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 794.1 36 
Error 615.87 35 17.59 
Treat. 178.23 1 178.23 
F RATIO = 10.1289 	 p< .01 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 11.21 16.16 16.54 
Control 11.89 12.58 12.19 
REMARKS 
In 1984, the two groups were close together in written numerical work. 
By 1986, the I.E. pupils are much more advanced than their peers in 
the control group. The difference between mean scores is statistic-
ally significant at the one percent level. 
5.34 AH 2/3, Perceptual: summary of Secondary School pupils' 
results. 
TOTAL SCORES 
Cell Total Mean St. Dev. 
I.E. 	 1984 333 17.53 3.6 
1986 498 26.21 3.15 
Control 1984 342 18.0 3.78 
1986 478 25.16 3.46 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
Source SS df MS 
Total 319.32 36 
Error 303.95 35 8.68 
Treat. 15.37 1 15.37 
F RATIO = 1.7694 
TABLE OF MEANS 
Group 1984 Mean 1986 Mean Adjusted Mean 
I.E. 17.53 26.21 26.32 
Control 18.0 25.16 25.05 
REMARKS 
Pupils in the Instrumental Enrichment group come from behind to gain 
a slight advantage over the control pupils as regards perceptual 
ability, but the difference between mean scores is not statistically 
significant. 
Results which appear to provide evidence of experimental effects 
on pupils' ability and attainment do not fall into an obvious 
pattern. They can only be properly understood in relation to the 
contexts in which they were achieved. Even then, they raise a 
number of questions. 
In 1986, the primary experimental group's mean score on the WISC-R 
Similarities test shows these pupils well on the way to catching 
up with their control group peers, after starting out in 1984 more 
than a point behind on average. The diference between means is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. 
	 Is this 
result the fruit of work on Feuerstein's Comparisons instrument? 
Comparisons invites the sort of exercise that appears to be a 
useful preparation for answering WISC-R Similarities questions. 
However, the secondary experimental pupils also worked on 
Comparisons, and yet their WISC-R Similarities scores improve less 
than those of the secondary control pupils. Why is there no sign 
of secondary experimental pupils having developed superior ability 
in the area tested by WISC-R Similarities, despite their having 
practised the same specific skills as their successful primary 
counterparts in Instrumental Enrichment lessons? Perhaps other 
skills or factors were involved in the primary pupils' 
achievement; and perhaps the Comparisons instrument was too easy 
for the secondary pupils, so that it could not stretch them unless 
it was complemented by some sophisticated bridging. I shall 
explore these interpretations in my next chapter, when I look at 
what can be inferred from the results of my experiment. 
Primary experimental pupils'enhanced ability to operate on verbal 
information, and to articulate their thoughts about it, is 
evidenced by other test scores besides the WISC—R Similarities 
scores. 	 Neale Analysis of Reading Ability scores show 
experimental pupils to have made more progress than control pupils 
in respect of reading accuracy and comprehension; the difference 
between mean comprehension scores is statistically significant at 
the five percent level. But when primary experimental pupils were 
asked in 1986 to produce written evidence of their abiliy, they 
proved to be even less of a match for their control group peers 
than they had been in 1984. The control group, who had sometimes 
worked on written assignments while the experimental group were in 
mainly oral Instrumental Enrichment lessons, continued to be much 
the better of the two groups at responding in writing on the AH 
2/3 tests. 
Despite the primary experimental group's experience of learning to 
solve Feuerstein's diagramatically presented problems, their worst 
AH 2/3 test result, relative to the primary control group's 
results, is the one concerning their perceptual ability. The 
control group's advantage, measured at more than three points 
difference between means, is statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Frances Link has claimed (in the course of visiting 
two Buckinghamshire schools on 3rd April 1987) that this 
persistent disparity between the groups demonstrates a need for 
her "mediated writing" programme (a set of "work journals" 
entitled Reflections on Thinking and Problem Solving, pilot 
version published in 1986) to supplement Instrumental Enrichment, 
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since certain pupils' difficulties with written expression are not 
overcome by Feuerstein's instruments alone. 
What Link may not have appreciated was that Buckinghamshire's 
Instrumental Enrichment teachers purposely neglect pupils' writing 
skills in the early stages of intervention, especially when they 
want pupils with learning difficulties to temporarily distance 
themselves from activities in which they have a history of 
conspicuous mistakes. There was never much hope of pupils doing 
justice to their cognitive development in the written mode of 
output, unless they had already acquired adequate skills from 
their English lessons. 
That said, the secondary experimental pupils managed to transcend 
their previous level of performance on the written AH test of 
numerical ability, 	 to an extent that routine progress in output 
skills would hardly have allowed. According to their results on 
the WISC-R Arithmetic test, their ability to process numerical 
data stayed level with that of their control group peers 
throughout my experiment; so, how is it that the secondary 
experimental pupils were so much more efficient at producing 
correct written answers on the AH test of numerical ability in 
1986? The explanation could be that bridging prepared the way for 
success. Two teachers collaborated on teaching the secondary 
experimental group the skills measured by the AH test of numerical 
ability: their Instrumental Enrichment teacher arranged to 
facilitate the transfer of pertinent skills by involving their 
mathematics teacher in a series of lessons. The pupils for whom 
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this "bridge" was constructed started a little behind their 
control group peers, then pulled ahead nearly four points on 
average; the difference between means is statistically significant 
at the one percent level. 	 Meanwhile, they stayed more or less 
level with their control group peers on the AH tests of verbal 
ability and perceptual ability. It clearly was not their written 
output per se that had undergone a dramatic improvement; perhaps 
they had negotiated improved work practices with their mathematics 
teacher, guided by mediation from their Instrumental Enrichment 
teacher? 
Given that secondary pupils seem to have been able to utilise 
skills developed in Instrumental Enrichment lessons to improve 
their performance in written mathematics, just as primary pupils 
seem to have been able to utilise skills developed in Instrumental 
Enrichment lessons to improve their performance in spoken English, 
we may affirm that intervention with Feuerstein's programme for 
cognitive modifiability does not automatically enhance predictable 
skill areas or attainments in school subjects. 	 Prediction is 
only possible when we know which direction a teacher's bridging 
will take. 
Pupils' results would seem to reflect at least some of the 
mediating teacher's intentions and goals. 	 Because .of this 
phenomenon, I did not ask any of the Buckinghamshire Instrumental 
Enrichment teachers for their assessments of pupils' adjustment to 
school. I already knew from their reports of critical incidents 
in the classrooms that they perceived profound changes in some of 
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their pupils, and that their perceptions of change were 
inextricably linked with their own professional development as 
mediators. Their influence on pupils' thinking and learning 
during Instrumental Enrichment lessons was undoubted; but 
Instrumental Enrichment lessons only occupy a tiny fraction of the 
timetable. What influence was feedback from other teachers 
having? Did the CAS schedules completed by form teachers 
foreshadow pupils' "wished for" or "self assessment" ratings? 
The relationship between form teachers' perceptions of pupils' 
adjustment to school and pupils' own perceptions seems to be a 
tenuous one, since teachers' ratings only coincide with pupils' 
ratings at an insignificant level (see Appendix 10 for cross-
partitioned tables, showing instances of agreement and 
disagreement between teachers and pupils). 	 Moreover, "co- 
operative behaviour" emerges as a factor in pupils' adjustment to 
school that is little changed by intervention. We can infer that 
experimental pupils have become confident that they are more like 
they wished to be without depending on their form teachers for a 
boost in self-esteem. 
Part of the experimental pupils' confidence, particularly in 
respect of their learning skills, is likely to have arisen from 
satisfaction with the accomplishments revealed by objective test 
scores. 	 It is impossibls to estimate how big a part: just as 
individuals are different in their sensitivity to praise or 
adverse criticism, they are also different in the amount of 
success they need before feelings of failure are outweighed by 
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feelings of prowess in the classroom. All we can say is that for 
most of the experimental pupils whose growth in confidence is 
above average, there is a corresponding above average increase 
somewhere among their personal objective test scores (see Appendix 
8 for tables of individual pupils' results) and the score that 
increased by more than the average amount may represent an 
achievement that was important to them. We can not substantiate a 
causal relationship between pupils' abilities and attainments and 
their adjustment to school, wherein increments in the former lead 
to proportionate increments in the latter; indeed, such an 
assumption would ignore the tenet that adjustment to school is a 
precondition for pupils to realise their potential in ability and 
attainment. 
Before my comments stray any further from a strict analysis of 
results into an overview of what can be inferred about the effects 
of Intrumental Enrichment on children's adjustment to school, I 
should acknowledge that I have reached the juncture at which to 
begin a new chapter. 	 By themselves, neither mean ratings and 
scores nor speculation about interaction among the dependent 
variables measured can inform future classroom practice. It is no 
use for practitioners 
hypothesis, unless they 
realise that support. 
implications of results 
the conditions under 
modifiability will take  
to know how much support there is for my 
also know what conditions are necessary to 
In the next chapter, I shall consider the 
from my experiment for colleagues planning 
which future intervention for cognitive 
place. 
144 
INFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS  
In this chapter I shall consider some of the inferences that can 
be drawn from my study, and the implications for colleagues 
interested in using Instrumental Enrichment to promote pupils' 
adjustment to school, under four sub-headings: first, "Changes in 
Individual Pupils' Self-Assessments and the Trend toward 
Psychological Integration"; secondly, "Primary and Secondary 
School Differences Observed"; thirdly, "A Response to Feuerstein's 
Critics"; and fourthly, "The Outlook Now". 
The results, after less than two years' intervention with 
Feuerstein's methodology and materials in the education of a 
sample of Buckinghamshire pupils, provide qualified support for my 
main hypothesis. It seems that Instrumental Enrichment can 
promote children's adjustment to school, at least insofar as it is 
conducive to their perceiving themselves as having made positive 
progress on one or more of the three dimensions which were held 
collectively to operationalise adjustment. Given a post-test 
situation in which class-teachers scarcely recognise that 
experimental pupils have made more progress or deteriorated less 
than their control group peers, however, how can we corroborate 
pupils' self-assessments? Objective test results were just as 
unhelpful toward this end as teachers' perceptions; ability and 
attainment scores only correlated patchily with pupils' "Learning 
Skills" ratings, and they can not be used as criteria for judging 
the validity of how individuals have measured themselves in 
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accordance with personal constructs. 
What we need, if we are to corroborate pupils' self-assessments, 
is to discover that an internal logic governed their responses to 
the Repertory Grid Technique. Without such evidence of pupils' 
affective-cognitive consistency, we can not trust that their 
higher ratings reflect profound changes in their perceptions: 
pupils may simply have learned to disassociate their various 
feelings and beliefs rather than to resolve conflicts between 
them. I already have a considerable amount of evidence at my 
disposal, in the form of correlation matrices calculated from 
individual pupils' grids to show the strength of relationships 
between constructs; 	 but so far, for the sake of economy in my 
attempts to communicate results, I have concentrated on whole 
groups' mean correlations and the statistical significance of 
differences between them. 
Changes in Individual Pupils' Self-Assessments and the Trend 
toward Psychological Integration  
What I want to do now is to make some of the evidence from 
individual pupils more accessible. This does not mean that I 
propose to undo my previous economy and to depart extensively or 
indiscriminately from the practice of analysing results on the 
basis of between-groups comparisions. 	 I shall just use a few 
pupils' profiles to demonstrate, more vividly and more reliably 
than I could if I stuck to drawing from group trends alone, how 
"self-assessment" ratings can be construed as expressions of the 
way in which relationships between constructs have been developed. 
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The experimental group's apparent all-round progress could 
conceivably comprise a haphazard sprinkling of positive responses 
to Instrumental Enrichment, with few pupils having improved in 
respect of more than one factor in their adjustment to school, 
notwithstanding the higher inter-correlation of their aspirations 
and their view of reality; whereas individual profiles render 
personal growth toward psychological integration quite 
unmistakeable. 
I shall use Hierarchical Linkage Analysis to display pupils' 
profiles graphically, in the manner adopted by Ravenette for his 
work on using grid techniques with children (1975, pp 79 to 83). 
This will allow us to see, at a glance, some examples of how 
pupils reconciled constructs and, particularly in cases where 
psychological integration was initially poor, what changes took 
place in the course of "like I'd like to be" and "like I really 
amft coming together in the same cluster. 	 Solid lines indicate a 
cluster of constructs wherein none of the correlation coefficients 
are lower than 0.5, while broken lines indicate weaker 
relationships. Let us begin the display by juxtaposing the 1984 
profile with the 1986 profile of Amanda, a pupil who 
received Instrumental Enrichment in the larger of the two primary 
school classes: 
AMANDA, 1984 
CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 
repertory grid) 
HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
Personal/Social Confidence 1 
55, 
Like I really am 5 
Learning Skills 3 >14 






CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 
repertory grid) 
Personal/Social Confidence 1 
HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
88 
Like I'd like to be 4 69 
53 
Like I really am 5 
Co-operative Behaviour 2 
76 
Learning Skills 3 
We can observe that Amanda considered herself to be fairly good at 
making friends in 1984, and that she wished to be good at 
learning. She identified with annoying teachers as opposed to co-
operating with them, as the negative sign beside the construct 
number shows, but this construct was not perceived as very 
relevant to the previous two clusters. By 1986, Amanda has not 
only increased her self-assessment rating as regards making 
friends but she has also switched the main focus of her 
aspirations into the area of personal and social confidence. 
Meanwhile, she seems to have decided that annoying teachers is not 
compatible with her wish to learn; 	 she links learning skills and 
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co-operative behaviour at a high level. Amanda is no longer in a 
situation where her position on one dimension of adjustment to 
school undermines her position on another dimension; she has 
realised that what she is really like in school is seminally 
related to who she would like to be, and she has become a more 
psychologically integrated person. 
Amanda's classmate, James, was far worse orientated than she was 
in 1984 as regards his readiness to adjust to school. Even though 
he linked learning skills and co-operative behaviour from the 
outset, his identification with this wisdom was nonetheless 
strongly negative. Perhaps he felt he had burned his boats by 
alienating teachers with the frequent outbursts of anger or 
protest that had earned him a reputation for being refractory. He 
was certainly a lonely figure, like somebody stranded: he did not 
enjoy the benefit of kudos among his peers as a reward for 
disrupting lessons, and he rated himself as bad at making friends. 
He was defeatist about what he wished to change at school, and it 
would seem reasonable to interpret the remoteness of the fourth 
construct in his 1984 profile as a guide to how hopeless he felt 
his predicament to be. 	 Indeed, James was one of the children 
deliberately selected by his class-teacher for Instrumental 
Enrichment, on the grounds that an intervention programme for 
cognitive modifiability was precisely what he needed if she was 
ever to "get through to him". Let us contrast how James came to 
present himself in 1986 with how he had presented himself in 1984: 
JAMES, 1984 
CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 	 HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
repertory grid 
Co-operative Behaviour 	 2 
22›.93 
Learning Skills 	 3 
Like I really am 	 -5 	 67 
Personal/Social Confidence 	 1 - - - - - - - - - - - =-42 
Like I'd like to be 
JAMES, 1986 
CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 
repertory grid) 
HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
Co-operative Behaviour 2 
Learning Skills 3 
Personal/Social Confidence 1 - '36, 
Like I'd like to be 4 60 - - - - ----=  .2 09 
Like I really am 5 
The most striking change in James's profile is the appearance of 
"like I really am" in the same cluster as "Like I'd like to 
be". Moreover, neither of these constructs remains negatively 
related to the adjustment to school constructs. These are signs 
of progress, even if they do not represent as much of a 
conversion as we might expect upon taking a step back from 
Hierarchical Linkage Analysis and looking at what happened to 
James's self-assessment ratings between 1984 and 1986 (see 
Appendix 8). James feels easier at school, as his class-teacher 
acknowledges on that part of the CAS schedule concerned with 
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personal and social confidence; but we know from the teacher's 
other ratings of him that he still seems shy of help with the 
management of his learning and inter-personal difficulties (see 
Appendix 8). It would therefore be presumptuous to infer any 
substantial improvement in James's receptiveness to adult 
mediation from the evidence of changes in his profile. What I can 
support is an interpretation which suggests that he is now less 
inclined to blindly reject every opportunity offered to him, 
because his aspirations are no longer limited to the impulsive 
negation of every construct. 
Tina, another pupil in the same class as James and Amanda, was 
already a well integrated person psychologically before she began 
to participate in Instrumental Enrichment lessons in 1984. What 
relevance could a methodology concerned with cognitive 
modifiability have for her, since she presented none of the 
problems which justified intervention in James's education? Was 
there anything that Feuerstein's methodology could add to 
the nature of her development and, if so, were his instruments 
necessary components in the process of making that addition? I 
shall respond to these questions further, when I review the notion 
of pupils having sovereignty over their adjustment to school and 
consider the curriculum issues that are raised when pupils are 
taught to exercise executive control over their own learning; 
meanwhile, I trust the changes in Tina's profile will provide 
something of an answer by themselves: 
TINA, 1984 
CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 
repertory grid) 
Personal/Social Confidence 1 
HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
76 
Co-operative Behaviour 2 
Like I'd like to be 4 62 
98 
Like I really am 5 91 
Learning Skills 3 
TINA, 1986 




Like I'd like to be 
Like I really am 
Personal/Social Confidence  
HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
95 	 86 
Taking Tina as an individual, we do not know whether any of the 
changes in her profile are wholly or partly attributable to 
Instrumental Enrichment. In order to make a worthwhile guess, we 
need to look at what happened to those of her control group peers 
who started out as psychologically integrated as she was in 1984. 
The fact that the control group's mean ratings for 1984 and 1986 
do not differ much suggests that, in the absence of intervention, 
pupils tended to drift rather than to make coherent progress along 
the three dimensions of adjustment to school. Tessa is an example 
of this phenomenon: 
Co-operative Behaviour 2 
Like I'd like to be 4 
Learning Skills 3 
Personal/Social Confidence 1 
Like I really am 
88 	  77 
93 
TESSA, 1984 
CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 	 HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
repertory grid) 
TESSA, 1986 
CONSTRUCTS (numbered as on 
	 HIERARCHICAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS 
repertory grid) 
Personal/Social Confidence 
Co-operative Behaviour 2 
Learning Skills 3 
Like I'd like to be 4 
Like I really am 5 
Primary and Secondary School Differences Observed  
The trend for experimental pupils to become more psychologically 
integrated in respect of their adjustment to school, while control 
pupils drift, is more pronounced in the primary groups. 
Embarrassment on the part of some pupils in the secondary 
experimental group, as well as the organisational factors 
mentioned in my previous chapter, might have contributed to this 
discrepancy in how pupils of different ages responded to 
Instrumental Enrichment. It was the secondary school pupils who 
complained that Feuerstein's instruments looked deceptively 
"babyish," and the suspicion of an insult to their dignity is 
likely to have been counter-productive. 	 Visually appealing 
artistry, such as that in the materials for Oxfordshire's and 
Somerset's thinking skills programmes, was sorely missed. It was 
also the secondary pupils who were embarrassed by the vocabulary 
associated with Instrumental Enrichment, although this time their 
complaint was not exactly about feeling belittled: they felt 
pretentious (Evaluative discussion lesson, conducted after post-
testing in July 1986). Two anecdotes provide us with insights 
into how secondary pupils came to feel pretentious about using the 
vocabulary recommended in the Teachers' Guides (Feuerstein and 
Hoffman, 1980), whilst primary pupils relished using it. 
I overheard the first anecdote in the secondary school staffroom. 
It was told by a subject teacher who had just finished a lesson 
with the class which comprised the experimental group of pupils. 
He wanted to share his sense of the ridiculous with colleagues, 
and he laughed awkwardly as he told them how the pupil who had 
provoked his ridicule had done so by volunteering to hypothesise 
about something. Nobody in the staffroom commented on the 
punchline: 	 "A hypothesis?" the teacher had sneered, "You 
wouldn't know what a hypothesis was even if one were to come up 
and bite you!" 
The second anecdote was told to an Instrumental Enrichment teacher 
by experimental pupils from the larger primary school class. On a 
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geography field trip, their class-teacher had jokingly rebuked one 
of them for using the word "hypothesis". 	 "Don't you use those 
swear words with me," he said. Unlike the subject teacher in the 
secondary school, however, he quickly recovered his composure and 
seized the opportunity to capitalise on what had been offered: he 
asked the pupil to explain why a hypothesis was more appropriate 
than a definitive answer in the circumstances and then invited the 
rest of the class, half of whom were also experimental pupils and 
half of whom were control pupils, to suggest ways of testing the 
hypothesis. 
I suspect that the personalities of the teachers in the two 
anecdotes were not the only factors which led to their different 
handling of pupils whose vocabulary struck them as 
uncharacteristic. The subject teacher in the secondary school had 
observed his union's temporary boycott of staff meetings, so he 
had only received a printed information sheet about Instrumental 
Enrichment; his lack of involvement no doubt put him in an 
invidious position. The class-teacher in the primary school did 
not depend on staff meetings for liaison, because his colleagues 
were so few in number that they could share information without 
being organised; an innovation affecting half of his class was 
hardly likely to have escaped his attention; and his role as the 
adult who set the tenor of lessons for most of each week was not 
immediately threatened when an experimental pupil showed 
initiative. 
A teacher who makes pupils unsure about their right to negotiate 
meanings with him is bound to havoc his own purpose, if we assume 
that what he does in the classroom is intended to enrich or extend 
the capacities of everyone present. The intention to educate has 
no virtue unless it is accompanied by the recognition "that 
teaching is a shared enterprise and learning is a social activity" 
(Holt, 25th April 1987, p.10). 	 Sharing amongst teachers is 
particularly important as a determinant of whether the effects of 
special educational intervention will be consolidated or 
dissipated, as I have inferred from the discrepant results 
obtained by primary and secondary school pupils in 
Buckinghamshire's Instrumental Enrichment groups. This is neither 
to imply that sharing is prohibitively complicated in secondary 
schools, nor that it is simple in primary schools. What I do want 
to say is that departmentalism in schools presents barriers to the 
implementation of a programme for cognitive modifiability, and 
secondary schools are more prone to departmentalism than primary 
schools. As Feuerstein's concept of bridging helped us to 
understand, cognitive development is contingent upon pupils being 
free to transcend departmentalised experience: 
It is therefore likely to receive support from 
curriculum models which encourage an integrated 
approach, and where appropriate curriculum design should 
foster the mutual support which enhances the 
achievement of generic aims across the curriculum as a 
whole. (Mays et al., March 1987, p.5) 
A Response to Feuerstein's Critics  
The practice of bridging, which demonstrates to pupils that the 
cognitive processes they were aware of in relation to specific 
circumstances can be marshalled together and applied to new 
circumstances of greater complexity, is dismissed by some of 
Feuerstein's critics as a futile attempt to distil thinking skills 
from the curriculum and to make them available in pure form: "the 
impossible dream of conferring a general capacity independent of 
context" 	 (Holt, 25th April 1987, p.14). 
	 It is ironic that 
Feuerstein should have brought this criticism upon himself, since 
the object of bridging is for pupils to transcend their 
predictable ambit and to gain access to a cultural context that 
has hitherto been beyond them. Two of Feuerstein's claims have 
been criticised quite vehemently: the claim that it is "when 
cognitive processes become detached from specific tasks that 
cognitive structures are established" (1980, p.22), and the claim 
that his instruments are "content-free" (1980, p.119). 
Much of the criticism that is meant to cast doubt on the first of 
these claims is, on close examination, wide of the mark. For 
instance, Holt questions whether "thinking can be dissociated from 
particular forms of inquiry and dispositions to act that take 
account of those forms" (25th April 1987, p.6). 	 But Feuerstein 
does not dissociate thinking from forms of inquiry; for him, 
forms of inquiry are accommodated in cognitive structures, 
schemata, which are precipitated whenever the paradigmatic 
potential of a line of thought is realised: 
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These structures are of a more general nature than the 
learning of specific tasks and, hence, result in more 
adaptive behaviour by the individual (Feuerstein, 1980, 
p.22). 
Feuerstein's model of cognitive development is thus similar 
to Piaget's in outline; it assumes that, 
a child's cognitive structure develops under the 
influence of maturation and experience; 
this development occurs through a series of stages such 
that each stage builds on, and grows from, the previous 
stage but is characteristically different from it; 
the mechanism of development includes assimilation by 
the child of stimuli into existing cognitive structures 
where possible. 	 When the experience cannot be 
assimilated, some cognitive dissonance occurs and there 
is an attempt to modify the cognitve structure so that 
it deals with experience more satisfactorily. The child 
is active in this procress (accommodation), and for 
cognitive development to occur must construct his or her 
own concepts from experiences. 	 (Shayer and Adey, 
October 1986, pp.1-2) 
Where Feuerstein's model of cognitive development differs from 
Piaget's is in the emphasis of the former on the effects of 
intervention for cognitve modifiability. Piaget takes relatively 
little account of mediation as a potential antidote against the 
constraints on concept formation imposed by an individual's 
existing cognitive structure, whereas Feuerstein sees the 
mediator's role as a pivot on which the transcendence of existing 
constraints depends. 
If thought processes are to become detached from their immediate 
context, so that they will be more generally available, the 
thinker must be able to relate them to a wider context; otherwise 
we are left with the absurd notion of solutions floating about 
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randomly "in search of any sort of problem" (Holt, 25th April 
1987, p.4). This is why the role of the mediator, who engages 
pupils in a cultural framework of reference, is such an imporant 
premise in Feuerstein's theory. Pupils who have not had adequate 
mediated learning experience are liable to find it difficult to 
transfer the cognitve strategies they used in a previous situation 
to process the content of a current situation because, without 
formative guidance, they will neither have all the structural 
mechanisms for recognising what is relevant to their situation nor 
the skills of transfer to exploit the capacity for assimilation 
inherent in those structural mechanisms. 
What evidence is there that bridging can create a reserve of 
intellectual capacity in pupils, on top of their memories of how 
to tackle specific tasks such as those posed by Feuerstein's 
instruments? The results of my experiment suggest that bridges do 
project a sphere of influence which is greater than the sum of 
their components: mediation which focussed on redressing pupils' 
language deprivation appears to have produced higher scores on 
tests primarily concerned with linguistic ability, even though the 
content of the tests did not match the content of the lessons 
taught. Buckinghamshire's Instrumental Enrichment pupils had 
presumably learned to use the language in which they received 
mediation as a medium for the semantic elaboration of information 
from other contexts (Sugden and Newall, in Teaching Transfer 
Strategies to Children with Moderate Learning Difficulties, June 
1987, p.63, define semantic elaboration as a strategy "by which 
information that is presented is actively transformed, overtly or 
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covertly, into one's own frame of reference"). According to 
Sugden and Newall, generalisation such as that achieved in 
Buckinghamshire is rare: 
In many experimental studies the task set was learned 
but, when the children were given a different task, 
closely related to the one on which they learned the 
rehearsal strategy, they failed to apply that strategy. 
It was demonstrated that they had definitely learned it, 
because when they were placed back in the original 
situation with the orginal task, they employed it again. 
It seemed as though the strategy was available only for 
a specific task in a particular setting. By failing to 
transfer across situations, the children showed that 
they did not have flexible access to the learned 
strategy of rehearsal. 
The concept of transfer can be broken down into two 
parts. The first is "maintenance," where the same 
materials and task are presented to a child at some 
later date. This is simply a strategy retention; 	 it 
has proved to be very amenable to teaching. The second, 
"generalisation," what most people mean when they talk 
of transfer, is taking a strategy or informationm that 
has been previously learned and applying it in a new 
setting. Contrary to the experimental studies of 
maintenance, transfer has proved to be an elusive 
condition to researchers. It shows much resistance to 
teaching. (June 1987, p.63) 
Feuerstein attributes the exceptional results achieved by users of 
his methodology to the triumph of metacognition over the learning 
difficulties which hitherto made generalisation appear resistant 
to teaching; he says Instrumental Enrichment makes children into 
cultural "messengers to themselves" (18th July 1985, lecture at 
Nottingham University), thereby overwhelming their isolative habit 
of confining their thoughts to what is "here and now". When he 
claims that his instruments are content—free, he is telling us 
that their value is extrinsic to their unique properties: each of 
them is a resource for the exercise of metacognition, and "only a 
vehicle" (Feuerstein, 1980, p.119) for the conduct of pupils' 
cognitions. 
	 This downgrading of content in Feuerstein's 
instruments does not mean that he has forgotten that thinking 
skills can neither be acquired not exercised in a mental vacuum, 
even though he invites scepticism by dint of his failure to 
acknowledge "the importance accorded to domain-specific cognitive 
processes in current theory and reserach" (Boreham, 1987, p.86). 
His position might have been more defensible if he had conceived 
of his instruments as having a transparent quality, so that each 
item of content was not merely incidental but a window through 
which insight into cognition, the prerequisite for metacognition, 
could be gained. 
The concept of metacognition implies a capacity for making 
decisions about what kind of thinking one chooses to employ for 
each problem encountered. If such a capacity has been developed 
in certain pupils, 	 then we might expect those pupils to feel a 
greater sense of sovereignty over their thoughts than is commonly 
felt among their peers. New-found sovereignty would alter pupils' 
self-esteem. We can therefore deduce a logical explanation for 
why the Buckinghamshire pupils who received Instrumental 
Enrichment assessed themselves as having made statistically 
significant gains in respect of their adjustment to school: 
mediation gave them an awareness of and control over their 
cognitions, experience of metacognition produced a sense of 
sovereignty in them, and sovereignty exalted their status as 
learners and invested them with the power to determine their part 
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in inter-personal relationships. 
The progress of Buckinghamshire's experimental pupils, towards 
cognitve modifiability and consequent readiness to adjust to 
school, was in reality much more complicated than my logical 
explanation suggests. The development of metacognition requires 
self-analysis on the part of the learner and diagnosis on the 
part of the teacher (Mays et al., March 1987, p.6), it requires a 
sharing of perceptions and respect for the feelings those 
preceptions engender. Feelings incite the will to learn and 
provide the motivating force which propels pupils' thoughts, 
whether those thoughts are confined to a single vehicle or 
spanning the contents of a pontoon-like mental bridge. We can not 
predict either the quantity or the quality of the feelings a 
perception will engender, because feelings are peculiarities of 
whole persons and not just peculiarities of the thoughts they 
accompany in persons' minds. As Gibson points out, 
the distribution of feeling is of quite a different 
order to the distribution of intelligence. That is, 
however sceptical we are of the notion of IQ, however 
much we resist the curve of normal distribution, it is 
evident that some people are naturally better at 
abstract thought than others. Indeed, on any scale of 
achievement the Gaussian curve has clear empirical 
backing. Learning difficulty is not simply a matter of 
social construction. But my claim is that the curve 
of normal distribution has very little application to 
feeling (1983, p.56) 
It might have been the unmeasurable nature of feelings which 
deterred Feuerstein from openly pursuing a curriculum dedicated 
to the practices necessary to enrich and change culturally 
deprived pupils. Practices of cultural exchange inevitably bring 
feelings into play, as do all human encounters, and they are 
therefore unlikely to appeal to a scientist who wishes to view the 
curriculum as technology. Feuerstein embodies both the educator 
seeking an interpretative curriculum and the technologically 
oriented scientist seeking a utilitarian one. How the theory of 
the former translates into practice is something of an arcanum, 
wrapped in a jargon typified by words such as "metacognition," 
"bridging" and "transcendence;" whereas the theory of the latter 
has a clear and precise translation into practice, which emerges 
as teaching techniques and learning skills. 
Hence, the uninitiated could be forgiven for believing that 
Feuerstein stopped short of creating a programme which changes 
pupils and instead created a programme made up of instruments 
which are supposed to render pupils susceptible to change. The 
provision of mediated learning experience entails such a dynamic 
approach to curriculum, however, that we are obliged to dismiss 
any illusion of its delivery entirely by procedures that are 
"algorithmic rather than hermeneutic" (Pratt, 1987, p.149). So, 
why does Feuerstein present Instrumental Enrichment as a 
technological breakthrough instead of presenting it as a careful 
blend of tried and tested educational practices? The explanation 
has more to do with the view of skills Feuerstein wants to 
inculcate in pupils than with his own view of skills. Feuerstein 
himself is unlikely to challenge Holt's assertion that attempts to 
express education through skills "are both reductionist in their 
view of knowledge and restrictive in their view of persons" (25th 
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April 1987, p.5). But singling out pupils' skills may be a way of 
insisting on their separateness from personality: 
the "real me" is not put at risk by rebuff or failure if 
it is only my skills that are found wanting .... My 
skills do not testify to the kind of person I 
fundamentally am .... Our skills do not say much about 
who we are because they make no reference to our 
dispositions, our wantings and valuings, and it is by 
virtue of these that we are persons of one sort or 
another. (Richard Smith in Holt, 25th April 1987, p.6) 
If Instrumental Enrichment convinces pupils that skills are part 
of their cultural heritage, and that the acquisition of skills is 
subject to a law of transfer which they can learn about, then 
those pupils will be less inclined to doubt their potential to 
adjust to school than peers who only have the limits of their 
personal capacity to blame for learning difficulties. Given that 
Instrumental Enrichment does make pupils aware of the existence of 
a property relation between a culture and the skills of its 
people, it must by the same token assure pupils that 
they retain custody of themselves. Obversely, "learning how to 
learn is fostered when pupils are expected to work independently, 
to raise questions that are meaningful to them, and be responsbile 
for their learing" (Eshel et al., 1987, p.166). 
The Outlook Now 
Johnson informs us that Jewish society has been organised to 
support the cognitive development of individuals, albeit an elite 
of intellectuals, for seventeen hundred years (15th March 1987, 
p.21). How far have we organised ourselves in this country to 
support congitive development in the way I have been describing? 
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Do our practices of working from the transmission of cultural 
structures toward pupils' enstructuration of themselves, and 
working from the promotion of adjusted behaviour in school toward 
pupils' sovereignty over their own adaptive behaviour anywhere, 
connect with the proposed national curriculum? Blagg fears that 
the practices generated by Instrumental Enrichment will not 
connect with the proposed national curriculum at all, because the 
authors of the latter project naively assume that, 
studying a broad and balanced range of subjects 
throughout compulsory schooling will help to develop 
pupil capacity to adapt and respond flexibly to a 
changing world. 
This is bound to pressurise teachers back into formal, 
rigid, old-fashioned teaching methods in their anxiety 
to meet the expected content goals. 	 (18th September 
1987, p.234). 
Feuerstein's methodology was never likely to spread so fast that 
there was a prospect of its informing all subject teaching in the 
near future, and metacognition was "unlikely to prove memorable 
for teachers" (Entwistle, 1987, p.83) without special instruments 
to draw attention to it. 	 Blagg's pessimism about the reviving 
emphasis on subject content at the expense of pupils' cognitive 
processes makes me wonder how much longer the schools which are 
currently finding space on the timetable for thinking skills 
lessons will continue to be able to do so. Besides, my experiment 
showed that isolating Instrumental Enrichment from subject 
teaching weakens its effect, and I expect the same goes for all 
thinking skills programmes. 	 Is there a middle way between, on 
the one hand, submerging thinking skills so deeply into the 
curriculum that they pass out of sight and out of mind, and on the 
other hand, leaving them on the periphery of the curriculum until 
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such time as they are squeezed out altogether? Happily, I think 
there is. The Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education 
project provides us with a model, which Shayer and Adey describe 
as follows: 
a series of teaching activities have been devised which 
may be intervened into the regular science curriculum. 
Each of these "interventions" is concerned with one or 
more of the reasoning patterns of formal operational 
thinking (for instance control of variables, 
proportional reasoning, probability, equilibrium) and 
employs a methodology in which: 
The essential vocabulary needed to "get inside" the 
formal reasoning is introduced and used. Examples are 
"variable", "relationships," "correlation". 
The vocabulary and scope of the reasoning patterns are 
introduced using only concrete strategies. 
Only then, given the vocabulary and other mental tools 
necessary, do pupils come up against problems which they 
find that they cannot solve with concrete operations. 
They are put in the position where they need to 
reorganise their type of thinking, to accommodate their 
schema to reality. 
Pupils are made aware of their own thinking processes. 
The material of the intervention lessons is linked to 
the regular science curriculum, to "bridge" the 
reasoning patterns and guard against them being seen as 
confined to the "special" lessons. (October 1986, pp.3-
4). 
Shayer and Adey admit that the Cognitive Acceleration through 
Science Education materials make "some demands on teachers to 
become acquainted with their underlying theory" (October 1986, 
p.6). 	 They are, of course, making a considerable understatement. 
Wolfe Mays and his team of colleagues identify two pre-conditions 
for the success of staff training: 	 firstly, training programmes 
should be experience-based, "providing opportunities for the 
identification of individuals' own strengths and weaknesses and 
feedback for the development of understanding;" and secondly, 
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"they should take as their model the processes which the teachers 
are aiming to offer to the learners" (March 1987, p.7). 
Hypotheses about training deserve a study of their own, but I want 
to end this thesis with an observation pertaining to the second 
pre-condition. 
Training based on the Instrumental Enrichment model will give 
teachers experience of tasks that demand personal resolutions of 
conflicts in the role of mediator, as well as experience in the 
implementation of classroom techniques. Experience of 
communicating intentionality, negotiating meanings and sharing 
(see my chapter on A Practitioner's Perspective for definitions of 
these tasks) is essential if teachers are to reconstruct the 
curriculum together with pupils in the way that Feuerstein 
advocates. 	 Such experience ensures that teachers deal 
democratically with the tension between their own priorities for 
the curriculum and the priorities of others. 
	
Instrumental 
Enrichment methodology democratises teachers' interaction with one 
another and with pupils. Thus it may be that the limiting factor 
upon the future uptake of Instrumental Enrichment is neither 
scepticism about its potential for promoting pupils' adjustment to 
school nor competition from other curriculum components but rather 
the strength of democratic commitment within teachers, within 
schools and within our society. Despite Feuerstein's emphasis on 
the importance of cultural transmission, Instrumental Enrichment 
would seem to enhance the sovereignty of learners and to diminish 
the case for any external agency to maintain suzerainty over their 
learning. 
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APPENDIX 1 : FEUERSTEIN'S CASE HISTORY OF "C". 
A Case History 
The history of C. was referred by a 
foreign governmental agency to the au-
thor for help in placing him in custodial 
care in Israel. His condition was that of 
a severely retarded individual who at 
the age of fourteen had only forty words 
and no orientation in time and space. 
He was devoid of the most elementary 
capacities of conceptualization and 
functioned without any apparent ability 
to reach a state of even minimal in-
dependence. Life placement in cus-
todial care seemed to be his only op-
tion, and the urgency of his placement 
was complicated by the fact that the dy-
ing mother required placement in a 
Jewish setting available only in Israel. 
C. is the second among three broth-
ers born to an alcoholic, hemiplegic 
father and a mother who died in a 
mental hospital, partly due to the 
severe conditions of life to which she 
had been subjected. The father had 
physically abused the mother, especial-
ly during periods of pregnancy, and 
this determined the premature birth of 
all three children. C. was born at the 
limits of viability, with a weight of two 
and a half pounds. He was placed for a 
long period in an incubator and suf-
fered from conditions of hyperoxia. He 
was separated from his mother because 
of his need for continuous medical care 
and her alleged incapacity to care for 
such a high-risk child. C. spent his ear-
ly childhood in creches and homes for  
the retarded, and at school age was 
referred to homes for trainable and 
severely retarded children. At the time 
of his mother's death he was living in a 
home for severe retardates that had a 
very limited if any provision for their 
training or education. 
Referred to us, we decided to ex-
amine him with the help of dynamic 
assessment, the LPAD.3 Despite great 
difficulties encountered in conveying 
simple instructions to him (we used 
mainly an imitation/gestural modality 
of interaction), we were able to demon-
strate a level of modifiability which, 
rather than causing us to accept his 
condition as immutable and unchange-
able, warranted an attempt on our part 
to initiate an active modificational ap-
proach. Very minimal signs of learning 
detected during a long session of 
dynamic assessment enabled us to see, 
beyond the apparent and pervasive 
deficiencies, certain breakthroughs that 
could become sources of learning. 
Thus. after acting in a very passive 
way, C. began to demonstrate a certain 
amount of intrinsic curiosity and an 
orienting reflex toward certain stimuli 
with which he was becoming familiar 
and able to master to a certain degree. 
Having learned to recognize and even 
to construct a square, he started to look 
for a square within other more com-
plex tasks, and succeeded in distin-
guishing it under conditions of embed-
dedness in a variety of tasks. 
Thus he demonstrated a capacity to 
develop task-intrinsic motivation. 
Following this minimal and yet impor-
tant evidence of modifiability, we 
decided against lifelong custodial care 
in favor of an active approach in a 
socially stimulating environment 
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among children in a foster home group 
care program. 
Ten years of investment using focused 
intervention as well as enriched social 
interaction geared toward mediated 
learning experiences have affected in a 
most dramatic—albeit slow—way the 
cognitive structure of C. He is today an 
independent young man, economical-
ly self-sufficient, and open to further 
learning and development. Having 
mastered reading, writing, and spoken 
fluency in Hebrew, he became able to 
mobilize previous experiences and to 
make use of them for further learning 
and growth. After having learned to 
speak and read Hebrew, he suddenly 
displayed an efficient command of his 
mother tongue, French! By the same 
token, many of the things he had ex-
perienced that had been totally inac-
cessible to exploration became available 
through his increased capacity to re-
trieve them, to organize them, and to 
successfully communicate them. 
The course of life of C. had seemed 
to be totally predictable in the direction 
of life placement in custodial care, cc• 1-
sidering the fourfold determinants of 
his condition: heredity, organicity, ear-
ly maternal deprivation, and prolonged 
exposure to restrictive conditions of 
life. All this, coupled with the fact that 
developmentally C. was in full adoles-
cence, made meaningful changes in his 
condition appear to be impossible. The 
fact that such changes have been evi-
denced in C., as well as in many hun- 
dreds and even thousands of children, 
albeit in less extreme conditions than 
that of C., points to the high plasticity 
of the human organism and the degree 
of openness to meaningful changes 
across etiological determinants of the  
condition, across the severity of the 
condition, and even across the devel-
opmental stage during which it is com-
monly considered that intervention 
may be instituted with significant ef-
fects. It is to this phenomenon that we 
refer when we discuss modifiability in 
general, and we consider the cognitive 
component of such drastic changes to 
be of greatest importance. It is the 
cognitive component that creates the 
prerequisites for adaptation, without 
which no meaningful progress in the 
integration of the individual within 
society can take place. 
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APPENDIX .2 : FEUERSTEIN'S INVENTORY OF COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS. 
Instrumental Enrichment Cognitive Functions 
I. Gathering all the information we need (Input) 
1. Using our senses (listening, seeing, smelling, tasting, touching, feel- 
ing) to gather clear and complete information (clear perception). 
2. Using a system or plan so that we do not skip or miss something im-
portant or repeat ourselves (systematic exploration). 
3. Giving the thing we gather through our senses and our experience a 
name so that we can remember it more clearly and talk about it 
(labeling). 
4. Describing things and events in terms of where and when they occur 
(temporal and spatial referents). 
5. Deciding on the characteristics of a thing or event that always stay 
the same, even when changes take place (conservation, constancy, 
and object permanence). 
6. Organizing the information we gather by considering more than one 
thing at a time (using two sources of information). 
7. Being precise and accurate when it matters (need for precision). 
H. Using the information we have gathered (Elaboration) 
1. Defining what the problem is, what we are being asked to do, and 
what we must figure out (analyzing disequilibrium). 
2. Using only that part of the information we have gathered that is 
relevant, that is, that applies, to the problem and ignoring the rest 
(relevance). 
3. Having a good picture in our mind of what we are looking for, or 
what we must do (interiorization). 
4. Making a plan that will include the steps we need to take to reach our 
goal (planning behavior). 
5. Remembering and keeping in mind the various pieces of information 
we need (broadening our mental field). 
6. Looking for the relationship by which separate objects, events, and 
experiences can be tied together (projecting relationships). 
7. Comparing objects and experiences to others to see what is similar 
and what is different (comparative behavior). 
8. Finding the class or set to which the new object or experience 
belongs (categorization). 
9. Thinking about different possibilities and figuring out what would 
happen if you were to choose one or another (hypothetical thinking). 
10. Using logic to prove things and to defend your opinion (logical evi- 
dence). 
HI. Expressing the solution to a problem (Output) 
1. Being clear and precise in your language to be sure that there is no 
question as to what your answer is. Put yourself into the "shoes" of 
the listener to be sure that your answer will be understood (overcom-
ing egocentric communication). 
2. Think things through before you answer instead of immediately try-
ing to answer and making a mistake, and then trying again (over-
coming trial-and-error). 
3. Count to ten (at least) so that you don't say or do something you will 
be sorry for later (restraining impulsive behavior). 
4. If you can't answer a question for some reason even though you 
"know" the answer, don't fret or panic. Leave the question for a lit-
tle while and then, when you return to it, use a strategy to help you 
find the answer (overcoming blocking). 
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APPENDIX 3 : DISTAL AND PROXIMAL ETIOLOGIES OF DIFFERENTIAL 
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT. 
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OF alLTLIKAL CORWATIOW: 
LOW MODiriABiLiTy 
Reuven Feuerstein, Instrumental Enrichment: An Intervention Program for Cognitive Modifiability  
(Baltimore, Md.: University Park Press, 1980), p. 18. 
APPENDIX 4 : SAMPLES OF FEUERSTEIN'S INSTRUMENTAL ENRICHMENT MATERIALS. 
Table of Contents 
1. Organization of Dots 8. Temporal Relations 
2. 'Orientation in Space I 9. 'Numerical Progressions 
3. Orientation in Space Di 10. Instructions 
4. Comparisons 11. Syllogisms 
5. Analytic Perception 12. Transitive Relations 
6. 'Categorization 13. Stencil Designs 
7. Family Relationships 14. Cartoons 
— 1prin5 'liznn rrop 12,1 nvin 
HADASSAH-WIZO-CANADA-RESEARCH INSTITUTE JERUSALEM 
INSTRUMENTAL ENRICHMENT 
A SELECTED SAMPLE OF MATERIALS 
FOR REVIEW PURPOSES 
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Addition of the third dimension complicates differen-
tiation, internalization and spatial orientation. A 
dot, instead of connecting only two lines, serves as 
a nexus of 3 or more lines. The shaded cue is a 
an 	 to Re „yea ,...,Mr 	 ofikors synthesized whole, 	 formed from parts separate in the C. —.** 
0.101, Or R MIER:STEM model and each cue is relevant to a different form 
Aso. MUM. WO • WWI • MAIM WPM' I in 	 the model. 
1-1 	 0.1...s.• •••••24/0 ta 
oVr•fp •••• w......•74.0 MOP, 
FIGURE 1 
	 EXAMPLES FROM ORGANIZATION OF DOTS  
The student must perceive the dots in an amorphous, irregular cloud so as to project 
figures identical in form and size to those in the given models. The task becomes 
more complicated by density of the dots, overlapoinn, increasing complexity of the 
figures and changes in their orientation. Successful completion demands segregation 
and articulation of the field. 
Among the cognitive functions involved are: 
Projection 'Of virtual relationships 
Discrimination of form and size 
Constancy of form and size across changes 
in orientation 
Use of relevant information 
Discovery of strategies 
Perspective 
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The thickened dots aid in projecting the square, but also serve as a distractor and 
prevent the perception of similarities between frames. In addition to the functions 
and operations listed on the title page (left), the tasks involve labeling, precision 
and accuracy, planning, determination of starting point, systematic search and compa-
rison to model. Successful completion aids in creation and maintenance of motivation. 
0 
0 • 
0 • • • • 0 
• 0  
• 
• 5 • • • • 
• • 







• • :\ \\* 
. • 
• 
• • o • 
• 
An asymmetric figure in the model necessitates representational re-orientation in 
space. The provided cues are reduced until extinction so that an alternate starting 
point must be found. Scientific thought: hypothesis, investigation and confirmation, 
as well as logical evidence, are necessary. 
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This page summarizes preceding exercises and illustrates varied repetition of a principle to 
facilitate habit formation. Solution requires: Definition of the problem; visual transport 
or internalization; simultaneous use of several sources of information; systematic work; and 
hypothetical and inferential thought as a basis for logical conclusions. The student learns 
of delimitation of alternatives and how to summarize his data, using a table. 
Position Object Direction in Relation to the Boy 




The house front 
3 The bench 
2 The house 









ana those that are stable and can be fixed by coordinates. Precise and accurate communication of information lessens egocentricity. 
Fill in the missing so that each square contains an arrow, a dot, and a word 





















BACK  LEFT  
I 
Solution involves a re-otfinition of the problem with each frame; the use of symbol 
encoding and decoding; the conservation of the constancy of the relationship across 
variations in the orientation of the arrow; projection of virtual relationships; 
hypothetical thought, and precision in gathering and communicatinn information. 
Position Position Position Position 
No. 1 	 No. 2 	 No. 3 	 No. 4 
ORIENTATION IN SPACE m 
WEST WINO 	 - WINO INAT COMES FROM THE WEST 
EAST WINO 	 - WINO THAT COMES FROM THE EAST 
NORTH WIND - WIND THAT COMES FROM THE NORTH 
SOUTH WIND - WIND THAT COMES FROM THE SOUTH 
The arrow shows  the direction of the wind. 
A. Inside the rectangles, write the directions. ' 
B. On each line, write the direction from which the wind is blowing. 
Positions  





East 	 Left 	 N ight 
 








1 	 turn • 
2 turns • 








Look at the above and fill in the blanks below. 
5. You are facing west,  
Make 2 turns to the right, then 3 turns left, and 1 to the 
right. Where are you? 
	  
In order to reach the same point, one may proceed 
	  
circle to the left. 
2 West 
North 
	 6. You are facing east.  
Make 3 left turns, 3 right turns, and 2 turns to the left. Where 
are you? 	  




suet Lef t 
1 Back 
DRAW 
3 	 4 LIST 
1. 6 
2. 7 	  










Write the side and the direction or eec man to reach the goal. 
1. To reach the tree, Man A must turn right and go 	  
2. To reach the flag. Man C must turn 	  
3. To reach the mailbox, Man A must turn 
4. To reach the stop signal, Man 8 and Man C must turn 	  
and go 	  
5. To reach the flag, Man 	 must turn 	  and go east and 
Man 	 must turn 	  and go 	  
6. Man C must turn left and go west, and Man B must turn right 
and go east to reach 	  
and go 	  
and go Why, in order to reach the flag, is it necessary for one 
man to go eastward, and another westward? 
Choose a goal and list how Man A would reach it, and how 




7. If Man B 
and goes 
• . N, 
 
--... 	 SOUTH 	 .
-- 
turns left and goes west, and Man A turns right 
east, they will meet next to 
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Sample Picture 2 Picture 1 
Lome 
14 
Copy nib C 19711 br Pto(c“..te 
Rcuren I cumtein. H.datub • 




Indicate what is common to eacb pair of pictures and the differences 
between them. 
Comp 
Indicate what is in common to the things named by each pair of words and 






Indicate what is in common to what each pair of words names and the differences between them. 
Circle the word or words that describe what is common between the sample picture on the 







from the sample in those aspects indicated by the encircled words. 




number 	 size (fore) €ecti
.. 
 




I* 	 . 4. 
MO 0.4,  
4fIlo number 4150  form CQCT1ICi)  QTumber) 41100, (for!) 










	 size 	 color 
	 form 
4 
direction size color form 
numper color size form 
0 • 
• 




The child must decide whether a part numbered within the frame is the same as 
the similarly numbered model. It not, he must find the 




To correct blurred, sweeping and alobal perception and to break down field dependency. 
The child learns to analyze the whole into.its component parts and to recognize the relationship between them. He learns that each part is a whole unto 
itself, and that it is possible to create new wholes by combining parts. In the process, he learns that any division is essentially arbitrary and 
dependent on needs and goals. Successful completion of the tasks demands botn structural and operational analysis. 
Look at the figure at the top of the page. 
For each drawing in the left column, there is a drawing in the right column completes it. 
Write the number and the letter of the two forms you combined to make the completion. 
CORRECT THE MISTAKES: The numbered parts which appear outside of the frame are 
hidden within the design. After you find them, see that they are numbered 
correctly. Cross out those numbers which are incorrectly printed on the sections within 
the design. 
and work systematically, internalize the model or 
transport it visually, and think hypothetically. He 
must use spaces and lines as cues and strategies. Size and 














   
FE 
t• 
   
   
The child must select the appropriate drawing 
from the left to complete the one on, the right 
so as to obtain a figure identical to the 
model at the top of the page. The task 
requires representation, internalization and labelling of the model, definition of 
the missing parts, systematic work and comparison to the model for self-criticism. 
11..WW,W I' wwwwwiownw.W 
1•013, •••• FT,. • • ••••••• •••••• 
AP rqbkis mew al to Po neon 
P RUIRSTE 
M.O. CA.11. ,110 O. wma 
belong to the group of 
belongs to the group of 	 . It is an exception. 
one belongs to a different group. 
It is an exception. 
CATEGORIZATION  
1. 	 Book, ball, girl, picture, chair 
rour 01 ;meal ue,uny a Inc 	 Exception 
4. 	 Leaf, tree, grass, wheat, stone 
4. Classify the cubes according to size and color. Fill in the headings and 
write the correct letter in each empty square. 
Label each picture. Choose a general name which describes the four pictures 
in each row and write it within the space provided at the beginning of each row. 
CLASSIFICATION OF ANIMALS 
How many animals are there in the table? 	
 You want to build a zoo and display all 
these animals. You have to pay attention to the following rules: 
All animals living In water need a pool. 
Those living on land need a suitable plot. 
Those who can fly need a cage which is closed on top. 
For dangerous and carnivorous animals you need strong 
iron bars. 
For animals that are not dangerous you can build a 
simple fence. 
Subject of classification: 	  













"I am Sarah's sister. Sarah Is my 	  
"I am Jim's grandson. Jim is my 	  
- 1 an, tstner's cousin. canner rs ."y 
;"I am Joseph's father. Joseph is my 	  
"I am Herb's uncle. Herb is my 	 ." 
"I am Michael's brother. Michael is my 	  
"I am Jim's granddaughter. Jim is my 	  
OITCCf or Incorrect?  
FAMILY RELATIONS  
A man told me: 
'After I had become a grandfather my first grandchild was born.' 
Is that correct? ____. - 
'After I married I was no longer a bachelor.' 
Is that correct? 
1. Look at the diagram and write the relationship between Joseph and 
the memher of his family as indicated by the direction of the arrow. 
Here is a story. Place the names that appear in the story in their 
proper places in the diagram. 
• r 
Sally and Ann are twins. After lunch one day they went out to play 
and while playing, they wandered away from the house. When their 
mother, Beth, returned from the ma4et, she saw that the girlswere 
not there. She immediately ran to her husband, Alan, and told him 
about it. Alan called 	 brothers, John and Steve. for help. Steve 
told his wife, Miriam, to take their children, Adam and Danny to 
their neighbors, and they joined in the search. It was not until the 
evening that someone suggested looking for the girls at their grand-
mother and grandfather's. Indeed, the girls were found at David and 














	 HrDan Dan — 
0 
John John-1 7--"/ 
inda 
I inda is Iliriam's 
granddaughter. 
• 
.er. is Linda and Dan's aunt, but she is not Sara's daughter. 23. 	 ' 	 4" 	 Dan is Martha 
and Martin's son. 
M,rtin and Dena are Arthur's children. 
TEMPORAL RELATIONS (I) 
AU UJAC HUUL. 
Which of them reached the water first? 
Explain: 	  
/NUR ill LUC V4LLuLco auu 







Time is going by 
so 	 . I 
nave another half 
hour to sta here 
Time is going by 
so 	 . I 
have another half 
hour to sta here. 
Doctor 
Write the words slowly and quickly in 





each of the above pictures. 





has a date at 7:30 
	
has a date at 6:30. 
Which of the two weeks would seem longer to the woman in the above 
pictures when she thought about them later? 
Which one would seem longer at the time she was experiencing it? 
In the appropriate column,list events that belong to your past, present and 
future and events that belong to the world's past, present and future. 
Past Present Future 4esiii 
R 
Q.5..) wire The world's Mine The world's 
Vine The world's 
There is a story hidden in each row. Place the number 1 in the 
circle of the drawing which should be the first, 2 for the second, 
etc. Tell the story you have found. 







101101 01 10 
On the 10th of every month at 8:45 a.m. 	  Monday at midnight 
In 5 minutes 	 Tomorrow night 
After Sunday 	
 Tomorrow morning at 9:00  
	 28 
In each sentence two things are happening at the same time. 
Next to each sentence, writes 
M if there must be a connection between the happenings. 
C if there can be a connection between them. 
N if there cannot be a connection between the two events 
and they just happened to occur at the same time. 
1. I turned on the radio. My doorbell rang. 
2. The girl fell off the chair. The mother was very 
frightened. 
3. The man took an umbrella. It was pouring outside 
5. A man crossed the street. A car stopped with a 
screech. 
6. There was no hot water. The shower drain was 
clogged. 
7. The principal was very angry. One pupil was sent 
out of the class. 
8. The water streamed out of the container onto the 





C. 	 Create a progression based on the formula: 
NUMFRICAL PROGRESSIONS  
6 5 
The pot is full 
of water. 
What happened ? The pot is enpty. 
0 
C. 	 Here we have an ascending progression. 	 Look at the formula and the 
first number. 	 Do you think the last number will be 13, 22, 17 or 147 
Encircle the correct answer. Thai conplete the progression. 
1. Fill in whatever is missing 
in the following exercises. 
r.••••• 1 	 Inl••• 
•••• 	 • • • 
C — ,I0Pi D. P IIIRSlith 
•••,••••• 	 wia.P.11.4. A•M ;•16,404 IllyiK• MMIVII 
	
J 	 1 	 J •3  
5 	 G 0 2, 
	
 	 1 	 I 	  





15 	 1 
c. This progression can be understood in another way. Continue on your own. 
1. 1 i 2 1 3 1. 2 i 5 1 2 i  
(JD 5 2 7 
3 2 5 3 
6 2 8 2 
1. a.  
b.  
2. a. Make up a formula and put it in the proper place. 
0  
b. Create a progression based on the formula you made up. 
	 The 
third number must be 12. 
tt 
c. Create another progression based on the same formula. 
Look at the pictures. 
16 25 41 
8 4 	 5 13 
10 
Create a progression based on the formula: 






In the frame, draw S triangle, a 
square and a Lir-iL. 
Draw the square ar. the lower right 
tine, below the triangle and to the  
fight Of the clxcle. 
• 
the upper left of the frame, draw a 
role. 
Ube circle, draw a square) and in the 
aare, a triangle. 
In the lower left side of the frame 
draw a triangle inside of a square, and 
a circle around both of thee. 
Drew three circles in size order on a diagonal 
line which begins at the upper left corner. 
The smallest circle should be the top one. 
) the line, draw a square, a rectangle 
Id a triangle in fire order. 
le square should be larger than the 
riangle, and the rectangle the largest 
all. 
le smallest figure should be on the 
.yht side. 
ea 
CORRECT THE DRAWINGS 
ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS 
CORRECT THE INSTRUCTIONS 
ACCORDING TO THE DRAWINGS . 
Craw a circle inside a rectangle in the 
lower right side of the 	 frame. 	 Mark 
an X in their tampon center. 
Draw a square inside a hexagon In the 
center of the frawe. 
	 To the left of the 
hexagon. draw a circle that intersects 
the hexagon. 
(:[1])C)  x 
0 
In the upper right side of the 	 frame. 
draw a small 	 circle and a big square 
so that they have a COMM center. 
Draw a square in the center of the 
frame 
	 and put a circle inside of it. 




lino bisecta the hexagon; beneath Darken the lines so that the smallest 
square will be underneath, and the largest 








, 	 1 	 1 
i 	
! 	 , 	 II 
I 
o another 	 line. 	 Fros the MA 
right corner is a MM. 
the hexagon. 
WNW 
Lne begins at the lower 	 corner, 
• 
Darken the lines so that the canter 
square will sees on top of the other two 
squares. 
r- 	 ' 1 	 , -i—i 
i 
	 - -1 
 1	 I 
	 I 	 i  
illel to sides 0 
	 and 	 . 	 There is MA bne that biaccto the 	 and parallels 
to e 
	 and 	 . 	 In the bottom of the War 2 war 
I 
	 1 	 I_I__1 L _ I_ _ J 
gon is a line 	 to the sides i 
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Conclusion: 	  is a CD  
(draw) 
›( is a CD 
Can we conclude that X. is a 	 ? 	  
	 D 	 c 	  
(draw) 	 (draw) 
Every A is a 	  
(draw) 
Can we conclude that X As a X is a 
Every 





1. All letters (__) ore postal matter ( ). 
All postal matter (__) is stamped (J. 
()Conclusion:  	  
2. All flowers ( ) are plants (__). 
Some flowers (J are fragrant (__). 
()Conclusion:  
3.'No liar ( ) is honest. 
Every judge ( ) le honest. 
()Conclusion:  
4. Sone 	 e 




Each one of the above shapes represents a set. Every set has a name. 
In the circle beside the conclusions, write the number of the drawing which 
illustrates each of the following exercises. 
Pill in the blanks. In the parentheses write the appropriate letter for 
each sot an illustrated by the drawing. 
The names of the sets are: salt, spices, food, ice-cream, dessert, cake, 
pepper, vinegar. 
5. No /---\ 	 is 0 
Fill 	 in the name of the 
Shape 	 Name of Set 
set. 	 Fill 	 in the names of the sets 	 in 
the correct places. 
All  	
is (-D food 
(2) 	 Conclusion: 
6. All A 
All F\ is V 
dessert 
0  Conclusion: O . vinegar 7. Every 	 is a bird. 
Every bird lays eggs. 
0  Conclusion: robins 
0): 	 ' pepper 
0 8. No ovals 
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C 	 B x 
and write the relationship between B C. 




2.In an apartment house, the tenants in apartments A, B and C each had a 
Party one Saturday night. The noise coming from apartment A added to the 
noise from apartment B was more than twice the noise from apartment C. 
The tenant in apartment C called the police and claimed that the noise 
coming from apartment A was greater than the noise from his own apartment 
and was disturbing his party. The tenant of apartment A claimed that 
this was not so and argued that the noise from his apartment was less 
than that coming from apartment C. 
What additional information would have helped the police and us to find 
the solution? 
When the only given is A + B 
to find the relationship 
3.Each week a messenger brings two packages, identical in size and weight, 
to Mr. Smith's office. 	 For each package Mr. Smith pays a service ch rge 
of one dollar. One day Mr. Smith received two•packages whose total weight 
was greater than that of the total weight of the packages he had been 
previously receiving. The new packages differed from each other both in 
size and weight. Package A was lighter than the regular weekly package. 
The messenger argued that because of the difference In weight he was 
entitled to more money for the second package, because it was undoubtedly 
heavier than the regular weekly package. Was the messenger correct? 
Set up the equation: 
Take into consideration all given information: 
Draw the conclusion: 
	 If A • B 
And it is given that 
A 
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Then B C . 
2. If the given is that 
B 
Then A 




















3. 	 Samson is stronger than Len. 
Len is as strong as Dennis. 
Conclusion: 	  
4 	 The bread is fresher than the meat. 
The meat is fresher than the lettuce. 
Conclusion: 
J 
Fill in the missing. 
Gary and Bill were born in the same year. 
Bill was born a year before Steve. 
Conclusion: 
If the given is only that 
a + 	 C + C 




Correct and define the errors: 
a. 	  15 	 14 	 12 17 	 3 	 11 
b. 	  15 	 14 	 12 18 	 3 
c. 	
 15 	 14 	 12 16 	 3 





D 	  
from left to right. Thenumber of the bottom stencil is listed first, on the left; the 





A-20 2. 	  
B. If we were to fill in the white parts in the design we 
would get a white cut-out in the form: 	  
C. Draw lines to connect the sections so as to complete the figure. 
SD 
16 
'ANSWER THE QUESTIONS  
Card 	 A. 	 Define and correct the two errors: 	 1 - 12 - 18 - 14 - 2 
Number 1 
STENCIL NUMBERS  




STENCIL NUMBERS  
from left to right 
1. In this design, the color 	  appears twice. The 
numbers of the stencils of this color are  
The color 	  also appears twice. The numbers of 
the stencils of this color are 
2. Which stencils of the same color blended' 
1. How many colors are in the design? 
2. How many stencils are in the design? 
3. In the design there is a 	  of white stencils.whose numbers are 
4. How do you know that the stencil closest to the center is 
stencil 4 and not 3? 
5. Is there any importance to the sequence of appearance of 





6. Is there any importance to the sequence of the appearanc STENCIL NUMBEnS  
of white stencils 15 and 18? 	  Why?  	 From left to right 
7. Write a similar sentence about stencils 3 and 4: 	  
3. Choose the appropriate word: It Is 	
 possible to know 
the sequence of the stencils if we proceed from the center outwards, 
exactly according to the colors in the design. (always, sometimes. never). 
In which of the drawings is it possible to know the sequence of the stencils from 
the center outwards exactly according to the order of the colors from the center, 
outwards. List a + in the circle if one can proceed according to the colors;" 
list a - in the circle if it is impossible to proceed according to the sequence 
of colors. 
E  	 F 	  
Cross out the incorrect word in each statement; 
- — — — 
1. It is possible/impossible to know the sequence of the stencils from the 
center outwards when all the stencils in the design are cut-out only in the 
center. For example: A, B, C, D, E, F 
• 2. It is possible/impossible to know the sequence of the stencils from the 
center outwards, when at least one of the stencils in the design is cut 




Fill in: 1. There is 	 importance to the order in which the stencil numbers 
are listed. 
2. We always begin by listing the number of the stencil that appears 
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APPENDIX 5 : FLETCHER'S TABLE OF THE STAGES OF SUPPORT BETWEEN 
INDEPENDENTS. 
TABLE ONE 
STAGES OF SUPPORT BETWEEN INDEPENDENTS 




RESPECT & REASSURANCE 
Contacting and Relating What 	 kind of support? 
2 11  V V Problem Stating What priorities? 
3 Searching What preferences? 
4 V y 	
)( 
Suggesting What 	 possibilities? 
5 Trying What resources? 
6 Y y 	 V Improving What criticisms? 
7 Reinforcing What reforms? 
8 
V 	  Y 	 Nr 
Withdrawing or returning to 
stage 2 
APPENDIX 6 : THE CHILD AT SCHOOL - A NEW BEHAVIOUR SCHEDULE. 
Inner London Education Authority 
Research and Statistics 	 Report 
THE CHILD AT SCHOOL - 
A NEW BEHAVIOUR SCHEDULE 
RS 907/83 
Prepared by Research and Statistics Branch 
Director: Dr. Peter Mortimore 











Copies and further information from: Hazel Pennell, Information Officer, 
Research and Statistics Branch, Addington Street Annexe, London, SE1 TUY. 
Tel: 633 2896 
October 1983. 
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THE CHILD AT SCHOOL - A NEW BEHAVIOUR SCHEDULE 
Introduction 
Behaviour at school affects a pupil's opportunities for learning and 
development. Pupils whose behaviour is regarded as 'disturbed', 'disruptive' or 
'maladjusted' have been shown to be at risk of poor educational attainment (1) 
and it was for this reason that the Plowden report (1967) recommended that 
'disturbed' pupils should be one of the criteria used to identify educational 
priority schools and areas. In addition to the consequences for the individual, 
behaviour problems also diminish the educational opportunities for other pupils 
in the classroom and contribute to teacher stress. To prevent these adverse 
effects, early identification of poorly adjusted pupils is clearly of 
importance. 
In this paper, we use the phrase 'adjustment to school' rather than 'disturbed' 
or 'disruptive' behaviour. A pupil's behaviour at school is the result of many 
influences; the teachers, the school as well as personality and home background 
factors. The concept of adjustment to school refers to the extent to which the 
pupil's behaviour conforms to the expectations of the school, without suggesting 
that the roots of such behaviour lie either with the pupil or with the school. 
Measuring adjustment to school raises a number of problems. It is, in theory, 
possible to observe and measure the frequency and intensity of certain 
behaviours by objective means. Such an approach however, ignores the context in 
which behaviour takes place and the possibility that a given form of behaviour 
may be appropriate in certain settings but inappropriate in others. Furthermore, 
observation is time-consuming and not a practical option for screening large 
numbers of pupils. 
In practice, pupil behaviour is usually assessed by means of rating scales 
completed by teachers. The Bristol Social Adjustment Guides and the Rutter B(2) 
scale are perhaps two of the best known and most widely used in educational 
research. Ratings on such scales are, of course, essentially subjective but in 
one sense this subjectivity is an asset. Teachers tend to rate a pupil's 
behaviour in relation to the behaviour they expect of the class. In other words, 
they make an assessment of the pupil's adjustment to these norms of behaviour. 
This paper reports on the development of a new rating scale to measure pupils' 
adjustment to school: the 'Child at School' (CAS) schedule. This schedule was 
devised for the ILEA Junior School Project which is following a sample of pupils 
through their career at junior school. Subsequently it was also used to collect 
behavioural data from all ILEA schools for the Authority's Educational Priority 
(EP) Indices. 
In view of the number of behaviour rating schedules which already exist, it may 
be asked why it was necessary to devise a new schedule. Most of the schedules we 
(1) For example, Davie, Butler and Goldstein (1972) found an association between 
maladjustment and low reading attainment in children in the National Child 
Development Survey. 
- 1 - 
196 
examined, however, were found to have disadvantages for large scale screening of 
pupils by teachers. 
An obvious disadvantage of many schedules is their length. A schedule of thirty 
or more items with multiple response answers for each item (eg the Child in 
School schedule of the Bristol Social Adjustment Guides) takes considerable time 
to complete. Completing such a schedule for all the pupils in the class can be 
an arduous task and accuracy may suffer as a result. 
A second disadvantage of many behaviour schedules is that they concentrate on 
negative aspects of behaviour. Teachers do not have the opportunity of 
identifying pupils who are particularly well adjusted. This was one of the main 
concerns raised by ILEA teachers about the Rutter B(2) scale when this was used 
as a measure of pupil behaviour in the Educational Priority Index. 
For longitudinal studies investigating change in pupil behaviour over time, it 
is necessary to have a behaviour schedule which is applicable to a wide age 
range. Schedules which depend on the identification of behaviours appropriate or 
inappropriate for a particular age group are not suitable for this purpose. 
Finally, in order to assess adjustment to school, it is important to have a 
schedule which relates to behaviour at school. Schedules which ask for global 
judgements about, or interpretations of the child's behaviour are not suitable 
for this purpose. Such schedules often demand a level of psychological knowledge 
which the ordinary classroom teacher cannot be expected to possess. 
The CAS schedule was designed to overcome these disadvantages. It is short and 
simple to complete. The items allow for a positive as well as negative 
assessment of pupil adjustment. Because the schedule is based on judgements 
about behaviour rather than measurement of behaviour itself, it is applicable to 
a wide age range. The judgements which teachers are asked to make relate to the 
school context and cover aspects of behaviour with which teachers should be 
familiar. 
Description of the Child at School (CAS) Schedule 
The CAS schedule consists of nine items focussing on the pupil's temperament, 
approach to learning and social behaviour in a school context. Teachers are 
asked to make direct judgements of the child's behaviour based on their 
knowledge of the child and of other children of the same age. 
The CAS schedule is reproduced below. In design and in the selection of some of 
the items, use was made of the Classroom Observation Procedure behaviour 
schedule (COP) developed by the ILEA Schools Psychological Service. Some of the 
items of the CAS are based directly on the COP, although these and other items 
were modified and revised in the light of comments from teachers participating 
in a pilot study. 
The items are scored on a five—point scale with the scoring reversed for items 
2,4 and 8 so that a low score on each item reflects good adjustment and a high 
score, poor adjustment. 
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Thl CHILD AT SCHOOL 
This observation schedule consists of pairs of statements. Each pair covers a particular 
aspect of the child's temperament and disposition, learning skills, or social behaviour. 
It is important, before filling in the schedule, to read All the statements carefully. It 
is, however, also necessary, when rating a child's behaviour, to consider each pair of 
statements SEPARATELY AND ENDEPENEENTLY of all the others. 
Judgements should be made on the basis of your personal knowledge and experience of children 
of this age - not just in the context of this particular Hass. You should also attempt to 
base judgements on your own knowledge of the child, not on what other teachers say. 
For each pair of statements: 
Tick 1 if Statement A is true of the child ALL CR MCST CF THE TIME 
Tick 2 if Statement A is USUALLY TRUE of the child. 
Tick 3 if the child's behaviour can be best described as falling exactly between the 
two statements, or if he/she is sometimes one and sometimes the other. 
Tick 4 if Statement B is USUALLY TRUE of the child. 




1 	 2 	 3 	 4 	 5 
	
Statement B 
	 I cc I  
1 A happy and contented 
	
An unhappy, anxious or 
child. 	 worried child. 	 131 
2 Has difficulties in 	 Copes easily with new 
coping with new 	 situations or people. 	 32 
situations or people. 
3 Even-tempered, easy- 	 Irritable or quarrel- 
going child. 	 some. 	 33 
4 Cannot concentrate 	 Can concentrate on any 
on any particular 	 task. NOt easily 
task. Easily 	 distracted. 	 34 
distracted. 
5 Eager to learn; 	 Shows little interest, 
curious and inquiring 	 curiosity or motivation 
child. 	 in learning. 	 35 
6 Perseveres in the 	 . I Lacks perseverance. 
face of difficult 	 Is impatient with 
or challenging work 
	
difficult or challenging 
work. 	 36 
7 Helpful and 
	
Btfllies or is spiteful 
considerate towards 	 towards other children. 	 137 
other children. 
8 Solitary, withdrawn 	 A sociable, friendly 
child. 	 child. 	 138 
9 Readily accepts 	 I Is generally disruptive, 
limits, discipline 	 unco-operative, or 
and control 
	
I disobedient. 	 39 
Scoring the CAS  
How the CAS should be scored depends on the purpose for which the schedule is to 
be used. For diagnostic purposes, the scores on the individual items are of 
interest and the schedule can be seen as a profile of the child's adjustment in 
different areas. For research and survey work, however, a profile is cumbersome 
and a summary score of the individual items may be required. 
Two approaches to scoring the schedule have been investigated. The first 
approach is norm-based. Scores on the individual items were added together to 
give a total out of 45. A table of percentile equivalents to the distribution of 
total scores was drawn up. By reference to this table, it is possible to 
discover for example whether a pupil's score places him/her in the top 'best' 
10% or bottom 'worst' 10% on the schedule. Such an approach to scoring assumes 
that the a single dimension underlies the ratings assigned to pupils. 
The second approach to scoring was developed after principal components analysis 
of the scores on the individual items had revealed that the items could be 
grouped into three clusters or subscales. A high score on one of these subscales 
was taken to indicate poor adjustment in a particular area. 
Sample  
The CAS was completed for all first year junior pupils (aged 7-8) and all first 
year secondary pupils (aged 11-12) in November 1981, as part of the data 
collection for the construction of the Authority's Educational Priority Indices. 
This provided a data base of 17,780 junior pupils and 19,763 secondary pupils 
when all pupils with incompletely filled in CAS schedules had been excluded. 
Analysis of the CAS scores was based on these groups. 
Scoring on the individual CAS items  
Table 1 shows the mean scores and standard deviations obtained by the junior and 
secondary pupils on each of the CAS items (1) 
(1) Items are scored out of 5 with a minimum score of 1 (not 0). A high score 
indicates poor adjustment and vice versa. 




1 - Means and standard deviations of CAS items 
Junior Pupils 
Mean 	 SD 
Secondary Pupils 
Mean 	 SD 
1 2.13 1.09 2.03 1.05 
2 2.54 1.23 2.42 1.20 
3 2.09 1.09 1.99 1.05 
4 2.73 1.29 2.52 1.22 
5 2.31 1.13 2.21 1.07 
6 2.66 1.21 2.45 1.13 
7 2.11 1.01 2.01 0.96 
8 2.14 1.05 2.17 1.08 
9 1.85 1.05 1.79 1.01 
N 
	
17780 	 19763 
( Scoring on items 2,4,8 has been reversed.) 
The distributions of scores on all items were skewed towards the lower end of 
the rating scale ie. to 'good adjustment'. The mean scores lie mainly in the 
range 2-3 and indicate that good adjustment in the area measured by the item was 
'usually true' of the average child. In contrast, a rating of 4 or 5 on an item 
is equivalent to scoring two standard deviations above the mean ie. is highly 
'a-typical', thus supporting the interpretation that such ratings indicate 
comparatively poor adjustment. 
Correlations between items 
The inter-item correlation matrix showed significant positive associations 
between all items in the schedule and between individual items and total score 
(all items added together) on the schedule. Table 2 shows the correlations for 
junior pupils. Those for secondary pupils were similar. 
Table 2 - Correlations between items and total score - junior pupils 
Item 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Total score 0.77 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.78 0.70 0.72 
Item 
1 0.63 0.61 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.65 0.44 
2 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.43 0.59 0.38 
3 0.48 0.45 0.52 0.75 0.47 0.69 
4 0.67 0.76 0.50 0.39 0.50 
5 0.75 0.50 0.49 0.46 
6 0.56 0.44 0.53 
7 0.48 0.70 
8 0.34 
As all items correlate positively with total score on the scale, the total score 
can reasonably be used as an indicator of general adjustment. 
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Distribution of total scores  
Figure 1 	 shows the percentile 	 equivalents of total 
	 scores for the 
	 junior and 
secondary pupils respectively. The possible range of scores is 9-45. 
Figure 1 - Percentile equivalents of CAS scores 
Score 	 Junior Pupils 	 Secondary Pupils 
45 100 100 
44 100 100 
43 100 100 
42 100 100 
41 99 100 
40 99 99 
39 99 99 
38 98 99 
37 98 98 
36 97 98 
35 96 97 
34 95 97 
33 94 96 
32 92 94 
31 91 93 
30 89 91 
29 86 89 
28 83 87 
27 81 85 
26 77 81 
25 73 78 
24 70 74 
23 65 71 
22 61 67 
21 57 62 
20 52 58 
19 48 53 
18 43 48 
17 38 43 
16 34 38 
15 30 34 
14 26 30 
13 22 25 
12 18 21 
11 14 16 
10 11 12 
9 8 9 
The mean score for juniors was 20.58 with a standard deviation of 7.78. For 
secondary pupils the mean score was 19.60 with a standard deviation of 7.48. 
Both the junior and secondary distributions were positively skewed 




For some purposes, it may be necessary to determine cut-off points to 
distinguish pupils who are 'well adjusted' or 'poorly adjusted' from the rest of 
the pupils. The ILEA educational priority indices include a measure of the 
proportion of pupils whose behaviour at school can be classified as 'poorly 
adjusted'. Another example where cut-off points might be useful is if the 
schedule is used for initial screening of pupils to identify any who may need 
extra attention or help. 
The cut-off points are, of course, arbitrary and depend on how the information 
is to be used. In the educational priority exercise, it was necessary to 
identify pupils who were poorly adjusted. In the past, the Rutter 
	 B(2) scale 
had been used as a measure of adjustment and on this scale roughly 20% of junior 
pupils were found to have abnormal scores, using the scoring criteria for the 
B(2) scale. Our initial plan was therefore to use 20% cut-off points on the CAS 
schedule. A 207 cut-off point on the percentile distribution of CAS scores is 
equivalent to a score of 28 or above for juniors and a score of 27 or above for 
secondary pupils. This, however, presented a conceptual problem. A score of 27 
on the CAS could be composed of nine ratings of 3. However 3 is the mid-point of 
the rating scale for each item. Is it valid to designate a pupil who is given 
'3' ratings on all the items as 'poorly adjusted'? It was this problem that led 
to the search for an alternative method of scoring the CAS. 
An alternative scoring system 
Principal components analysis revealed that three factors between them accounted 
for 80% of the variance in the data. Table 3 shows the varimax rotated factor 
matrix for the junior data. 
Table 3 - Factor loadings of CAS items 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1 0.2167 0.3608 0.7828 
2 0.4003 0.1411 0.7355 
3 0.1954 0.8147 0.3655 
4 0.8302 0.2804 0.2055 
5 0.8028 0.2124 0.3147 
6 0.8273 0.3202 0.2554 
7 0.2808 0.8128 0.2794 
8 0.1947 0.2061 0.8351 
9 0.3162 0.8367 0.1061 
It can be seen that items 4,5 and 6 have a high loading on factor 1. These are 
all items which refer to the pupil's approach to learning. Factor 1 was 
therefore labelled 'learning problems'. Items 3,7 and 9 had high loadings on 
factor 2, which, after inspection of the items was called 'aggressive 
behaviour'. Items 1,2 and 8 had high loading on factor 3 which was called 
'(social) anxiety'. 
What principal components analysis appeared to show was that although all items 
were positively correlated, both with each other and with total score on the CAS 
and there was a tendency for pupils to be seen as generally well or poorly 
adjusted, the items fell into three clusters or subscales. Items 4,5 and 6 
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formed one cluster or subscale, items 3,7 and 9 another, and items 1,2 and 8 a 
third. These subscales were taken to measure the dimensions of learning 
skills-learning problems, co-operative-aggressive behaviour, social/personal 
confidence-anxiety respectively. 
Scoring the subscales  
Scores on the items comprising the three subscales were totalled. 	 A score of 
12 or more (out of a possible score of 15) was taken to indicate poor adjustment 
in the area measured by the subscale in question. The reason for using 12 as a 
cut-off point was based on the rationale of the rating scale, rather than on 
statistical criteria. A score of 12 means that the pupil has to have ratings of 
'4' or '5' (ie the negative pole of the item is 'usually' true or true 'all or 
most of the time' of the child) on at least two of the three items comprising 
the subscale. 
A similar method of scoring is used on the Rutter B(2) scale where items relate 
either to the neurotic or anti-social subscales and pupils are regarded as 
showing some disorder if they score above the cut-off points on either or both 
subscales. 
Table 4 shows the percentage of pupils who were identified as poorly adjusted on 
each of the three subscales. 
Table 4 - Percentage of pupils scoring above cut-off points on subscales of the CAS. 
CAS Subscale 	 Junior Pupils 	 Secondary Pupils 
% 	 % 
Anxiety only 	 2.7 	 3.4 
Aggression only 	 1.7 	 1.3 
Learning Problems only 	 8.8 	 5.2 
Anxiety & Aggression 	 0.4 	 0.2 
Anxiety & Learning 	 2.5 	 1.9 
Aggression & Learning 	 1.8 	 1.6 
Anxiety, Aggression & Learning 	 1.5 	 1.0 





All Aggression 	 5.3 
	
4.2 
All Learning Problems 	 14.5 
	 9.7 
Using the subscales of the CAS, 19.3% of junior pupils and 14.7% of secondary 
pupils were classified as 'poorly adjusted' in one or more areas. Learning 
problems were the most prevalent type of difficulty in both groups 
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Relationship between the two methods of scoring the CAS  
Table 5 - Correlations between subscale scores and total score (Juniors) 
Total Score Anxiety 	 Aggression 
Anxiety 	 0.85 





Learning 	 0.88 	 0.62 
	
0.62 
One question of interest was whether the use of total scores as an index of poor 
adjustment identified the same pupils as the use of the three subscales, or 
whether the former failed to identify pupils with adjustment problems in 
particular areas. 
On the percentile distribution, 19% of junior pupils scored 28 or more. 
Similarly 19.3% of junior pupils had scores of 12 or above on one or more of the 
CAS subscales. Table 6 shows the extent to which the pupils identified by the 
two scoring systems were the same. 
Table 6 - Comparison between two methods of scoring the CAS 
Total CAS Score 
28-45 	 9-27 
N 	 % 
	
818 5.7 	 13528 94.3 
	
300 61.6 
	 187 38.4 
	
253 84.1 	 48 15.9 
	
1018 65.2 
	 544 34.8 
	
65 100.0 	 0 0.0 
	
436 99.8 	 1 0.2 
	
324 100.0 	 0 0.0 
	
258 100.0 	 0 0.0 
	
3472 19.5 	 14308 80.5 
CAS subscale 
Score of 12+ on ... 




Anxiety & Aggression 
Anxiety & Learning 
Aggression & Learning 
Anx,Agg,Learning 
Total Pupils 
The results show considerable agreement between the methods of scoring; 91% of 
junior pupils would have been classified in the same way by either method. In 
particular, all except one of the pupils who scored 12 or above on two or more 
of the subscales had total CAS scores of 28 or more. A high percentage (84%) of 
the pupils who scored 12 or more on the aggression subscale only also had total 
CAS scores of 28 or more. The main discrepancy between the scoring methods was 
with pupils who scored 12 or more only on the anxiety subscale or on the 
learning subscale. More than a third of these had total CAS scores of less than 
28. 
This analysis suggests that pupils seen as manifesting aggressive behaviour also 
tend to be rated relatively negatively in other areas giving them a high total 
score. Many of the pupils manifesting learning problems or social anxiety are 
relatively well adjusted in other areas, however, and are not identified if 
total scores are used as an index of poor adjustment. 
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The results of secondary pupils are not presented here but were broadly similar 
to those of the junior pupils. 
Differences between junior and secondary pupils  
Although the pattern of results for junior and secondary pupils was similar, 
indicating that the schedule could be used successfully with both groups, there 
were statistically significant differences in the mean scores obtained on the 
individual items and in the mean total scores. With the exception of item 8, 
secondary pupils were rated more positively (ie as better adjusted) than junior 
pupils. The mean total score for secondary pupils (19.60) was significantly 
lower than that for junior pupils (20.58). Fewer secondary pupils (14.7%) than 
junior pupils (19.3%) were identified as poorly adjusted on the CAS subscales. 
In particular there was a large difference (4.8%) between the percentage of 
secondary and junior pupils seen as having learning problems. 
These findings are open to various interpretations. It is possible that 
adjustment to school improves with age or with length of schooling. Another 
possibility is that the most poorly adjusted pupils are referred to special 
education and are no longer part of the cohort when it reaches secondary school. 
It is also possible that secondary teachers use a different frame of reference 
from junior teachers when assessing pupils . Further investigation is needed to 
establish which of these explanations is the most plausible. The ILEA junior 
school project which is following a sample of pupils through junior school may 
be able to provide some answers; pupils in the sample are reassessed on the CAS 
in the Autumn and Summer term of each year. 
Validity and reliability of the CAS  
The items in the CAS are judgements made about pupils by the teacher, rather 
than descriptions of specific measurable behaviours. Because of this, it is 
difficult to find external criteria against which to assess the validity of the 
ratings. The schedule is best seen as a measure of teacher perception of pupil 
adjustment. It is, after all, how the pupil is perceived by teachers that-
influences the way s/he is treated by those teachers at school. Behaviour 
schedules relying on teacher perception of pupil adjustment have been used 
successfully by Thompson (1975) to assess whether adjustment to school was 
affected by prior attendance at nursery school or class and by Hughes, Pinkerton 
and Plewis (1979) to study children's difficulties on starting infant school. 
The CAS is similar in concept to the schedules used in these studies. 
Of course it is important to establish that the items on the CAS are meaningful, 
not ambiguous and are interpreted consistently and in the same way by all 
teachers. In other words, that the inter-rater and test-retest reliability of 
the schedule is satisfactory. 
It was not possible to calculate reliability from the EP data as each pupil was 
only rated once by one teacher. However, before the CAS was used in the EP 
survey, a preliminary study involving eight teachers and 130 first year junior 
pupils was carried out. 
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To calculate inter-rater reliability, 84 of these pupils were each rated by two 
different teachers. Test-retest reliability was based on 214 ratings (1) of 
pupils repeated after an interval of 4-5 weeks. 
Table 7 - Reliability of the CAS 
r 	 A 	 N 
Inter-rater reliability 	 0.71 	 0.83 	 84 
Test-retest reliability 	 0.84 	 0.91 	 214 
r= Pearson correlation coefficient 
A= Co-efficient of agreement 
Two measures were used to calculate the reliability of the scale: the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient which is the usual measure employed for 
this purpose and the Coefficient of Agreement (A) (2). The latter appeared more 
appropriate to us as it reflects directly the degree of agreement between 
ratings, whereas the product-moment coefficient reflects the extent to which the 
two sets of ratings are linearly related. The coefficient of agreement varies 
from 0 (when the scores given by each pair of ratings differ maximally) to 1 
(when the scores given by each pair of ratings are identical). Both the 
inter-rater and the test-retest reliabilities of the scale, as measured by the 
two coefficients, were satisfactory. 
Uses of the CAS 
The CAS was developed because there was felt to be a need for a short behaviour 
schedule which would assess some of the more important aspects of children's 
adjustment to school and could be used with a wide age range by ordinary 
classroom teachers. The analyses performed on the data obtained from the EP 
survey suggested that the CAS can be used both as a measure of general 
adjustment to school and, by the use of subscales, as a measure of adjustment in 
different areas. Teachers did not experience any difficulty in completing the 
schedule and many found the CAS simpler and more relevant than other behaviour 
schedules they had used in the past. 
In the ILEA, the CAS now forms part of the information collected on pupils for 
the construction of educational priority indices. It is also being used in an 
ILEA research project following a sample of pupils through their career at 
junior school (the ILEA Junior School Project). This project should provide 
valuable information on the stability of the behaviour measured by the CAS 
schedule and on the feasibility of using the CAS for a large scale screening 
programme aimed at the early identification of pupils with adjustment 
difficulties. 
So far, the practical use of the CAS in the ILEA has been limited to identifying 
pupils with poor adjustment. It is, however, equally possible to use the 
(1) 84 pupils each rated by two teachers plus 46 pupils rated by one teacher 
(2) Mathematically, the coefficient of agreement A is derived from 
A = (rl 	 1)/2, where rl is the inter-class correlation coefficient. See 'The 
statistical measurement of Agreement', W.S. Robinson, A.S.Review, Feb 1957. 
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schedule to identify well adjusted pupils in order, for example, to see how good 
adjustment affects school progress. 
Summary 
The 'Child at School' is a new observation schedule for teachers which gives 
information on children's adjustment to school. There are three subscales 
assessing learning difficulties, anxiety and aggressive behaviour respectively. 
The schedule consists of nine items and has been used successfully by teachers 
with junior and with first year secondary pupils. 
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REPERTORY GRID TECHNIQUE  
Name: ....... 
	 0-0 	 0 	 .0 0 °Age: 	 0 	 0 	 0 .Examiner:.... — 0. „ 	 .00 0. 
Date Tested.  000.„.....-0000000.000.0-000.0.0.00-00 
Given and elicited constructs: 
1. Which one do you think makes friends most easily? 
2. Which one annoys teachers most? 
3. Which one is best at learning things at school? 
14 Which one is most like you'd like to be? 
5. Which one is really most like you? 





ABCDEFGH 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Friends 1 
2 Annoys 2 
3 Learning 3 
4 Wish 4 
5 "Like me" 5 
WORK SPACE: 
APPENDIX 8 : TABLES OF RESULTS. 







to 3 indicate 
to school, ratings 
15 indicate problems. 
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i .ouisc 5 	 9 3 	 6 6 	 10 .17 	 .88 .24 	 .98 .14 	 .71 .31 	 .60 .21 	 .76 .26 	 .90 .36 	 .64 
ADJUSTMENT TO SCHOOL : 
	 SECONDARY CONTROL GROUP 
PUPILS' NAMES 
Ratings closer to 3 indicate 
adjustment to school, ratings 
closer to 15 indicate problems. 



























social co-operative learning social co-operative learning social co-operative learning 
constructs 
confidence behaviour skills confidence behaviour ' skills confidence behaviour skills 
1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1936 
Leslie 11 	 10 6 	 4 15 	 11 .86 	 .79 .81 	 .74 .93 	 .67 .57 	 1.00 .60 	 .76 .62 	 .55 .69 	 .7'1 
Joseph 3 	 7 5 	 7 7 	 12 .83 	 .76 .74 	 .24 .93 	 .71 .93 	 .86 .74 	 .19 .95 	 .86 .95 	 .9- 
::tnart 4 	 4 5 	 4 6 	 7 .86 	 .95 .31 	 .90 .81 	 .86 .86 	 .95 .43 	 .61 .69 	 .76 .93 	 .9.; 
;irtin 9 	 9 7 	 10 9 	 12 .33 	 .60 .55 -.43 .69 	 .55 .69 	 .69 .40 	 .29 .45 	 .64 .90 	 .3.. 
Ji.:;e1 5 	 6 5 	 7 5 	 7 .67 	 .86 -.67 	 .60 .14 	 .60 .57 	 .60 .36 	 .10 -.14 	 .24 .81 	 .7'.,  
;girth 9 	 6 6 	 6 8 	 11 .36 	 .74 -.14 -.21 .07 	 .48 .24 	 .76 .10 -.29 .17 	 .24 .90 	 .ii 
iklroien 9 	 9 3 	 6 4 	 12 .88 	 .83 .08 	 .69 .76 	 .62 .79 	 .40 .79 	 .21 .62 	 .29 .86 	 ..:; 
;(--)rclon 3 	 il 3 	 4 6 	 9 0.00 	 .62 .43 	 .83 .29 	 .83 .40 	 .95 .60 	 .60 .19 	 .81 .71 	 .6'., 
AlliaM 12 	 11 5 	 4 5 	 6 .90 	 .81 .76 	 .50 .83 	 .50 .90 	 .95 .95 	 .86 1.00 	 .86 .83 	 .7' 
?nula 6 	 6 4 	 8 8 	 8 .83 	 .52 .52 	 .31 .24 	 .33 .50 	 .50 .14 	 .55 .62 	 .62 .62 	 .T0 
Leanne 12 	 11 11 	 10 9 	 11 .76 	 .64 .79 	 .17 .48 	 .24 .60 	 .74 .81 	 .29 .96 -.07 .38 
	 - 
,i,ir.2:ot 5 	 6 . 3 	 3 5 	 6 .52 	 .91) .40 	 .69 .29 	 .57 .88 	 .86 .83 	 .86 .81 	 .86 .57 	 .,*),; 
Linda 6 	 8 ii 	 5 7 	 6 .88 	 .71 .93 -.67 .62 	 .50 .76 	 .81 .76 	 .10 .31 	 .43 .03 	 .71:, 
Anne 5 	 3 3 	 6 7 	 9 .98 	 .86 .67 	 .62 .79 	 .83 .90 	 .79 .45 	 .81 .64 	 .69 .95 	 .;. 
Lisa 8 	 9 5 	 5 9 	 12 .05 	 .64 -.48 -.29 -.55 	 .36 0.00 	 .33 -.55 -.38 -.69 -.36 .90 	 .0:- 
kuth 12 	 6 5 	 6 7 	 12 .71 	 .76 -.07 	 .05 .74 	 .83 .33 	 .76 -.45 
	
.05 .36 	 .83 Ai. 	
.'j 
.:pristine 5 	 5 3 	 3 7 	 7 .95 	 .48 .19 -.50 -.76 -.33 .98 	 .45 .52 -.52 -.57 -.40 .9u 	 .9'; 
Diane 7 	 7 5 	 5 7 	 8 .83 	 .60 .81 	 .76 .60 	 .83 .60 	 .62 .67 	 .81 	 • .43 	 .67 .50 	 .8"?. 
Victoria 9 	 7 5 	 7 6 	 11 .60 	 .88 .12 	 .60 .52 	 .64 .67 	 .69 .33 	 .17 .55 	 .48 .88 	 .8': 
ADJUSTMErT TO SCHOOL : 	 PRIMARY EXPERIMENTAL GROUP "A" 
PUPILS' NAMES 
Ratings closer to 3 indicate 
adjustment to school, ratings 
closer to 15 indicate problems. 



























social co-operative learning social co-operative learning social co-operative learning constructs 
confidence behaviour skills confidence behaviour ' skills confidence behaviour skills 
1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 
ilichael 4 	 6 8 	 10 14 	 11 .83 	 .86 .81 -.02 .67 	 .48 .64 	 .67 .24 -.33 .36 	 .21 .40 	 .6,; 
Lewis 15 	 10 6 	 7 12 	 11 .62 	 .81 .74 	 .95 -.05 	 .67 .07 	 .60 .19 	 .57 -.38 	 .52 .64 	 .6Y 
:11:1 4 	 11 5 	 10 6 	 12 .67 	 .81 .86 	 .43 .90 	 .76 .74 	 .74 .68 	 .36 .93 	 .69 .96 	 .9"- 
Thane 14 	 10 10 	 10 9 	 11 -.81 	 .38 .83 	 .24 .95 	 .14 .14 -.67 -.10 	 .10 -.24 	 .36 . -.33 	 .07 
Ominic 12 	 11 5 	 6 12 	 8 .90 	 .79 .79 	 .38 .95 	 .12 .14 	 .86 .12 	 .26 .12 	 .40 .31 
	 .01 
Javii:s 15 	 13 7 	 11 9 	 11 -.14 -.14 -.29 	 .21 -.24 -.07 -.24 	 .02 -.67 	 .43 -.67 	 .38 .57 	 .6. 
;Iaron 8 	 8 4 	 5 6 	 8 .24 	 .76 .31 	 .76 .83 	 .24 .71 	 .76 0.00 	 .74 .33 	 .40 .71 
	 .9.:. 
Moira 4 	 3 7 	 4 12 	 10 .64 	 .86 .95 	 .05 .74 	 .88 .62 	 .79 .98 	 .19 .71 	 .86 .98 	 .97,  
,!::anda 10 	 9 6 	 5 9 	 7 .33 	 .88 -.38 	 .60 .83 	 . .60 .55 	 .64 -.21 	 .31 0.00 	 .55 .31 	 .7i; 
Ti nn 11 	 6 9 	 9 12 	 7 .60 	 .86 .62 	 .98 .88 	 .93 .69 	 .76 .57 	 .93 .95 	 .90 .c.F) 	 .. 
rrudv 14 	 10 9 	 9 15 	 11 .61 	 .57 .60 	 .90 .36 	 .55 -.43 	 .48 .07 	 .63 -.21 	 .50 -.24 	 .v‘) 
:;nchel 6 	 11 4 	 5 12 	 9 .45 	 .90 -.05 	 .38 .38 	 .90 -.07 	 .33 .07 	 .07 .14 	 .36 -.07 	 .14 
ADJUSTMENT TO SCHOOL : 







to 3 indicate 
to school, ratings 
15 indicate problems. 

































confidence behaviour skills confidence behaviour ' skills confidence behaviour skills 
1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 
tl7ireth 7 	 7 5 	 12 10 	 9 .33 	 .81 .76 	 .57 .64 	 .14 -.21 -.02 
-.05 -.33 -.52 -.45 -.05 	 .1/; 
,orris 11 	 12 5 	 6 7 	 12 .83 	 .71 .61 	 .67 .81 	 .74 .40 -.19 .55 -.17 .55 -.07 .7/1 	 -.!1•; 
:;i11:.1 6 	 6 5 	 9 8 	 8 .69 	 .36 .43 0.00 .31 	 .86 .31 	 .62 .05 -.14 -.31 	 .68 .52 	 .,; 
Lucy 6 	 4 8 	 7 3 	 11 .76 	 .33 .83 	 .67 .76 	 .74 .86 
	 .55 .93 	 .98 .36 	 .55 .61 	 .74 
;lynor 7 	 5 6 	 6 7 	 6 .93 	 .79 -.60 -.21 -.67 -.43 .45 	 .90 -.57 -.26 -.21 -.62 .113 	 .- 	 , 
Alice 4 	 6 11 	 9 6 	 8 .36 	 .83 .43 	 .71 -.17 	 .86 .71 	 .69 .74 	 .86 .43 	 .90 .52 
1•;y 
iliJcla 
6 	 3 
6 	 4 
3 	 5 
8 	 3 
5 	 8 
6 	 7 
	
.90 	 .79 
	
.74 	 .69 
	
.50 	 .90 
	
.43 	 .55 
	
.90 	 .69 
	
.62 	 .79 
	
.93 	 .76 
	
.69 	 .71 
	
.69 	 .95 
	
.48 	 .60 
	




.63 	 . 	 , 
.90 
T,:sa 6 	 5 3 	 3  3 	 4 .71 	 .88 .95 	 .93 .88 	 .98 .93 	 .81 .90 	 .66 .79 	 .74 .33 
	
.7 
12:A-(:31 3 	 4 3 	 4 3 	 10 .86 	 .79 .14 	 .48 .79 	 .71 .45 	 .05 .611 	 .71 .46 	 .40 .36 	 -.0.: 
Linyl 9 	 9 5 	 9 12 	 10 .93 	 .64 -.26 	 .90 .29 	 .69 .83 	 .90 -.14 	 .86 .12 
	 .69 .93 	 .61 
f)onmi 10 	 10 
• 
5 	 11 4 	 6 .71 
	 .69 -.64 -.71 .52 -.10 -.38 	 .10 .33 	 .02 .26 	 .60 .12 	 .5:, 
_ _ 
ADJUSTMENT TO SCHOOL : 







to 3 indicate 
to school, ratings 
15 indicate problems. 

































confidence behaviour skills confidence behaviour ' skills confidence behaviour skills 
1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1981! 	 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1936 
4 
Abi.21i1 :3 	 7 4 	 6 5 	 5 .79 
	 .95 .79 	 .24 .50 	 .90 .69 
	 .88 .50 	 .26 .30 	 .86 .67 	 .8;) 
ilthan 8 




:;ordon 10 	 14 6 	 10 12 	 14 .52 	 .74 .74 	 .52 .i38 	 .90 -.33 	 .52 -.57 	 .43 -.55 
	 .61 -.45 	 .,., 
,J.r.sty 9 	 6 7 	 4 6 	 4 .90 	 .90 .01 	 .74 .83 	 .83 .48 	 .83 .14 	 .95 .10 	 .79 .19' 	 .6',  
A,Aelia 3 	 8 3 	 11 3 	 6 .90 	 .93 .36 	 .83 .74 	 .83 .88 -.05 .07 	 .14 .46 -.10 .93 	 .12 
:;i4ion 
r,ou;las 
5 	 6 
7 	 9 
	
6 	 4 
	
13 	 7 
8 	 8 
6 	 8 
	
.83 	 .67 
	
.81 	 .14 
	
.79 	 .86 
	
.26 	 .31 
	
.90 	 .93 
	
.24 	 .71 
	
.90 	 .67 
	
.02 	 .24 
.83 	 .67 
-.36 -.07 
	
.95 	 .79 
	





.40 	 .7' 







to 3 indicate 
to school, ratings 
15 indicate problems. 

































confidence behaviour skills confidence behaviour ' skills confidence behaviour skills 
1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 1984 1986 
Award 3 	 3 4 	 6 6 	 7 .71 	 .83 .67 	 .93 .62 	 .86 .90 	 .69 .60 	 .60 .67 	 .45 .69 	 .64 
:ircus 3 	 11 5 	 5 4 	 4 .31 -.50 .36 -.21 .43 0.00 -.33 -.12 .10 -.67 -.1!! -.33 .62 	 .12 
'limns 6 	 9 5 	 4 6 	 7 .81 	 .81 .95 	 .67 .67 	 .14 .60 	 .90 .57 	 .33 .52 	 .31 .67 	 .31 
:_tike 5 	 4 6 	 3 9 	 11 .74 	 .93 .90 	 .95 1.00 	 ..33 .67 	 .93 .90 	 .93 .95 	 .95 .95 	 .90 
nrk 6 	 8 11 	 3 6 	 3 .71 	 .67 .81 	 .74 .81 	 .64 .52 	 .74 .71 	 .62 .79 	 .76 .74 	 .6') 
Ivor 4 	 5 3 	 3 4 	 7 .98 	 .83 -.40 	 .21 -.38 	 .36 .90 	 .67 -.36 	 .14 -.38 	 .43 .95 	 .79 
'ticiiird d 	 10 7 	 11 6 	 9 .19 	 .71 .55 	 .64 .67 	 .33 -.19 	 .29 .19 	 .14 -.55 -.07 -.40 	 .03 










1964 	 1986 
R 
Arithmetic 
1984 	 1906 
BEALE ANALYSIS 
Accuracy 
1984 	 1986 
OF READING 
Comprehension 
1984 	 1986 
Verbal 
1984 	 1986 
A.B. 	 2/3 
Numerical 
1904 	 1986 
Perceptual. 
1904 	 15:: 
Jonathan 06.01.72 12.09 10 12 08 08 09.01 11.03 10.01 12.07 01 17 00 15 15 2t) 
David 30.04.72 12.06 14 13 12 17 11.11 12.06 12.00 12.05 15 22 17 31 20 31 
Justin 13.06.72 12.04 09 12 08 10 12.01 12.08 12.01 12.04 22 23 11 12 16 25 
Granaqi 25.00.72 12.02 10 12 07 09 09.04 12.01 10.01 12.06 11 14 04 05 13 26 
Adrian 26.12.71 12.10 09 10 08 12 08.09 10.11 09.01 11.06 06 10 12 14 18 27 
Robert 16.09.71 13.01 10 10 10 11 12.02 13.00 11.10 12.08 20 20 19 23 23 30 
Steven 03.05.72 12.06 06 11 08 12 12.01 13.00 11.10 12.06 16 18 04 07 17 20 
Charles 18.12.71 12.10 07 06 07 07 09.03 09.06 11.06 11.10 05 15 05 08 12 21 
Gary 26.05.72 12.05 08 09 09 13 11.08 12.06 11.03 12.00 16 17 13 15 19 22 
Katherine 22.10.71 13.00 09 09 07 07 10.09 11.11 10.10 12.05 09 18 07 13 10 2u 
Trudy 27.11.71 12.11 10 12 10 11 11.03 12.04 11.04 12.06 19 23 10 18 21 2.3 
Vivien 01.05.72 12.06 11 11 14 17 09.03 10.08 10.10 12.06 16 20 13 22 23 25 
Lorna 12.09.71 13.01 00 12 09 14 11.11 12.04 10.01 11.01 11 19 09 16 16 23 
Angela 03.12.71 12.11 09 12 09 14 11.07 12.06 10.01 11.08 15 21 17 26 19 29 
Natalie 23.04.72 12.06 11 07 16 08 09.04 11.06 11.00 12.01 17 20 10 16 17 26 
Susan 24.12.71 12.10 12 13 08 09 11.11 12.07 12.05 12.04 17 22 11 11 20 2,) 
Marie 19.01.72 12.09 11 13 10 11 12.02 13.00 12.00 12.04 16 20 14 13 21 2( 
iar:oret 25.06.72 12.04 12 16 09 17 11.00 12.01 12.03 12.09 19 24 19 26 20 12 
Louise 15.01.72 12.09 12 14 07 09 11.10 12.05 11.01 11.10 16 19 10 14 13 2o 
ABILITY AND ATTAINMENT SCORES 
	










1964 	 1966 
R 
Arithmetic 
1964 	 1986 
WALE ANALYSIS 
Accuracy 
1964 	 1986 
OF READING 
Comprehension 
1984 	 1986 
Verbal 






1964 	 b.,. 
Leslie 04.03.72 12.07 10 08 07 07 12.00 12.06 11.04 12.03 08 10 01 05 06 19 
Josepn 14.03.72 12.07 01 08 08 09 11.06 11.11 10.10 12.02 10 21 06 20 13 23 
Stuart 06.02.72 12.06 11 12 08 09 11.06 12.05 12.01 12.04 16 18 06 06 20 2u 
Jartin 26.05.72 12.04 12 16 12 17 12.05 13.00 12.08 13.00 11 20 11 07 16 24 
0ije1 28.07.72 12.02 09 15 10 13 11.08 12.05 11.02 12.03 19 28 19 20 20 2/ 
Garth 17.12.71 12.10 12 14 12 17 11.08 12.07 12.07 12.09 22 25 17 14 25 36 
Damien 20.06.72 12.011 06 11 09 11 11.06 12.06 12.05 12.06 11 15 09 12 20 21) 
Gordon 13.10.71 13.00 12 12 15 17 12.10 12.02 13.00 12.10 21 30 20 26 19 32 
0illiam 25.05.72 12.04 11 13 14 11 12.06 12.10 11.06 12.08 20 23 20 23 16 22 
Paula 11.02.72 12.08 10 11 11 12 12.04 13.00. 11.02 12.02 16 19 11 15 19 22 
Leanne 01.08.72 12.02 09 09 07 08 08.02 10.11 00.08 12.04 08 14 09 03 18 2,)  
Manzot 26.09.71 13.01 08 10 13 14 12.03 12.08 12.00 12.02 12 24 16 15 21 29 
Linda 18.02.72 12.08 09 12 09 09 12.02 12.01 12.04 12.08 13 19 14 12 21 2u 
Anne 25.03.72 12.07 08 11 07 09 09.04 10.03 09.10 11.01 11 13 09 07 16 25 
Lisa 21'.10.71 13.00 07 09 09 11 09.07 11.01 09.10 11.02 14 19 13 13 19 27 
Ruth 06.04.72 12.06 07 08 07 09 09.06 11.05 08.11 11.06 12 . 	 14 12 10 20 21 
Christine 19.10.71 13.00 10 13 07 09 12.06 13.00 11.01 12.01 15 21 12 18 19 20 
Diane 21.08.72 12.02 09 09 06 10 11.03 11.09 11.05 12.01 15 20 10 05 16 2.3 
victoria 02.10.71 13.00 07 09 07 08 08.04 10.00 08.08 12.01 06 06 07 06 16 • 2:': 










1984 	 1966 
R 
Arithmetic 
1984 	 1986 
NEALE ANALYSIS 
Accuracy 
1984 	 1966 
OF READING 
Comprehension 
1964 	 1986 
Verbal 





1984 	 19.)..) 
t•lichael 17.04.74 10.06 10 13 05 09 08.07 11.01 09.06 12.04 09 11 04 06 07 2u 
Lewis 21.09.73 11.00 06 09 09 12 03.02 08.04 08.05 08.02 08 17 02 13 04 1.) 
Sam 02.04.74 10.06 10 13 09 09 11.04 12.01 08.07 11.01 03 11 06 03 10 20 
Shane 15.05.74 10.05 06 06 06 09 03.11 12.00 07.03 11.04 11 11 07 05 06 07 
Dominic 29.06.74 10.03 14 17 12 13 11.09 12.07 11.06 12.03 09 18 01 17 17 2'2 
James 04.09.73 11.01 08 13 11 13 09.04 11.10 09.05 11.06 04 13 06 10 03 11 
Sharon 28.11.73 10.10 10 14 07 09 10.02 11.08 11.08 12.02 11 26 04 12 19 26 
moira 09.05.74 10.05 10 13 12 07 11.08 12.07 09.06 12.03 12 11 09 00 16 22 
Amanda 04.10.73 11.0() 09 14 09 09 11.02 12.05 10.11 12.03 09 24 05 03 23 21 
Tina 25.12.73 10.09 07 10 11 10 11.08 12.01 08.08 12.02 12 21 10 12 10 1j 
Trudy 18.03.74 10.07 06 09 07 09 07.10 10.10 08.11 10.11 03 12 01 09 06 2'..., 
Rachel 26.01.74 10.08 08 10 10 09 07.09 09.01 08.10 09.06 06 04 00 04 11 20 
ABILITY AND ATTAINMENT SCORES 
	










1984 	 1966 
- R 
Arithmetic 
1984 	 1986 
NEALE ANALYSIS 
Accuracy 
1984 	 1966 
OF READING 
Comprehension 
1984 	 1936 
Verbal 





1934 	 19:)- 
6aretn 18.03.74 10.07 07 10 09 09 09.11 11.11 10.05 12.01 07 16 09 15 03 11 
,iorris 13.05.74 10.05 11 12 12 13 10.10 12.07 12.03 12.10 11 28 09 11 17 2., 
Silas 01.10.73 11.00 08 12 08 10 12.00 13.00 11.10 12.06 13 22 03 13 14 21 
Lucy 12.12.73 10.10 03 12 10 07 11.10 12.03 10.10 12.01 07 21 06 15 11 2:) 
Gaynor 22.02.74 10.08 11 09 11 13 03.07 09.07 09.10 11.01 11 24 09 14 16 2.) 
Alice 07.00.74 10.02 10 15 13 16 11.09 12.07 11.06 12.06 23 29 10 16 19 27 
10'm/ 04.11.73 10.11 10 12 09 10 11.05 12.08 10.06 12.05 11 17 04 13 14 23 
Primela 20.02.74 10.07 oo 10 12 09 10.10 12.01 09.01 12.01 06 18 07 14 19 2o 
Ce33a 09.03.74 10.02 15 18 15 13 12.05 12.07 12.03 12.07 13 24 07 10 17 24 
Feresa 17.03.74 10.07 15 17 16 16 11.03 12.04 12.08 12.09 22 31 15 27 19 30 
1:inya 02.04.74 10.06 10 15 10 14 09.01 11.04 09.01 12.02 10 17 07 06 09 24 
Oonnl 31.12.73 10.09 09 15 09 09 11.11 12.10 12.00 12.07 15 24 07 11 20 1, 
ABILITY AND ATTAINMENT SCORES  PRIMARY EXPERIMENTAL GROUP "B" 













1984 	 1986 
NEALE ANALYSIS 
Accuracy 
1984 	 1986 
OF READING 
Comprehension 
1984 	 1986 
Verbal 
1904 	 1986 




1904 	 19:):, 
Abiail 27.09.73 11.00 00 13 05 14 07.10 11.00 08.02 10.01 17 15 05 06 20 1 7.. 
,:atan 09.07.74 10.03 09 11 08 09 09.06 11.03 08.07 11.00 13 11 03 00 23 27-, 
Gordon 23.01.74 10.10 11 12 09 08 08.11 10.01 08.07 11.06 10 17 10 13 17 2'i 
Kirsty 09.02.74 10.08 06 10 07 10 03.06 09.03 07.10 09.10 13 21 06 13 17 21 
Amelia 25.09.73 11.01 05 05 06 06 08.04 09.05 07.10 08.07 03 07 03 05 06 07 
Simon 03.04.74 10.07 12 13 10 12 11.01 13.00 12.02 12.07 29 19 03 10 20 20 
0ou4as 31.10.73 11.00 11 12 11 09 03.00 09.11 08.11 11.06 06 16 11 14 22 2u 
ABILITY AND ATTAINMENT SCORES 
	
PRIMARY CONTROL GROUP "B" 
. 









1934 	 1936 
R 
Arit'nmetic 
1964 	 1966 
NEALE ANALYSIS 
Accuracy 
1984 	 1966 
OF READING 
Comprehension 
1984 	 1986 
Verbal 






1904 	 19,..) 
,0ward 05.01.74 10.10 09 15 10 12 11.10 12.06 11.08 12.09 14 16 06 00 19 22 
mavens 29.01.74 10.09 09 10 06 05 00.07 10.03 08.10 11.08 07 15 03 09 09 17 
Thowas 01.04.74 10.01 10 10 05 14 09.01 11.11 10.05 12.03 13 15 03 12 19 19 
Lime 23.10.73 11.00 11 12 12 14 12.03 12.10 11.06 11.00 24 21 12 16 19 26 





































APPENDIX 9 : SHAYER AND BEASLEY'S RESULTS. 
TABLE 4 
PRE ANO POST-TEST MEANS ANO MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS 
Experimental 	 Control 
mental 
	 age,years: 
	 lean 	 (S.0.) 
Pre 	 to Post-Test differences 
((E2 	 - 	 C2) 	 - 	 (EI 	 - 	 CI)) 
Test pre post pre post 't'value significance Effect 	 size Mental 	 age Class 	 of 




11,1(1.6) 13.4(1,2) 13,1(1,1) 13,1(1.3) 4.69 .001 1.22 20.1 
Fluid 
Intelligence 





Verbal 	 (v) 10.7(0.5) 11,6(0.9) 10.6(0.6) 11,8(1,1) 
-2.95 .02 0,37 
-3,8 
Crystallised 
Verbal 	 (p) 11,4(0.6) 11,6(1.3) 12.0(1.2) 12,2(1.4) 0 n.s. 0 0 intelligence 
Spatial 9.7(2.6) 10.6(2.2) 8,9(2.0) 9.2(2.3) 1.85 
.1 0.23 8,2 
Reasoning(v) 9.4(2.6) 10.1(0.7) 9,9(1.1) 9.8(1,6) 6.79 ,001 0.98 9.6 
Reasoning(p) 10.6(1,7) 11,3(0.8) 9.7(2,0) 10,9(2.7) -0.84 n.s. -0.26 
- 6.0 




Numbers 9,5(0,9) 9.8(0,6) 9,5(0,8) 9.9(0.7) 0.33 n.s, 0,07 - 0.6 
Neale Reading 
Accuracy 1,8(0,6) 8,3(0,7) 8.1(0.6) 8.4(0.5) 1.71 ,2 0,36 1,8 
Achievement 
Comprehension 8.7(0.5) 9,5(1.1) 9.1(1,0) 9.9(0.8) 0.73 n.s. 0.26 0,4 
Rate 7.1(0.6) 8,9(0.7) 7,5((0,7) 8,4(0.8) 1.53 ,2 0.47 3,5 
NFER Maths 8,6(0.4) 9.6(0.3) 8.4(0.8) 9,3(1,4) 1.45 .2 0.21 1,4 
Attainment 
Richmond 
Basic 	 Skills 
Map Reading 1,71 ,1 0,57 
Graphs and •••• 1,54 .1 0.46 
Tables 
Mean age of 
subiects 
12/4 14/0 12/5 14/1 
223 
APPENDIX 10 : CROSS PARTITIONED TABLES. 
PRT:!ARY PUPILS' "JISHED FOR" RAT-U:; vs. 
Frequencies with which teachers' ratings on the CAS schedule went 
up/stayed the same or went down between 1984 and 1986, and frequencies 
with which pupils' Repertory Grid ratings went up/stayed the same or 
went down between 1984 and 1986, cross-partitioned to display instances 
of agreement and disagreement. 



































































































































































































PRD1ARY PUPILS' "SELF ASS=UT" RATIi!GS vs. Tr',ACHF,RS' RATIUGS 
Frequencies with which teachers' ratings on the CAS schedule went 
up/stayed the same or went down between 1984 and 1986, and frequencies 
with which pupils' Repertory Grid ratings went up/stayed the same or 
went down between 1984 and 1986, cross-partitioned to display instances 
of agreement and disagreement. 
I.E. 	 (N = 	 19) Control (N : 19) 
SOCIAL CONFIDENCE 
Teachers' ratings 
u./same 	 down 
• Teachers' ratings 












































u./same 	 down 
Teachers' ratings 

























































u./same 	 down 
Teachers' ratings 





























































Frequencies with which teachers' ratings on the CAS schedule went 
up/stayed the same or went down between 1984 and 1986, and frequencies 
with which pupils' Repertory Grid ratings went up/stayed the same or 
went down between 1984 and 1986, cross-partitioned to display instances 
of agreement and disagreement. 
• 
I.E. 
	 (N = 
	 19) 
. 4 













• Teachers' ratings 








































































































up/same 	 down 
Teachers' ratings 































































































SCMDARY . -"IPILS' "SELF ASST" RATL!GS vs. T'.ACH!.:RS' qATI'!G 
Frequencies with which teachers' ratings on the CAS schedule went 
up/stayed the same or went down between 1984 and 1986, and frequencies 
with which pupils' Repertory Grid ratings went up/stayed the same or 
went down between 1984 and 1986, cross-partitioned to display instances 
of agreement and disagreement. 






• Teachers' ratings 
sa 	 - 	 ..., 
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.supYsame 	 down 
LEARNING SKILLS 
Teachers' ratings 
up/same 	 down 
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